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Online social networks, such as Facebook and Google+, have been emerging
as a new communication service for users to stay in touch and share information with
family members and friends over the Internet. Since the users are generating huge
amounts of data on social network sites, an interesting question is how to mine this
enormous amount of data to retrieve useful information. Along this direction, social
network analysis has emerged as an important tool for many business intelligence
applications such as identifying potential customers and promoting items based on
their interests. In particular, since users are often interested to make new friends, a
friend recommendation application provides the medium for users to expand his/her
social connections and share information of interest with more friends. Besides this,
it also helps to enhance the development of the entire network structure.
The existing friend recommendation methods utilize social network structure
and/or user profile information. However, these methods can no longer be applica-
ble if the privacy of users is taken into consideration. This work introduces a set of
privacy-preserving friend recommendation protocols based on different existing simi-
larity metrics in the literature. Briefly, depending on the underlying similarity metric
used, the proposed protocols guarantee the privacy of a user’s personal information
such as friend lists. These protocols are the first to make the friend recommendation
process possible in privacy-enhanced social networking environments.
Also, this work considers the case of outsourced social networks, where users’
profile data are encrypted and outsourced to third-party cloud providers who pro-
vide social networking services to the users. Under such an environment, this work
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1. INTRODUCTION
An online social network (OSN) facilitates users to stay in touch with other
users (such as distant family members or friends), easily share information, look for
old acquaintances and establish friendship with new users based on shared inter-
ests. The wide availability of the Internet has resulted in the fast growth of OSNs
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5], such as Google+, Facebook, MySpace, Twitter and LinkedIn, which
resulted in a vast amount of social data containing personal and sensitive information
about individual users. Social network analyses [4, 6] involve mining the social data
to understand user activities and to identify the relationships among various users.
Especially, in applications such as business intelligence, social network analyses have
boosted the research in developing various recommendation algorithms [7, 8]. For
example, an algorithm may recommend a new application to a Facebook user based
on either the applications he/she used in the past or the usage pattern of various
applications used by his/her friends. In general, a recommendation can be a friend, a
product, an ad or even a content potentially relevant to the user. This work focuses
on recommending new friends to a given user in an OSN.
1.1. MOTIVATION
In particular, the friend recommendation application [9] has gained special
importance from both the social network administrators and the users. From the net-
work administrator perspective, recommending potential candidates as new friends
to users will enable the development of the entire network/community since it results
in a more connected network. On the other hand, from the users’ side, friend recom-
mendations help them grow their social contacts and explore for new friends based on
their own interests. In general, the main goal of a friend recommendation algorithm
2is to identify the potential candidates for a given target user (who wish to make new
friends) in an effective manner. Along this direction, much work has been done in
developing various friend recommendation algorithms [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] based on
network topology, user contents or both. In the literature, discovering new friends
to a given user A is equivalent to solving the link prediction [15] problem for A in
the corresponding social network. Given a snapshot of the social network, the link
prediction problem aims at inferring the new interactions that are likely to happen
among its nodes. More specifically, the nodes of the social network are the users and
an edge between two users indicates a friendship between them.
Given the snapshot of an OSN, the social closeness between two users is termed
as proximity. The proximity measures can be divided into two groups. The first
group includes measures based on node neighborhoods, such as common neighbors,
Jaccard Coefficient, Adamic/Adar, and preferential attachment. Whereas, the second
group consists of measures based on ensemble of all paths, such as Katz, Hitting
time, Page Rank and SimRank [15, 16]. Irrespective of the similarity metric used,
computation of social closeness between any two given users requires the topological
structures of the network and/or user profile contents (such as friend list, social
interest tags, education, employment details, etc). Briefly, friend recommendations
can be performed as follows. (i) Social closeness (referred to as recommendation
score) between A and each potential candidate is computed. (ii) The candidates with
Top-K scores can be recommended as new friends to A.
The computation of recommendation scores between a target user A and any
other user in the given snapshot of a network is straightforward when user’s profile
information is treated as public. However, with the growing use of OSNs, there have
been various concerns about user privacy [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. Some well-
known privacy issues in the social networks are data publishing to a third party,
social phishing and analysis on the social data. Due to these privacy concerns, freely
3mining the social network data is not allowed or feasible; therefore, researchers from
both academia and industry are moving towards developing problem-specific privacy-
preserving techniques. What is private to a given user is subjective in nature. In
particular to the friend recommendation problem, the friendship between any two
users can be treated as sensitive/private information. This assumption is realistic
and being supported by many on-line social networks (e.g., Facebook) where users
are allowed to hide their friend lists. Most often, when people maintain friendship
with trusted ones, there is much information flowing from one to another. Thus,
revealing this sensitive information (i.e., friendship) poses a great threat to user
privacy through social engineering attacks [24, 25].
Recently, Ratan et al. [26] have conducted a survey by crawling the public
profile pages of 1.4 million New York City (NYC) Facebook users in March 2010 and
again in June 2011. It was shown that NYC users from their sample have become
dramatically private during this period. More specifically, in March 2010 only 17.2%
of users in their sample kept their friend lists as private; however, in June 2011, just
15 months later, 52.6% of the users hid their friend lists [26]. This further suggests
that users are more concerned about their privacy; therefore, forcing them to make
their profile information private. The observation is, in addition to friend list, other
contents of a user profile can also be kept private. Nevertheless, without certain
personal profile information, identifying new friends is not possible using the existing
friend recommendation techniques.
Based on the above discussions, it is clear that there is a strong need to develop
privacy-preserving friend recommendation algorithms in OSNs. Along this direction,
this work proposes a set of private friend recommendation protocols by assuming
different combinations of user’s profile information is kept as private.
41.2. ORGANIZATION
The emerging growth of online social networks has opened new doors for var-
ious business applications such as promoting a new product across its customers.
Besides this, friend recommendation is an important tool for recommending poten-
tial candidates as friends to users in order to enhance the development of the entire
network structure. Existing friend recommendation methods utilize social network
structure and/or user profile information. However, these techniques can no longer
be applicable if the privacy of users is taken into consideration. Along this direc-
tion, this work proposes four different set of private friend recommendation protocols
which are organized into four sections as follows.
First, Section 2 presents an overview of the existing work related to the prob-
lem domain. In addition, this section reviews the literature work of secure multiparty
computation and highlight the security definition adopted.
Section 3 proposes a two-phase private friend recommendation protocol for
recommending friends to a given target user based on the network structure as well
as utilizing the real message interaction between users. The proposed protocol com-
putes the recommendation scores of all users who are within a radius of h from the
target user in a privacy-preserving manner. This work also addresses some imple-
mentation details and point out an inherent security issue in the current online social
networks due to the message flow information. To mitigate this issue or to pro-
vide better security, this work proposes an extended version of the proposed protocol
using randomization technique. In addition, the practical applicability of the pro-
posed approach is discussed extensively through empirical analysis based on different
parameters.
Section 4 proposes two private friend recommendation algorithms for users in
a social network group G by leveraging both social tags and network topology. For
5a given target user ui, the proposed protocols compute the social closeness scores
between ui and each user in the subset Gi ⊂ G in a privacy-preserving manner by
utilizing an ontology tree T constructed by the domain expert such as the network
administrator. The first protocol is more efficient from a user’s perspective compared
to the second protocol, and this efficiency gain comes at the expense of relaxing the
underlying privacy assumptions. On the other hand, the second protocol provides the
best security guarantee. In addition, this work empirically analyzes the complexities
of the proposed protocols and provides various experimental results.
Section 5 proposes two novel methods to recommend friends for a given tar-
get user by using the common neighbors proximity measure in a privacy preserving
manner. The first method is based on the properties of an additive homomorphic
encryption scheme and also utilizes a universal hash function for efficiency purpose.
The second method utilizes the concept of protecting the source privacy through
randomizing the message passing path and recommends friends accurately and effi-
ciently. In addition, this work empirically compares the efficiency and accuracy of
the proposed protocols, and addresses the implementation details of the two meth-
ods in practice. The proposed protocols act as a trade-off among security, accuracy,
and efficiency; thus, users can choose between these two protocols depending on the
application requirements.
Section 6 considers the scenario of outsourced social networks, where users
encrypt their profiles independently and export them to a third-party cloud service
provider, such as Google or Amazon. Since the data are encrypted, query processing
over encrypted data becomes challenging for the cloud. In particular, this section
focuses on the friend recommendation problem over encrypted users’ profiles based on
the secure k-nearest neighbor (SkNN) technique. More specifically, this work develops
two novel SkNN protocols for the cloud to recommend the top k-nearest neighbors
as potential friends to a given target user in a privacy-preserving manner. The first
6protocol, which acts as a basic solution, leaks some information to the cloud. On the
other hand, the second protocol is fully secure, that is, it protects the confidentiality
of the data and also hides the data access patterns. However, the second protocol
is more expensive compared to the basic protocol. Also, the performance of the
proposed protocols under different parameter settings is evaluated.
Finally, this report concludes the contributions of this work and demonstrates
several possible directions for future research in Section 7.
72. LITERATURE REVIEW
Social network analyses have been utilized for various business applications
[6, 27], such as predicting the future [28] and developing recommender systems
[29, 30, 31, 32]. With growing interest of expanding a person’s social circle, friend rec-
ommendation has become an important service in many online social networks. This
section reviews upon the existing friend recommendation algorithms along with the
the existing work related to private friend recommendations. Finally, it discusses the
literature work on secure multiparty computation along with the security definition
adopted in this work.
2.1. EXISTING FRIEND RECOMMENDATION METHODS
Social network analyses have been utilized for various business applications
[6, 27], such as predicting the future [28] and developing recommender systems
[29, 30, 31, 32]. With growing interest of expanding a person’s social circle, friend rec-
ommendation has become an important service in many OSNs. Along this direction,
researchers from both academia and industry have published much work. In par-
ticular, Chen et al. [9] evaluated four recommender algorithms, which utilize social
network structure and/or content similarity, in an IBM enterprise social networking
site Beehive through personalized surveys. Their analysis showed that algorithms
based on social network information produce better-received recommendations. A
novel user calibration procedure was proposed by Silva et al. [11] based on a ge-
netic algorithm to optimize the three indices derived from the structural properties
of social networks. Xie [12] designed a general friend recommendation framework to
recommend friends based on the common interests by characterizing user interests in
two dimensions - context (e.g., location and time) and content.
8By treating the friend recommendation process as a filtering problem, Naru-
chitparames et al. [10] developed a two-step approach to provide quality friend recom-
mendations by combining cognitive theory with a Pareto-optimal genetic algorithm.
Gou et al. [13] developed a visualization tool (named as SFViz) that allows users
to explore for a potential friend with an interest context in social networks. Their
method considers both semantic structure in social tags and topological structures
in social networks to recommend new friends. The correlation between social and
topical features in three popular OSNs: Flickr, Last.fm, and aNobii has been stud-
ied by Aiello et al. [33] to analyze friendship prediction. Their results showed that
social networks constructed solely from topical similarity captured the actual friend-
ship accurately. Nevertheless, Facebook uses the “People You May Know” feature to
recommend friends based on the simple “friend-of-a-friend” approach [34].
2.2. PRIVATE FRIEND RECOMMENDATION (PFR) METHODS
Due to various privacy issues [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], many users keep
their profile information as private. Existing friend recommendation techniques
[9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] do not take users’ privacy into consideration; therefore, they
cannot be directly applied. Only recently, researchers have focused on developing
accurate and efficient PFR methods. Along this direction, Dong et al. [35] proposed
a method to securely compute and verify social proximity between two users using
cosine similarity in mobile social networks. In their approach, (mobile social network)
users physical location is treated as private. Their approach identifies new friends
who happen to be in the physical vicinity of the target user. That is, social coordi-
nates (users geographical location) are used to compute the social proximity between
users. Nevertheless, their approach assumes that the social coordinates (which may
9change often due to the mobility of users) for individual users are pre-computed by
a trusted central server which is a violation of user privacy.
Machanavajjhala et al. [36] formally analyzed the trade-offs between accuracy
and privacy of private friend recommendations using differential privacy [37]. In their
work, the authors used the existing differentially private algorithms as underlying sub-
routines and assumed the existence of PFR protocols based on these sub-routines.
Also, according to their claims, if privacy is to be preserved when using the common
neighbors utility function [15], only users with Ω(log n) friends can hope to receive
accurate recommendations, where n is the number of users in the graph. Furthermore,
the users’ privacy in [36] is based on differential privacy. Whereas, in this work,
privacy guarantees are based on an entirely different security model, namely the semi-
honest security definitions from the field of secure multiparty computation (SMC)
[38, 39]. Under the SMC model, this work develops accurate and private friend
recommendation protocols.
2.3. SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION AND ITS SECURITY
DEFINITION
Due to the growing concerns about privacy and the distributed nature of data,
secure multiparty computation (SMC) plays an important role in solving a wide-
range of applications. Some of these applications include secure electronic voting
[40], private auctioning and bidding [41, 42], and privacy-preserving data mining
[43, 44].
Consider a scenario where multiple parties, each with their private input ai,
wish to collaborate and compute a common functionality f by preserving the privacy
of each user. To achieve that, parties have to exchange messages and perform some
local computations until all the parties get the desired output. In the literature,
this is referred to as secure multiparty computation (SMC). More formally, SMC is
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the evaluation of the function f(a1, . . . , an) = (b1, . . . , bn) such that the output bi is
known to party Pi and the input ai of each party is kept private. This definition was
first introduced by Yao to solve the famous Millionaires’ problem in 1982 [38, 39].
Let Alice and Bob be two millionares with their respective wealth a and b. The goal
of Alice and Bob is to determine who is richer without revealing their wealth to one
another. More precisely, the functionality one need to evaluate is “greater than”, that
is, whether a is greater than b or not. The first general and provably secure solution,
for a two-party case, was developed by Yao and it was also demonstrated that any
function that can be described by a polynomial size boolean circuit of logarithm depth
can be solved securely [38, 39]. This work was extended to multiparty computations
by Goldreich et al. [45]. It was proved in [45] that any computation which can be done
in polynomial time by a single party can also be done securely by multiple parties.
Since then much work has been published for the multiparty case [46, 47, 48, 49].
In this work, privacy/security is closely related to the amount of information
disclosed during the execution of a protocol. There are many ways to define in-
formation disclosure. To maximize privacy or minimize information disclosure, this
work adopts the security definitions in the literature of SMC [49, 50]. There are two
common adversarial models under SMC: semi-honest and malicious. An adversarial
model generally specifies what an adversary or attacker is allowed to do during an
execution for a security protocol. In the semi-honest model, an attacker (i.e., one
of the participating parties) is expected to follow the prescribed steps of a protocol.
However, the attacker can compute any additional information based on his or her
private input, output and messages received during an execution of a secure proto-
col. As a result, whatever can be inferred from the private input and output of an
attacker is not considered as a privacy violation. An adversary in the semi-honest
model can be treated as a passive attacker; on the other hand, an adversary in the
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malicious model can be treated as an active attacker who can arbitrarily diverge from
the normal execution of a protocol.
In this dissertation, to develop secure and efficient protocols, all the participat-
ing parties are assumed to be semi-honest. Detailed security definitions and models
can be found in [49, 50]. The following definition captures the above discussion
regarding a secure protocol under the semi-honest model.
Definition 1. Let ai be the input of party Pi,
∏
i(pi) be Pi’s execution image of the
protocol pi and bi be the result computed from pi for party Pi. pi is secure if
∏
i(pi) can




In the above definition, an execution image generally includes the input, the
output and the messages communicated during an execution of a protocol. Briefly,
to prove a protocol is secure, it is required to show that the execution image of a
protocol does not leak any information regarding the private inputs of participating
parties [50].
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3. STRUCTURAL AND MESSAGE BASED PRIVATE FRIEND
RECOMMENDATION
In general, a recommendation score between any two given users can be com-
puted based on the network topology and/or user profile contents (such as previous
employer, location and hobbies). For the past few years, researchers have been focused
on developing hybrid friend recommendation algorithms [9, 13] to take advantage of
both approaches. Recently, Bi-Ru Dai et al. [14] proposed a new friend recommenda-
tion algorithm (denoted as CSM - meaning “Combine Structure and Messages”) by
utilizing the real messages communicated between the users as well as the network
structure. To be concrete, this work computes the recommendation scores between
users based on the similarity metric given in [14]. More details are given in the later
part of this section.
The computation of recommendation scores based on the similarity metric
given in [14] is straight-forward if user’s data is public. However, as users are more
concerned about their privacy [19, 21, 22, 23, 51], many online social networks have
provided various privacy settings for users to keep their data private. In general, users
are allowed to keep their friend lists, profile information etc., as private information.
Under this scenario, the computation of recommendation scores is non-trivial. This
work proposes a two-phase private friend recommendation algorithm based on the
similarity metric proposed in [14]. The proposed method computes the recommen-
dation scores between A and all potential users who are h-hop away from A in a
privacy-preserving manner. Figure 3.1, shows a sample network for target user Lee
with h = 3. In practice, as proposed by Stanley Milgram [52], any two people can
get acquainted each other through six degree of separation (i.e., 1 < h ≤ 6) in the
network.
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Figure 3.1: A sample social network for Lee with h = 3
Also, this work discusses various practical implementation details of the pro-
posed protocol. In addition, this work points out an inherent security issue in the
current online social networks due to the message flow information among various
users. To mitigate this issue or to provide better security, an extension to the pro-
posed protocol is developed using randomization technique.
3.1. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Consider a social network graph Gs with the nodes denoting the users and the
(directed) weighted edge between any two nodes denoting the number of real message
interactions between them. Since the message interaction can be bi-directional, one
can take the minimum number of messages, as mentioned in [14, 53], as the actual
weight of the edge (denoting the strength of the relationship). A sample minimum
message interaction between various users (for h = 3) in Lee’s network is as shown in
Figure 3.2. In general, if user A sends n1 messages to B and B sends n2 messages to
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Figure 3.2: Message interaction between different users in Lee’s network
implies that the weight of the edge between any two friends is directly correlated to
the strength of their relationship (i.e., larger weight indicates stronger friendship).
For a target user A (i.e., a user who wants to make new friends), generate a
candidate network with A as the root and an edge between the users denoting the
number (minimum) of real message interactions. Note that the users who are 1-hop
away from A are actually his/her friends. In order to generate the candidate network,
one has to remove the links between users at the same level. E.g., refer to Figure 3.2,
one can generate the candidate network by removing the link between Hall and Cox
(since they are on the same level). The recommendation score (RS) between A and














where Pk(A,U) denotes all the intermediate users on the k
th shortest path starting
from A (root) to user U , |Pk(A,U)| is the total number of messages along path
Pk(A,U), and let L(i) be the set of all users at level i (i.e., i-hop away from A).
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Si ∈ Pk(A,U) ∩ L(i), for i = 1, . . . , l − 1, where U ∈ L(l). Note that S0 denotes
the root user A. C(Si−1, Si) denotes the proportion of messages between users Si
and Si−1 to the total number of messages at level i. Here, user Si−1 is the parent of
user Si in the corresponding candidate network; DU denotes the degree of U and TN
denotes the total number of users in the candidate network.
When the privacy of users is taken into consideration, the computation of
above mentioned recommendation score is not straight-forward. More specifically,
this work assumes the following private information (PI) for user U :
(i). PI 1 - Friendship: The friendship between any two users U and V is not
revealed to any other user.
(ii). PI 2 - Strength of Friendship: The weight of an edge between U and V ,
denoted as CU,V , is not revealed to users other than U and V .
(iii). PI 3 - Degree: The size of the friend list of U is not revealed to other users.
Without loss of generality, let U1, . . . , Un be the set of potential candidates
who are at most l-hop (2 ≤ l ≤ h) away from A. The goal of this work is to develop a
private friend recommendation (PFR) protocol which is formally defined as follows:
PFR(A,F (A), U1, . . . , Un)→ Γ (3.2)
where F (A) denote the friend list of user A. Γ is defined as:
Γ = {〈R˜S(A,U1), U1〉, . . . , 〈R˜S(A,Un), Un〉}
Here, R˜S(A,Uj) is the new recommendation score for Uj which is correlated to the
actual score RS(A,Uj) (based on Equation 3.1) as below, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
R˜S(A,Uj) = Mh ∗ TN ∗RS(A,Uj)
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Mh is the normalizing factor for a user at h-hop away from A and TN is the number
of users in the candidate network. For any fixed h and A, the observation is that Mh
and TN are constants. At the end of the PFR protocol, the values of R˜S(A,Uj) and
Uj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are known only to A and the privacy of each user (PI 1, 2, and
3) is preserved. In practice, since the friend lists can be large, the number of scores
returned to A can be in the hundreds. Therefore, a more effective way is to simply
select Top-K users as the final set of friend recommendations.
3.2. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
The proposed protocol computes the recommendation scores between a target
user A and all potential candidates who are at most l-hop (2 ≤ l ≤ h) away from A
in a privacy-preserving manner. The main contributions of this particular work are
summarized below:
• Security - The proposed protocol guarantees that the friend lists, the strength
of friendships, and the friend list sizes of each user are kept as private from
other users. However, this work identifies an inherent security issue that may
leak valuable information to the network administrator in the current online
social networks which is also applicable to the proposed protocol. To mitigate
this risk, this work also proposes an extended version of the proposed protocol
using randomization technique.
• Accuracy - The proposed protocols compute the recommendation scores which
are scaled by a constant factor Mh ∗TN ; therefore, the relative ordering among
the scores is preserved. Hence, the proposed protocols guarantee the same kind
of effectiveness similar to the CSM method [14]. That is, the final Top-K list
of recommended users in the proposed protocols is the same as that in [14] and
is independent of K.
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• Efficiency - In the empirical analysis, this work shows the practical value of
PFR through various experiments. Also, it shows that the efficiency of the
extended version is very close to that of PFR. The experiments show that the
computation costs incurred on the internal users in the proposed protocols are
very small; therefore, the proposed protocols are very efficient from an internal
user’s perspective.
3.3. RELATED WORK
As mentioned earlier, friend recommendation is a very useful application for
both users and the social network provider. Through social recommendations, users
are allowed to make new friends; therefore, expanding their social connections. In
addition, it helps the social network provider in a way to enhance the development
of entire network structure.
3.3.1. Existing Friend Recommendation Methods. In general, recom-
mendation scores between any two given users can be computed either based on the
network topology [10, 11] and/or user profile contents [12].
Only recently, researchers have focused on developing hybrid friend recommen-
dation algorithms [9, 13] to take advantages of both approaches. As an independent
work, Lo et al. [53] proposed a graph-based friend recommendation algorithm us-
ing a weighted minimum-message ratio as the scoring metric. This work was later
improved in [14] by taking the evolution of entire network into consideration. The
computation of recommendation scores based on the metric given in [14] is straight-
forward when users data is public. However, due to the growing concerns over user
privacy [19, 21, 22, 23, 51], many users prefer to keep their profile data (including
their friend lists) as private. Along this direction, many online social networks such
as Facebook, provide various privacy settings for users to make their data private.
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Therefore, the above existing methods are not applicable if privacy of users is taken
into consideration.
To make friend recommendations possible even in privacy-sensitive environ-
ments, this work proposes a two-phase PFR protocol based on the similarity metric
given in [14]. Furthermore, this work addresses an inherent security issue in the
current online social networks. To overcome this issue, an extended version to the
proposed PFR protocol is also proposed.
3.3.2. Existing PFR Protocols. In the literature, that there has not been
much work done in developing efficient PFR protocols based on different metrics.
Dong et al. [35] proposed a method to securely compute the social proximity between
users in a mobile social network. They have used the cosine similarity metric to
compute how close two give users are by treating user’s location as private.
Machanavajjhala et al. [36] analyzed the trade-offs between accuracy and
privacy for private friend recommendation algorithms based on differential privacy
[37, 54]. The work in this section is entirely different from theirs since the security
guarantee in this work is based on the the well-known semi-honest security definition
of secure multiparty computation (SMC) [38, 39, 50]. In addition, they use a different
similarity metric, namely common neighbors [15] whereas this work is based on the
scoring metric given in Equation 3.1.
In general, different metrics have different advantages. Secure protocols de-
signed for one metric often may not work for other metrics. Therefore, there is a
strong need to develop a secure protocol based on particular scoring function. In
particular, this work focuses on developing a secure PFR protocol based on the scor-
ing function given in Equation 3.1. Table 3.1 presents some common notations used
extensively in this section.
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Table 3.1: Common notations used in PFR
HPEnc+ An Additive Homomorphic Probabilistic Encryption System
T A trusted party (such as network administrator)
〈E,D〉 A pair of HPEnc+ based encryption and decryption functions
〈pk, pr〉 A public and private key pair corresponding to 〈E,D〉
F (U) Friend list of user U
m Size of friend list of target user A
CU,V Minimum number of messages exchanged between U and V
(or weight of edge between U and V )
L(i) List of all users at level i in the corresponding candidate network
Mi−1,i Minimum number of messages exchanged between users at L(i− 1) and L(i)
C(Si−1, Si) Ratio of CSi−1,Si to Mi−1,i
Ml,M
′
l Normalization and Scalar factors for a user ∈ L(l)
3.4. ORDER PRESERVING SCORING FUNCTION
The original scoring function [14] given in Equation 3.1 contains a rational
factor (i.e., C(Si−1, Si)) which varies with i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1 and 2 ≤ l ≤ h.
Therefore, to perform encryption operations, this work defines a new scoring function
(producing an integer value) based on Equation 3.1 such that the relative rankings
among the final recommendation scores are preserved.
3.4.1. Normalization Factor. Given a snapshot of the network for A, the






where Mi−1,i, denoting the total number of messages exchanged between users at






CU,V denotes the minimum number of messages exchanged between users U and V .
This work explicitly assumes M1 = 1 since users who are 1-hop from A are already
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friends of A. For any two potential candidates who are l-hop away from A, the
observation is that the two candidates have the same normalization factor.
Example 1. Refer to Figure 3.2. Consider the potential candidate Cole who is
2 hops away from Lee. Here, L(0) = 〈Lee〉 and L(1) = 〈Hall, Cox,Bell〉. The
normalization factor for Cole is M2 = M0,1 = CLee,Hall + CLee,Cox + CLee,Bell = 5.
Note that the normalization factor for Ford,Butler, and Kelly (who are also 2 hops
away from Lee) is the same as Cole. Similarly, it is clear that M1,2 = 13. By
substituting these values in Equation 3.3, the normalization factor for users at level
3 is M3 =
∏2
i=1Mi−1,i =M0,1 ∗M1,2 = 65.
Observation 1. For any user Si−1 ∈ L(i − 1) and Si ∈ L(i), one can observe that
the value of C(Si−1, Si) is equivalent to
CSi−1,Si
Mi−1,i
. Therefore, for a potential user U at










3.4.2. Scalar Factor. Given a target user A and h, the scalar factor for a





M0,1 ∗ . . . ∗Mh−2,h−1
M0,1 ∗ . . . ∗Ml−2,l−1 (3.4)
where Ml is the normalization factor for a user belonging to L(l). In addition, the
observation is that M ′l is the same for all users who are at same level l. Furthermore,
when l = h, it is clear that M ′h = 1. This further implies that M
′
1 = Mh. From




Definition 2. For any given target user A and potential candidate U who is l hops
away from A, the new scoring function (denoted as R˜S(A,U)) is defined as follows:











Note that CSi−1,Si is the weight of edge between parent user Si−1 and its child user Si
on the kth shortest path from A to U , for 1 ≤ i ≤ l− 1. Based on Equations 3.3 and




































=Mh ∗ TN ∗RS(A,U)
The values of Mh and TN are constants for any given snapshot of the social network
(for a fixed h). Therefore, the relative orderings among the recommendation scores
of the potential candidates based on Equation 3.5 are preserved. That is, for any two
potential users U and V if RS(A,U) > RS(A, V ), then the new scoring function
guarantees that R˜S(A,U) > R˜S(A, V ) for any fixed h and A, and vice versa.
3.4.3. Computation of Recommendation Score. Refer to Figure 3.2 and
let us consider the case of computing the recommendation score between Lee and Fox.
Here, Fox has two shortest paths from Lee; P1(Lee, Fox) = {Lee,Hall, Butler, Fox}
and P2(Lee, Fox) = {Lee, Cox,Butler, Fox}. The total (minimum) number of mes-
sages along the first path i.e., |P1(Lee, Fox)| is 7. Similarly, |P2(Lee, Fox)| = 10.
Along P1(Lee, Fox), there exist two internal users Hall and Butler who are respec-
tively 1 and 2 hops away from Lee. In addition, CLee,Hall = 2 and CHall,Butler = 1.
Similarly, for the path P2(Lee, Fox), CLee,Cox = 2 and CCox,Butler = 4. Since Fox is
3 hops away from Lee, her scaling factor M ′3 is 1. By substituting the above values
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in Equation 3.5, the recommendation score for Fox is given as:
R˜S(Lee, Fox) = 1 ∗ [7 ∗ 2 ∗ 1 + 10 ∗ 2 ∗ 4] ∗DFox = 94 ∗DFox


















∗ 94 ∗ DFox
TN
where DFox is the degree (size of friend list) of Fox and TN denotes the size of the
candidate network. It is clear that R˜S(Lee, Fox) =Mh ∗ TN ∗RS(Lee, Fox), where
Mh =M0,1 ∗M1,2 = 5 ∗ 13 = 65.
3.5. THE PROPOSED PFR PROTOCOL
This sub-section presents the proposed private friend recommendation (termed
as PFR) protocol which computes the recommendation scores between the target user
A and all potential candidates who are at most h-hop (> 1) away from A based on
Equation 3.5. This work explicitly considers the following assumptions:
1. If U ∈ F (V ), then V ∈ F (U), and CU,V is known only to U and V . Also, let
F (A) = 〈B1, . . . , Bm〉 denote the friend list of A.
2. Each user has a unique user ID (for example, Facebook user ID is generally at
most 128-bit integer).
3. There exists a third party T (e.g., network administrator) who generates a
pair of encryption and decryption function 〈E,D〉 for A based on the additive
homomorphic probabilistic encryption scheme (HPEnc+) such as the Paillier
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cryptosystem [55]. The corresponding private key pr is known only to T and
the public key pk is public. In addition, let N be the group size (usually of
1024 bits). For any two given plaintexts m1,m2 ∈ ZN , the HPEnc+ system
exhibits the following properties:
(a) Homomorphic Addition: Epk(m1+m2)← Epk(m1)∗Epk(m2) mod N2;
(b) Homomorphic Multiplication: Epk(m1 ∗m2)← E(m2)m1 mod N2;
(c) Semantic Security: The encryption scheme is semantically secure as
defined in [49, 56]. Briefly, given a set of ciphertexts, an adversary cannot
deduce any additional information about the plaintext.
To generate the candidate network, one need to omit the messages between
users who are at the same level. For example, in Figure 3.2, one should not con-
sider CHall,Cox for computing the recommendation scores in the PFR protocol (as
mentioned in [14, 53]). Thus, to explicitly generate the candidate network, this work
includes an initialization step as follows. Initially, A generates a counter t = h − 1
and passes it over to his/her friends. Upon receiving the counter, each intermediate
user U stores the value of received counter (locally) and also stores the parent user
who sent the counter to U (denoted as Pr(U)). After this, U decrements the counter
by 1 and sends it to his/her friends. This process continues until users at h-hop from
A receive a counter of t = 0. Since a user can receive multiple counter values, the
following observations are considered.
Observation 2. Consider user U , who is l-hop away from A and 1 ≤ l ≤ h, receiving
multiple t values. This work addresses the following two cases:
Case 1: If the counter values are same, then U has multiple shortest paths
(with parents of U on the same level). In this case, U considers one of the parents
(can be chosen randomly) as actual parent Pr(U) and any further communication
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happens only with that parent. E.g., refer to Figure 3.2, “Hart” receives t = 0 from
both Cole and Kelly. Therefore, he can pick one of them, say Kelly, as Pr(U).
Case 2: If U receives different values of t which happens when U receives
counters from parents who are at different levels. In this case, U selects one of the
parent user who sent the maximum t value as Pr(U). In the PFR protocol, the
child users of U (denoted as Ch(U)) are users belonging to F (U) − R(U), where
R(U) denotes the set of users who have sent a counter value to U . The important
observation here is U omits the messages exchanged with the users who have sent
smaller counter values (also dumps the corresponding counter). This further implies
that, U considers only messages exchanged between him/her and either Pr(U) or
Ch(U) (therefore forming a candidate network by omitting messages with users on
the same level). An example to this case is user “Cox” (refer to Figure 3.2). Here,
Cox receives t = 2 and t = 1 from Lee and Hall respectively. Therefore, Cox treats
Lee as the actual parent user and omits CCox,Hall.
At the end of the initialization step, based on Observation 2, each internal
user U who is l-hop away from A, for 1 ≤ l ≤ h, has the values of t, pk, Pr(U) and
Ch(U). Apart from the above initialization step, the proposed PFR protocol mainly
consists of the following two phases:
Phase 1 - Secure Computation of Scalar Factors: During Phase 1, A
computes the list of encrypted scalar factors (denoted as Φ, where Φl−1 denotes the
encrypted scalar factor for level l and 2 ≤ l ≤ h) in a privacy-preserving manner.
This phase utilizes a secure multiplication protocol (only if h > 3) as a building block.
At the end, only A knows Φ and nothing is revealed to other users.
Phase 2 - Secure Computation of Recommendation Scores: Follow-
ing from Phase 1, A (with Φ as input), T and other internal users jointly compute
the recommendation scores of all potential candidates who are l-hop away from A,
for 2 ≤ l ≤ h. This phase utilizes a secure multiplication and addition protocol as a
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building block. The final recommendation scores and the corresponding user IDs are
revealed only to A and nothing is revealed to other users.
To start with, A chooses the value of h∗ and executes the initialization step
as explained earlier. Then, during Phase 1, A decides whether there is a need to
take the help of other users in order to generate Φ. If h = 2, A computes Φ locally.
Otherwise, for h > 2, A computes Φ with the help of internal users. After this,
during Phase 2, A sends necessary information to Bi along with his/her user ID
and Φ, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Then, each intermediate user Uj receives the necessary
information from Pr(Uj), generates his/her encrypted partial scores (only if Uj is
not already a friend of A) and sends the encrypted partial scores to A. In addition,
if the value of t (stored during initialization step) of Uj is greater than 0, he/she
computes the necessary information (for t > 0) and sends it to his/her corresponding
child friends. After receiving all the encrypted partial scores, A and T involve in a
secure multiplication and addition protocol to compute the recommendation scores
for each potential candidate Uj . At the end of this step, only A knows the user IDs
of all potential friends along with their recommendation scores (computed based on
Equation 3.5). The main steps of PFR are shown in Algorithm 1. Now, the steps
involved in each of the two phases are discussed in detail.
3.5.1. Phase 1 - Secure Computation of Scalar Factors. If the value
of h is 2, then only the child friends of A’s friends are considered as the potential
candidates. Since the scalar factor for users at l = 2 is M ′2 = 1, A simply sets
Φ1 = Epk(1) for security reasons. When h > 2, A does not have necessary information
to compute the encryption of scalar factors (such asM ′3) since the potential candidates
can belong to any L(l), where 2 ≤ l ≤ h. Therefore, when h > 2, A computes Φ,
with the help of internal users who are at most h− 2 hops away from A. Note that
the potential candidates who are at most h − 2 hops away from A are sufficient to
∗Note that h should always be greater than 1. Because, if h = 1, then l = 1 implies the potential
candidates who are 1-hop away from A who are already friends of A.
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generate the encryptions of all scalar factors because the partial scores of Mh−2,h−1
are known to users belonging to L(h − 2). Note that, irrespective of the value of h,
Φh−1 = Epk(1) always hold. Phase 1 involves steps 1 to 16 as shown in Algorithm 1.
In order to compute Φ, for h > 2, A simply waits for internal users with t ≥ 2
to send in the aggregated data. To start with, each internal user Uj (including Bi)
performs the following operations based on his/her counter value t:
1. Compute XUj = Epk(
∑s
i=1CUj ,Vi), where Vi is the child friend of Uj and s =
|Ch(Uj)|
2. Create a vector LUj of size t− 1; sets LUj [t− 1] to XUj
3. If t > 2, Uj receives LVi from Vi and updates LUj by aggregating LVi component-
wise as follows, and sends it to Pr(Uj).
LUj [k] =
∏s
i=1 LVi [k] mod N
2, for 1 ≤ k ≤ t− 2
The above process forwards the aggregated data at each internal user in a bottom-up
fashion. At the end, A receives LBi from Bi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. After this, A generates
the final aggregated encrypted list (LA) and proceeds as follows:
1. LA[k] =
∏m
i=1 LBi [k] mod N
2, for 1 ≤ k ≤ |LBi |, where LBi denote the aggre-
gated list received from Bi. The observation is |LBi | = h− 2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
2. Assign the encrypted scalar factor for level h as Φh−1 = Epk(1). If h = 3, set
Φ1 ← LA[1]. Else, let LA = 〈Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xh−2)〉. Using secure multiplica-







, for 1 ≤ l ≤ h− 2
The SMP protocol is one of the basic building blocks in the field of secure multiparty
computation (SMC) [50]. The basic concept of the SMP protocol is based on the
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Algorithm 1 PFR
Require: pr is private to T , h is private to A, Uj knows 〈t, Pr(Uj), Ch(Uj)〉
{Steps 1 - 7 performed by Uj with t ≥ 2}
1: s← |Ch(Uj)|
2: XUj ← Epk(
∑s
i=1CUj ,Vi), where Vi ∈ Ch(Uj)
3: LUj [t− 1]← XUj
4: if t > 2 and Uj received LVi from Vi then
5: LUj [k]←
∏s
i=1 LVi [k] mod N
2, for 1 ≤ k ≤ t− 2
6: end if
7: send LUj to Pr(Uj)
{Steps 8 - 16 performed by A and T}
8: Φh−1 = Epk(1)
9: if h ≥ 3 then
10: LA[k]←
∏m
i=1 LBi [k] mod N
2, for 1 ≤ k ≤ h− 2
11: if h = 3 then
12: Φ1 ← LA
13: else
14: Compute Φ using LA as input to the SMP protocol
15: end if
16: end if
{Steps 17 - 21 performed by A}
17: for all Bi ∈ Ch(A) do
18: α1 ← Epk(CA,Bi)
19: αl ← ΦCA,Bil−1 mod N2, for 2 ≤ l ≤ h
20: send A,Φ, and α to Bi (note that α is different for each Bi)
21: end for
{Steps 22 - 36 performed by Uj}
22: receive A,Φ, and α from Y = Pr(Uj)
23: if A ∈ F (Uj) then
24: send A, Φ and α to each Vi ∈ Ch(Uj)
25: else
26: compute βj ← αDUj1 mod N2
27: compute γj ← α2 ∗ ΦCY,Uj1 mod N2
28: Zj ← {Epk(Uj), 〈βj, γj〉}
29: send Zj to A
30: end if
31: if t > 0 then
32: Φl ← Φl+1, for 1 ≤ l ≤ t
33: α1 ← αCY,Uj1 mod N2
34: αl ← αl+1 ∗ ΦCY,Ujl−1 mod N2, for 2 ≤ l ≤ t+ 1
35: send A, Φ and α to each Vi ∈ Ch(Uj)
36: end if
37: (R˜S(A,Uj), Uj)← SMPA(Zj), for each Zj
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following property which holds for any given a, b ∈ ZN :
a ∗ b = (a+ r1) ∗ (b+ r2)− a ∗ r2 − b ∗ r1 − r1 ∗ r2 (3.6)
where all the arithmetic operations are performed under ZN . Given that A has input
Epk(a) and Epk(b), the SMP protocol computes Epk(a ∗ b) as the output (which will
be revealed only to A) without disclosing the values of a and b to either A or T . The




l+1), for 1 ≤ l ≤ h− 1
where M ′l+1 is the scalar factor for users at (l+1)-hop away from A. If the maximum
value of h is 6 (sufficient for most situations), the maximum size of LA is 4. Therefore,
Phase 1 is bounded by 2 instantiations of the SMP Protocol.
Theorem 1. The output of Phase 1 is the list of encrypted scalar factors (in order)
for each level. That is, Φl is equivalent to the encryption of scalar factor for users at




where M ′l+1 is the scalar factor for users at l + 1 hops away from A.
Proof. For h = 2, since M ′2 = 1, it is clear that Φ1 = Epk(1) = Epk(M
′
2). Note
that irrespective of the value of h, Φh−1 = Epk(1) = Epk(M ′h) always holds. When
h ≥ 3, initially the internal user X with t = 2 (denoting level h − 2) sends LX =
Epk(
∑|Ch(X)|
i=1 CX,Yi) to Z, where Yi ∈ Ch(X) and Z = Pr(X). Then, Z aggregates
the data received from Ch(Z). Without loss of generality, let Z receives LX1 , . . . , LXd ,
where Xi ∈ Ch(Z). Then, the aggregated entry in LZ is LZ [1] = LX1 [1]∗ . . .∗LXd [1].
In addition, Z sets LZ [2] = Epk(
∑|Ch(Z)|
i=1 CZ,Xi). Since the data are aggregated
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Algorithm 2 SMP(Epk(a), Epk(b))→ Epk(a ∗ b)
Require: A has Epk(a) and Epk(b)
1: A:
(a). Pick two random numbers ra, rb ∈ ZN
(b). za ← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra) mod N2
(c). zb ← Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb) mod N2; send za, zb to T
2: T :
(a). Receive za and zb from A
(b). ua ← Dpr(za); ub ← Dpr(zb)
(c). Compute u = ua ∗ ub mod N
(d). v ← Epk(u); send v to A
3: A:
(a). Receive v from T
(b). s← v ∗ Epk(a)N−rb mod N2
(c). s′ ← s ∗ Epk(b)N−ra mod N2
(d). Epk(a ∗ b)← s′ ∗ Epk(ra ∗ rb)N−1 mod N2
component-wise, lth component in LZ is equivalent to the encryption of summation of
(minimum) number of messages exchanged between users at L(h− l−1) and L(h− l)
under sub-tree of Z. (Note that, following from Observation 2, if Xi has multiple par-
ents, then he/she will send LXi to only actual parent user Pr(Xi)). This aggregation
process continues at each level in a bottom-up fashion. Finally, when A computes
LA (by aggregating the LBi ’s component-wise, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m), the lth component
in LA is equivalent to the encryption of sum of (minimum) number of messages ex-
changed between users at L(h− l− 1) and L(h− l), that is, LA[l] = Epk(Mh−l−1,h−l),
for 1 ≤ l ≤ h − 2. As mentioned earlier, let LA = 〈Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xh−2)〉, where
xl = Mh−l−1,h−l, for 1 ≤ l ≤ h − 2. Based on the above discussions, consider the
following two scenarios:
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Scenario 1: When h = 3, it is clear that |LA| = 1 and Φ1 gives the encrypted
















Scenario 2: On the other hand, when h > 3, A and T jointly involve in the SMP
protocol (Step 14 in Algorithm 1). Following from the SMP protocol (as given in





















M0,1 ∗ . . . ∗Mh−2,h−1










3.5.2. Phase 2 - Secure Computation of Recommendation Scores.
During Phase 2, A with input Φ along with T and the internal users jointly compute
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the recommendation score for each potential candidate. The main steps involved in
Phase 2 of the PFR protocol are shown as steps 17 to 37 in Algorithm 1. To start






2, for 2 ≤ l ≤ h
After this, A sends A,Φ, and corresponding α to Bi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Then, each
internal user Uj receives the values of A,Φ, and α from Pr(Uj) and checks whether
A is already a friend of Uj (this case happens only if Uj is equal to one of the Bi’s).
If A ∈ F (Uj), then Uj simply forwards A,Φ, and α to each of his/her child friend.





2; γj = α2 ∗ ΦCY,Uj1 mod N2
where DUj denotes the degree of Uj (i.e., |F (Uj)|) and Y is the parent friend of Uj .
After this, Uj sends Zj = {Epk(Uj), 〈βj , γj〉} to A. Note that Uj can receive multiple
pairs of (Φ, α) which occurs only when there exist multiple shortest paths from A
to Uj . Under this scenario, Uj creates the encrypted partial scores for each pair of
(Φ, α) and simply appends them to Zj as follows.
Zj = {Epk(Uj), 〈β1,j , γ1,j〉, . . . , βs,j , γs,j〉}
where each βl,j, γl,j, for 1 ≤ l ≤ s, is computed as explained above for each pair of
(Φ, α) and s denotes the number of such pairs (number of shortest paths to Uj from
A). In addition, if the counter (t) corresponding to Uj is greater than 0, then Uj
generates necessary information for his/her child friends as follows.
• Update Φ and α:
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– Φl = Φl+1, for 1 ≤ l ≤ t




– αl = αl+1 ∗ ΦCY,Ujl−1 , for 2 ≤ l ≤ t+ 1
• Send A, Φ and α to his/her child friends. If Uj receives multiple pairs of (Φ, α),
Uj updates each pair as above and sends all updated pairs to the child friends.
Upon receiving the entries from all potential candidates, A and T involve in a secure
multiplication and addition (SMPA) protocol. The main steps involved in the SMPA
protocol are shown in Algorithm 3. Without loss of generality, consider the entry
Zj = {Epk(Uj), 〈β1,j , γ1,j〉, . . . , 〈βs,j , γs,j〉}, where s denotes the number of shortest
paths from A to Uj . In addition, let βk,j = Epk(ak,j) and γk,j = Epk(bk,j), for 1 ≤ k ≤
s. The goal of the SMPA protocol is to securely compute a1,j ∗ b1,j + · · · + as,j ∗ bs,j
as output without revealing the values of ak,j and bk,j, for 1 ≤ k ≤ s, to either A or
T . At the end of the SMPA protocol, only user A knows the recommendation score
corresponding to Uj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The basic idea of the SMPA protocol is based
















where rk,j and r
′
k,j are random numbers in ZN and all arithmetic operations are per-
formed under modulo N . The overall steps involved in SMPA are shown in Algorithm
3. Initially, A randomizes each encrypted tuple 〈βk,j, γk,j〉, for 1 ≤ k ≤ s, as follows:
β˜k,j = βk,j ∗ Epk(rk,j) mod N2
γ˜k,j = γk,j ∗ Epk(r′k,j) mod N2
Here rk,j and r
′
k,j are randomly chosen in ZN . A also randomizes Epk(Uj) and performs
these homomorphic operations (steps 1(b) to 1(g) of Algorithm 3). The rj and r˜j are
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Algorithm 3 SMPA
Require: A’s input is Zj
1: A:
(a). for 1 ≤ k ≤ s do:
• β˜k,j ← βk,j ∗ Epk(rk,j) mod N2, where rk,j ∈ ZN
• γ˜k,j ← γk,j ∗ Epk(r′k,j) mod N2, where r′k,j ∈ ZN
(b). λj ← Epk(Uj) ∗ Epk(rj) mod N2, where rj ∈ ZN
(c). Epk(r)← Epk(
∑s













(f). τ ← Epk(r˜j) ∗ Epk(r)N−1 mod N2, where r˜j ∈ ZN
(g). wj = τ ∗ Epk(r1)N−1 ∗ Epk(r2)N−1 mod N2
(h). Send wj, λj and β˜k,j, γ˜k,j, for 1 ≤ k ≤ s to T
2: T :
(a). Receive parameters from A
(b). a˜k,j ← Dpr(β˜k,j) ; b˜k,j ← Dpr(γ˜k,j), for 1 ≤ k ≤ s
(c). cj ←
∑s
k=1 a˜k,j ∗ b˜k,j mod N
(d). zj ← Dpr(wj); s1,j ← zj + cj mod N
(e). s2,j ← Dpr(λj); send s1,j and s2,j to A
3: A:
(a). Receive s1,j and s2,j from T
(b). R˜S(A,Uj)← s1,j − r˜j mod N (recommendation score)
(c). Uj ← s2,j − rj mod N (corresponding user ID)
also random numbers in ZN . Then, A sends β˜k,j and γ˜k,j, for 1 ≤ k ≤ s, to T along
with wj and λj. Upon receiving, T decrypts β˜k,j and γ˜k,j, for 1 ≤ k ≤ s, multiplies
and adds them as below:




k=1 a˜k,j ∗ b˜k,j mod N .
Furthermore, T decrypts wj and λj: zj = Dpr(wj) and s2,j = Dpr(λj), and computes
s1,j = zj + cj mod N . Then, T sends s1,j and s2,j to A. Finally, A removes the
randomness from s1,j and s2,j to get the actual score and user ID Uj as follows:
R˜S(A,Uj) = s1,j − r˜j mod N ; Uj = s2,j − rj mod N
Here, R˜S(A,Uj) is the recommendation score for user Uj based on Equation 3.5.
Note that (N − 1) represents “-1” under ZN .
Theorem 2. The output of Phase 2 is the list of recommendation scores along with
the corresponding users IDs. That is, for any given entry Zj:
s1,j − r˜j mod N = R˜S(A,Uj)
s2,j − rj mod N = Uj
Where s1,j and s2,j are the final values sent to A from T corresponding to the entry
Zj in the SMPA protocol, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider a potential user Uj who receives A and
(Φ, α) pairs from his/her parent friends. Let us assume that Uj receives s number
of different (Φ, α) pairs (representing s number of shortest paths from A to Uj) and
let βk,j, γk,j denote the encrypted partial scores corresponding to k
th pair (Φk, αk)
(denoting kth shortest path from A to Uj), for 1 ≤ k ≤ s. Uj computes the encrypted











γk,j = α2,k ∗ ΦCY,Uj1,k mod N2 = Epk(M ′l ∗ |Pk(A,Uj)|)
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where αy,k (resp., Φy,k) denotes the y
th component of vector αk (resp., Φk); i =
1, . . . , l − 1; l = L(Uj) and Si−1 = Pr(Si) along the kth path from A to Uj. Then,
Uj sends Zj = {Epk(Uj), 〈β1,j , γ1,j〉, . . . , 〈βs,j , γs,j〉} to A. Upon receiving, A and
T involve in the SMPA protocol. As mentioned earlier, let βk,j = Epk(ak,j) and
γk,j = Epk(bk,j), for 1 ≤ k ≤ s. Since SMPA securely multiplies each (βk,j, γk,j) pair
and then adds them, the output of the SMPA protocol can be formulated as follows:










CSi−1,Si) ∗ (M ′l ∗ |Pk(A,Uj)|)











Similarly, it is easy to show that s2,j − rj mod N = Uj.
During the actual implementation, the SMPA protocol can be initiated in
parallel as the computation for potential user Uj is independent of others. Thus,
overall, SMPA requires only one round of communication between A and T .
Example 2. As an example, various intermediate steps and results involved in the
PFR protocol based on Figure 3.2 are shown. Here h = 3 and Lee is the target
user. Following from initialization step, users at 1-hop away from Lee, that is,
〈Hall, Cox,Bell〉 have a value of t = 2. Similarly, 〈Ford,Butler, Cole,Kelly〉 have
a value of t = 1. Whereas, 〈Shaw,Ray, Fox,Ryan,Hart, Jones〉 have t = 0. Each
of them is aware of pk and also their parent and child friends (following from the
initialization step).
Phase 1: Initially, Hall computes LHall[1] = Epk(CHall,Ford + CHall,Butler) =
Epk(3). Similarly, Cox and Bell compute LCox[1] = Epk(7) and LBell[1] = Epk(3)
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respectively. Observe that CHall,Cox is not included in LHall[1] and LCox[1] since Hall
and Cox are at same level from Lee. After this, Hall, Cox, and Bell send LHall, LCox,
and LBell resp., to Lee. Upon receiving values, Lee computes LLee[1] = LHall[1] ∗
LCox[1] ∗ LBell[1] mod N2 = Epk(13). Then, Lee sets the encrypted scalar factors as
follows:
Φ1 = LLee[1] = Epk(13); Φ2 = Epk(1)
Phase 2: During Phase 2, Lee computes encrypted vector α (different) for
each of his friends. Without loss of generality, consider user Hall. Lee creates α for
Hall as follows.
α = 〈Epk(CLee,Hall),ΦCLee,Hall1 ,ΦCLee,Hall2 〉
= 〈Epk(2), Epk(2 ∗ 13), Epk(2 ∗ 1)〉
Then, Lee sends 〈Lee,Φ, α〉 to Hall who further forwards them to Ford and Butler.
The final entries (that are sent to Lee) from all potential users are shown in Table 3.2.
Finally, Lee and T involve in the SMPA protocol to get the scaled recommendation
scores. E.g., the recommendation score for Ford is R˜S(Lee, Ford) = 2 ∗DFord ∗ 4 ∗
13 = 104 ∗ DFord. It is clear that R˜S(Lee, Ford) = Mh ∗ TN ∗ RS, where actual




and Mh = 65. 
3.5.3. Security Analysis. This sub-section analyzes the security of the ini-
tialization step and each phase in the proposed PFR protocol separately.
First, during the initialization step, the generation of candidate network does
not leak any information. Consider the two possible cases of the initialization step
as discussed in Observation 2. For case 1, where U receives the same counter values
from multiple parents (on the same level), U cannot predict whether there exists a
friendship between any two parents. For example, suppose U receives t = 2 from two
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Table 3.2: Encrypted partial scores corresponding to each potential candidate based
on the PFR protocol
{Epk(Ford), 〈Epk(2 ∗DFord), Epk(52)〉} {Epk(Butler), 〈Epk(2 ∗DButler), Epk(39)〉,
〈Epk(2 ∗DButler), Epk(78)〉}
{Epk(Cole), 〈Epk(2 ∗DCole), Epk(65)〉} {Epk(Fox), 〈Epk(2 ∗DFox), Epk(7)〉,
〈Epk(6 ∗DFox), Epk(10)〉}
{Epk(Kelly), 〈Epk(DKelly), Epk(52)〉} {Epk(Ryan), 〈Epk(2 ∗DRyan), Epk(5)〉,
〈Epk(6 ∗DRyan), Epk(8)〉}
{Epk(Shaw), 〈Epk(4 ∗DShaw), Epk(6)〉} {Epk(Hart), 〈Epk(6 ∗DHart), Epk(10)〉,
〈Epk(3 ∗DHart), Epk(6)〉}
{Epk(Ray), 〈Epk(4 ∗DRay), Epk(5)〉} {Epk(Jones), 〈Epk(3 ∗DJones), Epk(8)〉}
parents M1 and M2. Here U cannot distinguish the two scenarios shown in Figure
3.3. This is because the value of t received by U is independent of the relationship
between the parents who sent it.
Similarly, for case 2, where U can receive different counter values from mul-
tiple parents (different levels), U cannot deduce any information by simply using
the received counter values. For example, consider that U receives t = 3 from M1
and t = 2 from M2. Then, U cannot distinguish between the following two possible
scenarios as shown in Figure 3.4, where J is the parent user of M2. It is clear that
the counter values passed to U are independent of the relationship between M1 and
M2. Hence, passing the counter values during the formation of candidate network
(initialization step) in PFR does not reveal any information.
During Phase 1, each internal user sends the encrypted aggregated data only
to Pr(Uj). Thus, the privacy of individual users is preserved as per the security
definition of SMC [50]. In addition, during the SMP protocol, A first randomizes
the values of LA and sends them to T . Therefore, the simulated view of T is indis-
tinguishable compared to the real view (trusted third party model). Furthermore,
since T sends only the encrypted scalar factors to A, neither the values of Mi−1,i’s
nor M ′i ’s are revealed to A, for 1 ≤ i ≤ h − 1. Therefore, the privacy of A and Uj

















(b) M1 and M2 are not
friends
Figure 3.3: Case 1 of initialization step in PFR
known to A, since M ′h = 1 always hold. However, it is worth pointing out that this
does not reveal any information to A.
On the other hand, in Phase 2, A initially sends {A,Φ, α} to each Bi, for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Each internal user Uj, computes his/her encrypted partial scores using
DUj and CYi,Uj , where Yi is the parent friend of Uj (with multiple parents denoting
multiple shortest paths from A to Uj). Then, Uj sends his entry Zj in encrypted form
to A. Here, the privacy of each Uj is preserved under the assumption that number of
shortest paths to Uj can be revealed to A. However, this problem can be solved by
random masking without affecting the recommendation score (more details are given
in the later part of this section). During the SMPA protocol, the values of each entry
are randomized in ZN and sent to T . That is, the values of DUj ∗
∏
iCSi−1,Si and
M ′l ∗ |Pk(A,Uj)|, for 1 ≤ k ≤ s, are randomized and sent to T . Therefore, the privacy
of A and Uj is preserved. In addition, the final output sent to A is the actual output
and the intermediate values are never revealed to A, T and other internal users.
Based on the above discussions, it is clear that, apart from the initialization
step, Phase 1 and 2 are secure. In addition, the values returned from Phase 1 to 2
are pseudo-random; therefore, the sequential composition of the two Phases lead to




















(b) M1 and M2 are not friends
Figure 3.4: Case 2 of initialization step in PFR
3.5.4. Complexity Analysis. The computation and communication costs
of each party in the PFR protocol are analyzed. For the rest of this sub-section, this
work omits the cost of the Initialization step since they are negligible compared to
the encryption costs in Phase 1 and 2 of PFR.
Computation Cost. For Phase 1, the computation cost of each internal user Uj
depends on his/her counter value and number of child friends. In addition, irrespec-
tive of the counter value, Uj has to perform one encryption operation. Therefore, the
computation complexity of Uj is bounded by one encryption and O(t ∗ |Ch(Uj)|) ho-
momorphic addition operations. Whereas, the computation complexity of A mainly
depends on h and m. If h = 2, then A simply performs one encryption operation.
However, when h = 3, A’s computation complexity is bounded by O(h ∗m) homo-
morphic additions and one encryption. On the other hand, if h > 3, the computation
complexity of A mainly comes from the SMP protocol which depends on the value
of h. That is, A’s computation complexity is bounded by O(h ∗ m) homomorphic
additions and O(h) number of encryption operations. Whereas, the computation
complexity of T is bounded by O(h) decryption operations (coming from the SMP
protocol).
In Phase 2, the computation complexity of each internal user (excluding Bi’s)
depends on his/her t and s (number of shortest paths from A to Uj). Specifically,
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Uj’s computation cost is bounded by O(t ∗ s) exponentiations and homomorphic
additions. On the other hand, A has to initially compute α, which depends on the
value of h, for each Bi. Therefore, the computation complexity of A for computing
all α values is bounded by O(h ∗ m) encryption and exponentiation operations. In
addition, during the SMPA protocol, A has to randomize all components of each
potential candidate. Let n denote the number of potential candidates and s be the
maximum number of shortest paths, then the computation cost of A in the SMPA
protocol is bounded by O(s ∗ n) encryption and exponentiation operations. Overall,
during Phase 2, the computation complexity of A is bounded by O(s ∗ n) encryption
and exponentiation operations (under the assumption s ∗ n > h ∗m). Whereas, the
computation complexity of T is bounded by O(s ∗ n) decryption operations (coming
from SMPA).
Communication Cost. Without loss of generality, let K denote the Paillier
encryption key size (in practice, K should be at least 1,024 bits). During Phase 1, the
communication complexity between any two internal users is bounded byO(K∗t) bits.
Note that t may vary between each pair of users depending on their location in the
corresponding candidate network and only adjacent users (i.e., friends) communicate
to each other. Whereas, between A and all Bi’s, the communication cost is bounded
byO(K∗h∗m) bits. In addition, for the SMP protocol, the communication complexity
between A and T is bounded by O(K ∗ h) bits.
Additionally, during Phase 2, the communication cost between any two inter-
nal users is bounded by O(K ∗ t) bits, where t is the counter of the corresponding
parent user. Since A has to send Φ and α to each Bi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the communica-
tion cost between A and all Bi’s is bounded by O(K ∗ h ∗m) bits. In addition, since
each potential candidate sends the encrypted partial shares to A, the communication
cost between A and all potential candidates is bounded by O(K ∗s∗n) bits (assuming
there exist s number of shortest paths from A to each potential candidate). Finally,
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during the SMPA protocol, the communication cost between A and T is bounded by
O(K ∗ s ∗ n) bits.
3.6. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
3.6.1. Masking Number of Shortest Paths. As mentioned earlier, the
PFR protocol reveals (only to A) the number of shortest paths from A to each poten-
tial candidate Uj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. However, it is unclear how this additional informa-
tion affects the privacy of Uj. Nevertheless, this problem can be solved by randomly
masking the number of entries corresponding to each Uj without affecting his/her fi-
nal recommendation score. Suppose Zj = {Epk(Uj), 〈β1,j , γ1,j〉, . . . , 〈βs,j , γs,j〉} is the
entry corresponding to Uj, where s denotes the number of shortest paths from A to
Uj in the corresponding candidate network. Briefly, the steps involved in masking
the entry Zj by Uj are as given below, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
• Randomly mask the number of shortest paths by computing Z ′j as follows.
Z ′j = {Epk(Uj), 〈β1,j , γ1,j〉, . . . , βs+θ,j , γs+θ,j〉}
where θ is the security parameter chosen by Uj, such that βs+i,j = γs+i,j =
Epk(0), for 1 ≤ i ≤ θ. Note that the encryption scheme used in this work
(based on HPEnc+ system) is probabilistic. Therefore, encryption of 0 each
time yields different (random) ciphertext in ZN2 .
• Send the masked entry Z ′j to A
The rest of the steps are same as in Phase 2 of PFR. Observe that applying SMPA
on Z ′j yields the same result as on Zj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
3.6.2. Data Encryption and Secure Peer-to-Peer Communication.
The PFR protocol assumes there exist peer-to-peer network connectivity and the
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communication between any two users is secure. However, in practice, as it is the case
is many online social networks, communication between any two users should happen
through the social network provider (say the network administrator) for security
reasons. Another reason for this is a user may not be online at the receiving end.
In this work, users profile data are assumed to be encrypted first (using his/her
own secret key) and then stored on the server of network administrator [57]. From
user’s perspective, this assumption, which is also practical, gives more flexibility
to them since it gives more control to users on their own data. In addition, secure
communication between any two users can be achieved by establishing a secure session
(using AES session key [58]) between them. During the process of establishing a
secure session if the end user is offline, then the information corresponding to the
session key (in encrypted form using public key of end user) is stored on the network
administrator’s server. Under this scenario, the network administrator merely acts as
an intermediate router who simply stores the encrypted data sent by the sender and
delivers them to the concerned end-user after he/she logins. Note that the data to be
sent is first encrypted using the corresponding session key of sender and then stored
on the server. Therefore, only the end-user who holds the session key can decrypt
it. For example, during the initialization step of PFR, each user U first establishes
a secure session with his/her friends. Then, the value of t to be sent is encrypted
and stored on the server. Once the intended end-users (i.e., friends of U) logins into
social network, the network administrator sends the encrypted value of t to him/her
who decrypts it to know his/her counter value. Note that the session keys should be
changed occasionally for security reasons.
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3.7. EXTENSION TO PFR
In many online social networks, such as Facebook, there exist an inherent
security issue due to the information flow between different entities. For example,
consider the scenario of user U sending a message to another user V . Though the
message is encrypted using the session key of U , as explained above, it is clear that
the network administrator will know that U and V have some kind of relationship.
This is because of the fact that the communication between any two users should
pass through the network administrator. Here U and V might be friends but this
may not be the case always since a user can send a message to any other user in the
social network (i.e., no need of friendship between the two users).
In particular to the PFR protocol, this information might be too specific since
U sends an encrypted counter or some other information during Phase 1 or 2 to only
his/her parent or child nodes (i.e., friends of U). However, the network administrator
cannot distinguish which message belongs to which application. This is because the
messages are encrypted and thus the underlying application is not transparent to the
network administrator. Nevertheless, the network administrator will still know that
there exists some kind of relationship between U and the users at the receiving end.
It is unclear how this extra information will be useful to the network administrator
in deducing any private information of U .
As mentioned above, the PFR protocol might leak the additional information
that there exists some kind of relationship between U and his/her friends to the
network administrator. Note that this kind of information is never revealed to other
users in the PFR protocol. If the message flow is always between U and only his/her
friends, then the probability of guessing user Vj ∈ F (U) is a friend of U by the network
administrator is very high. Therefore, to mitigate this issue or to provide better
security, this sub-section presents an extended version (denoted by PFRrand) of the
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PFR protocol by randomly including additional users (apart from the actual friends)
to take participation in the PFR protocol without affecting the final recommendation
scores. By doing so, this work actually allows users to randomize their friend lists;
therefore, reducing the probability of guessing the friends of a user by the network
administrator.
Similar to PFR, the PFRrand protocol consists of an initialization step and
two phases. However, the methodology is slightly different from PFR. Therefore, the
key steps in PFRrand that are different from PFR are discussed below.
3.7.1. Initialization Step. To start with, the target user A selects a random
set of dummy friends (excluding the actual friends of A) from the social network,
denoted by D(A), where |D(A)| is the security parameter for A. Note that the
dummy friends can also be referred to as dummy child nodes. Then, A sets the
counter t to h − 1 and sends (δ, t) to each user Yj in F (A) ∪D(A). Where δ = 1 if
Yj ∈ F (A), and 0 otherwise. Then, each intermediate user U selects his/her random
set of dummy users D(U), stores (δ, t) and the parent user who sent the entry to
U locally (as explained below). In addition, he/she sends the updated (δ, t) entry
to users in Ch(U) ∪D(U), where Ch(U) denotes the actual child nodes of U . This
process is continued until the users at h-hop away from A receive a counter of t = 0.
Since U can receive multiple pairs of (δ, t), depending on whether U is a dummy user
or not, this work addresses the following two cases.
Case 1: If the δ values received by U are all 0’s (whereas the values of t can
be different), then U is actually a dummy user (i.e., not part of candidate network).
Under this case, U stores δ as 0 and the maximum t value received locally. Plus, U
selects the user who sent the maximum t as his/her parent (i.e., P (U)). In addition,
U sends (δ, t) to each user in Ch(U) ∪D(U) with δ ← 0 and t← t− 1.
Case 2: On the other hand, if U receives either different δ values (i.e., both
0 and 1’s) or same δ values of 1, then U is part of the candidate network. Therefore,
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U stores δ as 1 and selects the maximum t value among the entries with δ = 1 as
his/her counter value . Also, among the users who sent δ = 1, U selects the user who
sent the maximum t as Pr(U). Unlike in the previous case, U sends (1, t) to users in
Ch(U) and (0, t) to users in D(U), where t← t− 1.
At the end of the initialization step, each user who participates in the PFRrand
protocol knows whether he/she is a dummy user (i.e., δ = 0) or part of the candidate
network (δ = 1). In addition, each user knows his/her parent user (Pr(U)), actual
child users (Ch(U)), and dummy child users (D(U)).
3.7.2. Phase 1 - Secure Computation of Scalar Factors. Following
from Case 1 and 2 of the above initialization step, one can deduce the following
observation in the PFRrand protocol.
Observation 3. For any internal user U who belongs to the candidate network (i.e.,
δ = 1), Pr(U) belongs to the candidate network and is also the same as in the PFR
protocol (assuming single parent).
The basic idea of Phase 1 in PFRrand is same as in PFR. However, the only
difference is that whenever an internal node (and also A) receives the encrypted
aggregated data from his/her child nodes (i.e., users in Ch(U) ∪ D(U)), U simply
dumps the messages received from dummy child nodes (∈ D(U)). More specifically,
only the messages received from actual child nodes are used in performing further
computation by U and the resulting aggregated data is forwarded to Pr(U). Since
the messages from dummy nodes are not used for computations and following from
Observation 3, it is clear that the final output from Phase 1 is same as that of Phase
1 in PFR.
3.7.3. Phase 2 - Secure Computation of Recommendation Scores.
Similar to PFR, at the end of Phase 1 in PFRrand, A has the list of encrypted scalar
factors (i.e., Φ) for all potential users within a radius of h. Note that, as mentioned
above, these scalar factors are computed based on the candidate network. That is,
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even though dummy child friends are added for each user to provide better security,
the corresponding messages are not used during the computation of encrypted scalar
factors for each level. Thus, the final result of Phase 1 in PFRrand is equivalent to Φ
(list of encrypted scalar factors for each level).
During Phase 2, A initially sends his/her ID, Φ, and α (which is computed
similar to in PFR) to each user in F (A) ∪ D(A). Then, each participating user
Mj in PFRrand, after receiving encrypted data from his/her parent(s), computes the
encrypted shares of his/her recommendation score as mentioned in PFR. After this,
Mj sends his/her entry Zj, as defined below, to A.
Zj = {Epk(Mj), Epk(δj), 〈β1,j , γ1,j〉, . . . , βs,j , γs,j〉}
where s denotes the number of shortest paths from A to Mj and the flag δj denotes
whether or not Mj is part of the candidate network. Observe that δj is not used in
the PFR protocol. Note that, similar to PFR, the number of shortest paths can be
masked by Mj before sending it to A. For each entry Zj received, A first retrieves δj
securely as follows:
• A randomizes Epk(δj) by computing σj = Epk(δj) ∗ Epk(rj) mod N2, where rj
is a random number chosen from ZN , and sends σj to T .
• Upon receiving, T computes δ′j = Dpr(σj) and sends δ′j to A.
• A removes the randomization from δ′j to get δj, i.e., computes δj = δ′j − rj
mod N .
At the end of this step, A knows which entries belong to actual potential users (i.e.,
δj = 1) and dummy users (i.e., δj = 0). Finally, A and T involve in the SMPA
protocol to get the recommendation scores and corresponding user IDs for only those
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entries with δj = 1. Note that, the number of instantiations of SMPA in PFRrand is
the same as in PFR.
3.8. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Since the effectiveness of PFR is the same as CSM method [14], this sub-
section analyzes the computation costs of PFR based on different parameters. In
addition, the computation costs of PFRrand are compared with that of PFR.
3.8.1. Platform and Dataset Description. The experiments used Paillier
cryptosystem [55] as the underlying encryption scheme. The proposed protocols
were implemented in C, and experiments were conducted on an Intel R© Xeon R© Six-
CoreTM3.07GHz PC with 12GB memory running Ubuntu 10.04 LTS.
Since it is hard to control parameters in a real-world dataset, this work simu-
lated the environment and computed the computation costs. In all the experiments,
the minimum number of messages exchanged between any two users U and V (i.e.,
CU,V ) is assumed to be uniformly distributed in [1, 1000]. Also, this work assumes
that there is no communication delay between participating users (which further im-
plies that users are online). In addition, the number of child friends for each user
(including the target user A) is varied from 50 to 250.
3.8.2. Performance of PFR. First, the computation costs of A, T , and
internal user Uj in Phases 1 and 2 of PFR are analyzed separately. Since the run
time of Uj depends on which level he/she belongs to, the average over the computation
costs of all internal users at different levels are presented. For the rest of this sub-
section, the Paillier’s encryption key size (i.e., K) is fixed to either 1024 or 2048 bits.
The results are as shown in Figure 3.5.
For Phase 1, the value of h is set to 6 and the run time of A, T , and Uj are


























































































































(f) Total cost of PFR for K = 2048
Figure 3.5: Computation costs of PFR
at level h − 1 and h do not involve in Phase 1). As shown in Figure 3.5(a), for
Paillier key size K=1024 bits, the computation time for A, T , and Uj are 79, 30, and
4.25 milliseconds respectively when the number of child friends is 50. In addition,
the computation time of Uj varies only slightly (due to less expensive homomorphic
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operations) from 4.25 to 6 milliseconds when the number of child friends of Uj are
varied from 50 to 250. However, for A the computation time remains the same
since the cost of homomorphic addition operations are negligible compared to the
encryption operations involved in SMP. Since h is fixed, the encryption cost in SMP
remains the same irrespective of the child friends of A. Therefore, the computation
costs of A and T remains the same in Phase 1. A similar trend can be observed for
K=2048 bits as shown in Figure 3.5(b). Briefly, when the number of child friends
is 50, the computation costs of A, T , and Uj are 571, 240, and 24.25 milliseconds
respectively. Also, irrespective of the number of child friends and h, the computation
time of Uj is always significantly less than that of A and T .
During Phase 2, the computation time to find the recommendation score for
each potential candidate Uj mainly depends on m (number of A’s friends) and the
cost of SMPA which in turn depends on the number of shortest paths (s) from A to
Uj. However, for any given m, the cost to compute recommendation score for each Uj
varies with the corresponding s. Thus, the computation costs for A, T and Uj based
on varying values of s, with h = 6 and m = 50, are analyzed. As shown in Figure
3.5(c), the computation cost of Uj (averaged over different levels) increases from 0.8
to 2.4 milliseconds when s is varied from 5 to 25 for K=1024 bits. However, due
to the expensive encryption costs, the computation cost of A varies from 207 to 538
milliseconds when s is changed from 5 to 25. On the other hand, due to the decryption
costs in SMPA, the computation cost of T varies from 30 to 130 milliseconds when s
is changed from 5 to 25. A similar trend can be observed for K=2048 bits as shown in
Figure 3.5(d). In short, when s = 5, the computation costs of A, T , and Uj are 1.79,
0.24 and 0.002 seconds respectively. For any fixed parameters, the observation is that
the computation costs of A and T are increased by a factor of almost 8 whereas Uj ’s
time is increased by a factor of 2 when K is doubled.
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Based on the above results, it is clear that the computation costs incurred
due to Phase 2 are much higher than those of Phase 1. This further validates the
computational analysis of PFR as discussed in the previous sub-section.
Furthermore, the total run time of PFR based on varying values of h and
s is computed. That is, the total time took by the PFR protocol to compute the
recommendation score corresponding to the potential user Uj (similar analysis can
be deduced for other potential candidates) is computed. The number of child friends
for each potential user (and A) is fixed to 50. The results are as shown in Figures
3.5(e) and 3.5(f). For K=1024, as shown in Figure 3.5(e), the total time does not
change much when h is changed from 2 to 3 for both s =1 and 5. For example, when
s = 5, the run time of PFR varies from 241.8 to 245.8 milliseconds when h is changed
from 2 to 3. This is because the cost of Phase 1 does not change much since there
is no need of SMP when h = 2 and 3. Also, the cost of Phase 2 almost remains the
same for any fixed s (assuming m is also fixed). However, the total cost increases as
h is varied from 3 to 6. For example, when s = 5, the total time for PFR to compute
the recommendation score for Uj varies from 245.8 to 351.05 milliseconds when the
value of h is changed from 3 to 6. A similar trend can be observed for s = 1 as shown
in 3.5(e). Also, for any given value of h, the computation time of PFR is almost
increased by a factor of 1 to 2 when s is changed from 1 to 5. E.g., when h = 6,
the computation time of PFR varies from 264.25 to 351.05 milliseconds when s is
changed from 1 to 5. In addition, observe that for any fixed values of h and s, the
running time of PFR grows almost linearly with n. A similar trend can be observed
for K=2048 as shown in Figure 3.5(f).
These results show that most of the significant computation (more than 97%)
is from A and T . The computation cost incurred on all internal nodes is negligible. In
addition, for A and T the computation time grows linearly with s and n. Furthermore,
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when the size of encryption key doubles, the computation time of PFR increases by
almost a factor of 8 for any fixed parameters.
3.8.3. Computation Costs - PFR Vs. PFRrand. In this sub-section, the
computation costs of PFRrand are compared with that of PFR. As mentioned earlier,
remember that adding random dummy users to take participation in the PFRrand
protocol does not change the relative ordering among the recommendation scores of
actual potential candidates. That is, the effectiveness of PFRrand is the same as in
PFR. For the rest of this sub-section, the Paillier key size K is fixed to 1024 bits
(however, similar analysis can be deduced for K=2048 bits). The comparison results
are as shown in Figure 3.6.
For any given parameters, it is important to note that the computation cost
of Phase 1 in PFRrand is the same as in PFR. This is because of the fact that though
additional dummy child friends are added for each internal user (and A), he/she will
operate on the encrypted partial data received from only his/her actual child friends.
Therefore, first, the computation costs of Phase 2 in PFR and PFRrand are compared.
Suppose the number of actual child friends for each potential candidate Uj
be 50, i.e., |Ch(Uj)| = 50. Also, let m = 50, n = 100 and h = 6. Now, the
computation time of Phase 2 in the proposed protocols for varying n′ and s = 1 are
evaluated, where n′ denotes the total number of dummy random users participating
in the PFRrand protocol. As shown in Figure 3.6(a), the computation time of Phase
2 in PFR is 5.2 seconds and it remains constant with varying n′ since Phase 2 is
independent of n′ in PFR. Whereas, the computation cost of Phase 2 in PFRrand
varies from 5.93 to 6.27 seconds when n′ is varied from 10 to 50. It is clear that
the extra cost incurred on Phase 2 in PFRrand is not much compared to the cost of
Phase 2 in PFR. A similar trend can be observed for s = 5 as shown in Figure 3.6(b).
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of computation costs of PFRrand and PFR for K=1024
seconds whereas in PFRrand the cost varies from 14.61 to 14.95 seconds when n
′ is
varied from 10 to 50.
Also, the total run time of PFR and PFRrand for varying s and by fixing n
′ to
50 are computed. The results are as shown in Figure 3.6(c). The total run time of
PFR varies from 13.99 to 57.25 seconds whereas that of PFRrand varies from 15.07 to
58.33 seconds when s is changed from 5 to 25. Irrespective of the value of s and for
any fixed parameters, observe that the total run time of PFR is very close to that of
PFRrand.
Note that friend recommendations are generally performed on a daily basis
(not a real-time application); therefore, the performances of the proposed protocols
are reasonable in practice. The main advantage is that the proposed protocols make it
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possible to do friend recommendations even in a privacy-preserving social networking
environments.
3.9. CONCLUSION
Friend recommendation has become an important service in many online so-
cial networks to enhance the development of the entire network as well as to provide
opportunities for users to expand their social relations. Due to privacy concerns
[19, 21, 51], many online social networks are providing various privacy settings to
users. Existing friend recommendation algorithms do not take privacy into account;
therefore, they are not applicable in privacy-preserving social networking environ-
ments. This work first proposes a new two-phase private friend recommendation
(PFR) algorithm based on the network structure as well as real messages exchanged
between users. The proposed PFR protocol computes the recommendation scores of
all users within a radius of h from the target user A by using the similarity metric
proposed in [14] as a baseline. In particular, the proposed protocol generates the
(scaled) recommendation scores along with the corresponding user IDs in such a way
that the relative ordering among the users in the TOP-K list of recommended users
is preserved (i.e., same accuracy as in [14]).
This work provided an in-depth security and complexity analysis of the pro-
posed PFR protocol and also addressed various implementation details related to
PFR in practice. In addition, this work demonstrated a new security issue in the
current online social networks due to the inherent message flow information between
different entities. To mitigate this issue or to provide better security, an extended
version of the proposed protocol was developed using randomization technique. Also,
this work showed the practical applicability of the proposed protocols through exten-
sive experiments based on different parameters.
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4. INTEREST-DRIVEN PRIVATE FRIEND RECOMMENDATION
Most of the time, users in a social network wish to find new friends based on
their own interests. For instance, a biologist working on cancer cells may want to
collaborate with new researchers who are also interested in the relevant topics. A
computer science researcher may want to make new friends who are working in the
field of “Social Networks”. Due to social engineering attacks [24], a social network
user may not want to keep his or her personal profile publicly available. Especially,
considering the size of the social network users (which is usually in millions), finding
new friends based on both social network structure and users’ dynamic interest will
make the private friend recommendation (PFR) problem even more challenging.
This section considers the set of users within a group G and proposes a set of
solutions to privately recommend friends within this group based on users’ specific
interests. Note that the profile information of users even within a public group (where
any one can join the group) can be treated as private and is not allowed to be visible
to other users even within the same group. This work assumes that users’ friend lists
and social tags are private information. In other words, friendship between any two
users is treated as sensitive information, and the social tags [59] attributed to any
given user are also treated as private.
4.1. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Consider G as a group in a social network, and let n be the number of users
in G. Without loss of generality, let u1, . . . , un denote the users in G and T be the
ontology tree constructed from the domain knowledge using the possible set of social
tags in G. For the rest of this section, assume that T is constructed by the domain
expert such as the network administrator (more details on how to construct T are
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given in later part of this section). Each leaf node in T represents a set of social tags,
and each internal node denotes a category Ck representing the generalization for the
set of social tags under the sub-tree rooted at Ck. In addition, each user ui’s social
tags in G is denoted by Tags(ui), and let FL(ui) denote the list of user IDs who are
friends of ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In the literature, there exist several similarity metrics for
computing the social closeness score (denoted as SC) between any two given users
as part of the friend recommendation process [15]. Each metric has its pros and
cons, and this work adopts the scoring function proposed in [13] that considers both
social tagging information and topological structures in the social network. More
specifically, the social closeness between two users ui and uj in G is defined as [13]:
SC(ui, uj) = θ · NS(ui, uj) + (1− θ) · TS(ui, uj) (4.1)
where θ is a control parameter; NS(ui, uj) and TS(ui, uj) are the network and social
tag similarity scores, between ui and uj, respectively defined as below:








In the above equations, Cosine(ui, uj) denotes the cosine similarity between the friend-
ship vectors vi and vj of ui and uj respectively. vi and vj are constructed from FL(ui)
and FL(uj), such that |vi| = |vj| = n (denoting the size of global friend list space of
G) and vi[k] = 1 if uk ∈ FL(ui), otherwise vi[k] = 0, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. ||vi|| and ||vj||
denote the Euclidean norms of vi and vj. Cat(ui) and Cat(uj) denote the category
(deepest non-leaf) nodes of ui and uj. SP(Cat(ui), Cat(uj)) denotes the trail of nodes
in the shortest path between nodes Cat(ui) and Cat(uj). Nodes k and k + 1 are two
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consecutive nodes in the shortest path, and d(k) is the depth of node k. More details
about how to compute the SC score are given later along with a concrete example.
Given a snapshot of the social network for users in G along with their social
tags and the ontology tree T , the problem of computing social closeness score between
a target user ui and any other user uj based on Equation 4.1 is straightforward.
However, the problem becomes non-trivial if the network structure and social tags
are considered as users’ private information. More formally, this work considers the
following users’ profile information as private:
• Friendship between any two users ui and uj should not be revealed to any other
user. This further implies that FL(ui) is only known to ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• The social tags attributed to ui (i.e., Tags(ui)) are only known to ui.
Without loss of generality, let Gi = 〈uj1 , . . . , ujt〉 denote a subset of users in G
(excluding ui and friends of ui). Here Gi is chosen by ui either based on his/her
interest or randomly. More details regarding this issue are provided in later sections.
According to the above privacy assumptions, the goal of this work is to securely
compute the social closeness scores between a target user ui and each user in Gi in
a privacy-preserving manner. As mentioned earlier, this process is termed as private
friend recommendation (PFR). Formally, the PFR problem is defined as:
PFR(ui, Gi ⊂ G)→ 〈SC(ui, uj1), . . . , SC(ui, ujt)〉 (4.2)
At the end of the PFR protocol, only ui knows the values of SC(ui, ujl), for 1 ≤ l ≤ t.
Once the t social closeness scores are known to ui, he/she can either send friend
requests to or browse through the pubic profiles of Top-K users (i.e., users in Gi with
Top-K social closeness scores with ui) and take action accordingly.
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4.2. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
This work proposes two new PFR protocols based on both the network struc-
ture and users’ social tags using a knowledge based ontology tree. Both of the pro-
posed protocols compute the social closeness scores, according to Equation 4.1, be-
tween a target user ui in a group G (who wish to make new friends) and each user
in a subset Gi ⊂ G without revealing any private information between each other.
The first protocol assumes FL(ui) and FL(ujl) as private information and the social
tags of users can be revealed to the network administrator, and returns SC(ui, ujl)
without disclosing FL(ui) to ujl and FL(ujl) to ui, for ujl ∈ Gi. Whereas the second
protocol assumes not only FL(ui) and FL(ujl) are private but also their social tags
are private. At the end of both protocols, only user ui knows the SC(ui, ujl) scores
(based on Equation 4.1) and decides whether to send a friend request to user ujl , for
ujl ∈ Gi. Specifically, the main contributions of this work are summarized below:
• Interest-Driven. The first protocol provides more flexibility to users in terms
of identifying new friends based on his/her specific interest (i.e., choosing users
in Gi based on his/her own interest).
• Security. The second protocol preserves the privacy of individuals (i.e., both
users’ friend lists and social tags) and is more secure than the first protocol.
The security guarantee follows the well-known semi-honest security definition
of secure multiparty computation [38, 39, 50].
• Trade-off. Since some of the users’ computations in the first protocol are
pushed to the network administrator, the first protocol is more efficient than
the second protocol. However, this efficiency gain comes at the expense of
releasing the users’ social tags directly to the network administrator. Therefore,
the proposed protocols act as a trade-off between efficiency and security.
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4.3. RELATED WORK
Social network analyses have been utilized for various business applications [6],
such as predicting the future [28] and developing recommendation systems [31, 32].
With growing interest of expanding a person’s social circle, friend recommendation
has become an important service in many online social networks. Along this direc-
tion, Silva et al. [11] proposed a novel user calibration procedure based on a genetic
algorithm to optimize the three indices derived from the structural properties of social
networks. Xie [12] designed a general friend recommendation framework to recom-
mend friends based on the common interests by characterizing user interests in two
dimensions - context (e.g., location and time) and content. By treating friend rec-
ommendation process as a filtering problem, Naruchitparames et al. [10] developed a
two-step approach to provide quality friend recommendations by combining cognitive
theory with a Pareto-optimal genetic algorithm. As an independent work, Gou et al.
[13] developed a visualization tool (named as SFViz) that allows users to explore for
a potential friend with an interest context in social networks. Their method considers
both semantic structure in social tags and topological structures in social networks to
recommend new friends. Nevertheless, Facebook uses the “People You May Know”
feature to recommend friends based on the simple “friend-of-a-friend” approach [34].
Due to various privacy issues [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], many users keep their
profile information as private. Existing friend recommendation techniques [9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14] do not take users’ privacy into consideration; therefore, they cannot be
directly applied. Only recently, researchers have focused on developing accurate and
efficient PFR methods. Along this direction, Dong et al. [35] proposed a method to
securely compute and verify social proximity between two users using cosine similarity
in mobile social networks. This work differs from theirs in two aspects. First, the
problem setting is entirely different from theirs. This work considers the users in an
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(Internet-based) online social network group G, where the friend list and social tags of
each user are treated as private. Whereas, in their approach, (mobile social network)
users physical location is treated as private. Secondly, the proposed protocols in
this section identify new friends based on the users’ friend lists and their social tags.
More specifically, this work uses the scoring function proposed in [13] to measure
the social closeness between any two given users. On the other hand, their approach
identifies new friends who happen to be in the physical vicinity of the target user.
That is, social coordinates (users geographical location) are used to compute the
social proximity between users.
Machanavajjhala et al. [36] formally analyzed the trade-offs between accuracy
and privacy of private friend recommendations using differential privacy [37]. In their
work, the authors used the existing differentially private algorithms as underlying sub-
routines and assumed the existence of PFR protocols based on these sub-routines.
They have considered network topology based similarity metrics. Different from their
work, the algorithm proposed in this section securely computes the social closeness
score using the similarity scoring function proposed in [13] which is based on the social
network topology as well as the social tagging information. Also, according to their
claims, if privacy is to be preserved when using the common neighbors utility function
[15], only users with Ω(log n) friends can hope to receive accurate recommendations,
where n is the number of users in the graph. Furthermore, the users’ privacy in
[36] is based on differential privacy. Whereas, the privacy guarantees in this work
are based on an entirely different security model, namely the semi-honest security
definitions from the field of secure multiparty computation (SMC) [38, 39]. Under
the SMC model, this work develops accurate PFR protocols. In particular, the second
proposed protocol recommends friends accurately, similar to [13], and simultaneously




This sub-section highlights the steps involved in computing the category for a
given user ui ∈ G using the social tags of ui and T . Then, details on how to compute
the cosine similarity score between friend lists of users are given. Also, a running
example for computing the social closeness score based on Equation 4.1 is presented.
Finally, this sub-section describes the properties exhibited by additive homomorphic
encryption schemes. Notations commonly used throughout this section are given in
Table 4.1.
4.4.1. Computation of User Category. Without loss of generality, let
C1, . . . , Cm be the deepest non-leaf category nodes (in order from left to right) in T .
For any given user ui ∈ G, assign ui to exactly one of the category nodes, which is
referred to as “category of user ui” and is denoted by Cat(ui), as follows[13]:
• Compute the matching score (MS) between ui’s social tags and each category
node Cx as given by
MS(ui, Cx) =
∑
h ∈ Tags(ui) ∩ allTags(Cx) f(h) · d(h)∑
y ∈ allTags(Cx) f(y)
(4.3)
where f(h) and d(h) denote the frequency and depth of tag h respectively; h
is common to Tags(ui) and allTags(Cx), where Tags(ui) returns all tags of user
ui, and allTags(Cx) returns tags under category Cx and all ancestors of Cx
(omitting root node as stated in[13]).
• Next, pick the largest score and assign user ui to the corresponding category
(i.e., Cat(ui)).
Example 1. Consider the sample ontology tree T for a group G as shown in
Figure 4.1. Following from the Figure 4.1, all tags related to category C3 are given as
allTags(C3) = {t1, t2, t3, C3, C1,3}. Without loss of generality, let Bob be a user in G
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Table 4.1: Some common notations used in the interest based PFR protocols
HPEnc An Additive Homomorphic Probabilistic Encryption system
G A group in social network with users u1, . . . , un
T Ontology tree (generated by the network administrator)
〈Epk, Dpr〉 A pair of HPEnc based encryption and decryption function
with (pk, pr) as the corresponding public-private key pair
FL(ui) Friend list of user ui
Tags(ui) Social tags of user ui
Cat(ui) Category of user ui
s Scaling factor
such that Tags(Bob) = {t1, t3, t9, C3}. The common set of tags between C3 and Bob
are {t1, t3, C3}. In addition, suppose the frequencies are as follows. f(t1) = 2, f(t2) =
5, f(t3) = 1, f(C3) = 4, and f(C1,3) = 2. The matching score between C3 and Bob,
based on Equation 4.3, is computed as follows:
MS(Bob, C3) =
f(t1) · d(t1) + f(t3) · d(t3) + f(C3) · d(C3)
f(t1) + f(t2) + f(t3) + f(C3) + f(C1,3)
=
2 · 3 + 1 · 3 + 4 · 2




4.4.2. Computation of Cosine Similarity Score. For any given user ui ∈
G, let vi denote the friendship vector of ui derived from the global user space of G.
More formally, the vector vi is defined as follows:
vi[k] =
 1 if uk ∈ FL(ui)0 otherwise
That is, if vi[k] = 1, then the user corresponding to the k
th dimension in the global




C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
t1 t2 t3
Figure 4.1: A sample ontology tree T along with the tags of C3
u1, . . . , un (in order). If vi[k] = 1, then ui and uk are friends. Note that if ui is not a
friend of uk, then the entry corresponding to the k
th dimension (i.e., vi[k]) is zero.
Once the users’ friend lists are represented as friendship vectors, cosine simi-
larity between the friend lists of any two users ui and uj gives the cosine of the angles
between the corresponding two friendship vectors vi and vj. The following equation
captures the cosine similarity score between ui and uj.
Cosine(ui, uj) =
∑n
k=1 vi[k] · vj[k]
||vi|| · ||vj|| = ~vi • ~vj (4.4)
where ||vi|| and ||vj|| denote the Euclidean norms∗ of vi and vj; ~vi and ~vj are the nor-
malized vectors of vi and vj respectively, and ~vi •~vj denotes the dot product between
~vi and ~vj. Note that the value of cosine similarity score always varies between 0 and
1. A cosine similarity score of zero means the two friendship vectors are orthogonal,
and the two users have no friends in common. On the other hand, a cosine similarity
score of one means that the friend lists of both users are the same.









Example 2. Consider two users Bob and Charles in G with friend lists {Ellis, Reed,
Beck,Walton} and {Beck, Steele, Bush,Walton,Hodges} respectively. Assume that
{Ellis, Beck,Bob, Francis,Walton, Steele, Bush, Joseph,Reed, Charles,Hodges} is
the global user space of G. Observe that Francis and Joseph are neither friends
of Bob nor Charles. The friendship vectors for both Bob and Charles are given
as vBob = 〈1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0〉 and vCharles = 〈0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1〉 respec-
tively. In addition, ||vBob|| = 2 and ||vCharles|| =
√
5. Therefore, the cosine similarity









4.4.3. Computation of Social Closeness Score. Following from the above
discussion, consider the scenario of computing the social closeness score between Bob
and Charles in G based on Equation 4.1. Let C3 and C4 be the categories of Bob and
Charles respectively. Since NS(Bob, Charles) = Cosine(Bob, Charles) = 1√
5
, let us
compute the tag similarity score between Bob and Charles. As mentioned earlier,
the tag similarity score between Bob and Charles is given by




where SP(C3, C4) denotes the trail of nodes on the shortest path between C3 and C4,
node k and k + 1 are the consecutive nodes on the shortest path, and d(k) denotes
the depth of node k in T . From Figure 4.1, SP(C3, C4) = {C3, C1,3, Root, C4,5, C4}.
In addition, d(C3) = d(C4) = 2, d(C1,3) = d(C4,5) = 1, and d(root) = 0. Therefore,
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Suppose the value of control parameter θ be 0.75. Then, the social closeness score
between Bob and Charles, based on Equation 4.1, is given as:
SC(Bob, Charles) = 0.75 · NS(Bob, Charles)
+ (1− 0.75) · TS(Bob, Charles)
= 0.75 · 0.44 + 0.25 · 0.18
= 0.375
4.4.4. Additive Homomorphic Probabilistic Encryption. The proposed
protocols utilize an additive homomorphic encryption scheme which is probabilistic
in nature. In the literature, such a scheme is referred to as HPEnc system (such
as Paillier cryptosystem [55]). Let Epk and Dpr be the encryption and decryption
functions of an HPEnc system with pk and pr as their public and private keys re-
spectively. In addition, let N be the RSA modulus generated by taking the product
of two large primes of similar bit-length. For any given plaintext messages a, b, and
c ∈ ZN , the HPEnc system exhibits the following properties:
• Homomorphic Addition - Epk(a+ b) = Epk(a) · Epk(b) mod N2
• Scalar Multiplication - Epk(c · a) = Epk(a)c mod N2
• Semantic Security - Given a set of ciphertexts and public key pk, it is not
feasible for a computationally bounded adversary to derive any information
about the plaintexts [49, 56].
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4.5. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
This sub-section presents the proposed PFR protocols which compute the
social closeness score between a target user ui (who wish to make new friends) and
each user in Gi in a privacy-preserving manner. Both the proposed protocols aim
at protecting the users’ friend lists and social tags. At the end of the proposed
protocols, only user ui knows the social closeness scores and decides whether to send
a new friend request (such as “Add Friend” in Facebook) to users in Gi. This work
explicitly considers the following set of assumptions for the rest of this sub-section:
• User ui owns Epk and Dpr: an additive homomorphic encryption scheme (e.g.,
Paillier cryptosystem [55]) with a public-private key pair (pk, pr) and N as the
ring size.
• Each user in G is aware of all the other users within group G which is practical
since it is indeed the case in many online social networks. However, the friend
list and social tags of each user are treated as private information.
4.5.1. The PFRα Protocol. This protocol assumes that users’ social tags
can be revealed to the network administrator to reduce the work load of users. Though
this protocol releases users’ social tags to the network administrator for efficiency
reasons, users’ friend lists are kept as private. In addition, assume that the network
administrator acts as a third party and there is no collusion between users and the
network administrator. At the end of the PFRα protocol, the final social closeness
scores are revealed only to ui. Under the above assumptions, the PFRα protocol
consists of the following two stages:
Stage 1 - Computation of Users’ Categories: During this Stage, the network
administrator first computes ontology tree T and assigns each user uk ∈ G to one of
the deepest non-leaf nodes as the category of uk (denoted as Cat(uk)), and updates
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T by attaching the user ID of uk to the node Cat(uk). At the end of this stage, the
updated T is published to the users in G.
Stage 2 - Secure Computation of Social Closeness Scores: User ui first picks
a list of users Gi ⊂ G (omitting ui and friends of ui) based on his/her interest using
T resulted from Stage 1. After this, ui securely computes the social closeness scores
with each user in Gi.
The overall steps involved in the PFRα protocol are highlighted in Algorithm
4. Briefly, during Stage 1, each user sends his/her social tags to the network admin-
istrator. Upon receiving the tags, the network administrator computes the category
for each user based on Equation 4.3, and assigns each user ID to his/her category
by updating T . After this, the network administrator publishes the updated T to
the users in G. During Stage 2, target user ui first selects a subset of users in G
(i.e., Gi) based on his/her own interests. For example, if ui is interested in the
users under category Cj, then he/she can compute the social closeness scores with
only the users in Cj based on Equation 4.1. To be more generic, this work assumes
that Gi can contain users from multiple categories. For each user ujl in Gi, ui can
compute TS(ui, ujl) locally since he/she knows (from the published T in Stage 1)
where node Cat(ujl) (i.e., the category node for user ujl) is located in T . However,
to compute NS(ui, ujl), one need to calculate the cosine similarity score between ui
and ujl securely such that FL(ui) is not revealed to ujl and FL(ujl) is not revealed to
ui. This can be seen as a sub-problem of secure similar document detection (SSDD).
Therefore, existing SSDD techniques can be utilized to solve the problem of secure
computation of cosine similarity [60, 61]. Finally, for each ujl ∈ Gi, ui combines
NS(ui, ujl) and TS(ui, ujl) based on the linear operation in Equation 4.1 to derive the
social closeness score SC(ui, ujl), for 1 ≤ l ≤ t.
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Algorithm 4 PFRα(ui, Gi ⊂ G)→ 〈SC(ui, uj1), . . . , SC(ui, ujt)〉
Require: pr is known only to ui, pk is public, and FL(uk) are private ∀ uk ∈ G
1: User uk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n do:
(a). Send Tags(uk) to the network administrator
2: Network administrator:
(a). Receive Tags(uk) from uk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n
(b). Generate T
(c). for each uk ∈ G do:
• Compute Cat(uk) based on Equation 4.3
(d). Update T and publish it in G.
3: User ui:
(a). Select Gi using T
(b). Compute TS(ui, ujl), for l = 1, . . . , t
(c). for k = 1 to n do:
• ~vi[k]← vi[k]||vi||
• Vi[k]← Epk(s · ~vi[k]), where s is a scaling factor
(d). Send Vi to user ujl , for l = 1, . . . , t
4: User ujl , for 1 ≤ l ≤ t do:
(a). Receive Vi from ui




s·~vjl [k] mod N2; send Zjl to user ui
5: User ui:
(a). for 1 ≤ l ≤ t do:
• Receive Zjl from ujl
• Decryption: Φ(ui, ujl)← Dpr(Zjl)
• SC(ui, ujl)← θ · Φ(ui,ujl )s2 + (1− θ) · TS(ui, ujl)
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Note that the control parameter θ in Equation 4.1 can be either a static value
(published by the network administrator) or chosen by the target user ui. Now, the
steps involved in each of the two stages are explained in detail.
Stage 1 - Computation of Users’ Categories. The overall steps for Stage 1 in
PFRα are highlighted as steps 1 and 2 in Algorithm 4. Initially, each user uk sends
his/her social tags (i.e., Tags(uk)) to the network administrator, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Note that since this work assumes that there is no collusion between the network
administrator and the users, it implies that Tags(uk) is not leaked to users other than
uk. Upon receiving the social tags, an ontology tree T is constructed by the network
administrator, such that the leaf nodes in T are individual tags and the internal nodes
(i.e., non-leaf nodes) can be regarded as categories denoting the generalization of all
social tags under the sub-tree rooted at the internal node [13, 62]. Since social tags
can be represented as XML data, T can be generated automatically as long as the
network administrator knows the frequencies of individual tags.
Once T is built, the network administrator computes the matching score (MS)
between each uk and all deepest non-leaf nodes and assigns the category that have
the highest MS score to uk as the category node for uk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Once the
users are assigned to each category, this information (i.e., update T by including user
IDs to their respective categories in T ) is published within the group.
Stage 2 - Secure Computation of Social Closeness Scores. Following from
Stage 1, the leaf nodes in T (published by the network administrator) represent the
user IDs and the deepest internal nodes represent the category label for all the leaf
nodes under it. Suppose user ui wants to compute the social closeness scores with t
users in the group Gi ⊂ G denoted by uj1 , . . . , ujt . The observation is that since ui
knows the categories of all users in G, he/she can choose the potential users based on
his/her own interests. For example, consider a biology community where users can
be assigned to multiple research categories in T . If ui is interested only in researchers
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working on cancer cells, he/she can choose only the user IDs under the cancer cell
category and proceed further. Here the users in Gi may belong to multiple categories
and the choice purely depends on the ui’s interest. The main steps involved in Stage
2 of PFRα are shown as steps 3, 4, and 5 in Algorithm 4.
Once the group Gi is chosen, user ui first computes TS(ui, ujl) locally, for
1 ≤ l ≤ t. After this, he/she computes ~vi (using FL(ui)) and encrypts the scaled ~vi
component-wise. Note that since the encryption scheme operates on group ZN (i.e.,
integer-based) and as ~vi[k] can be fractional, one need to convert ~vi[k] to integer before
encrypting it, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. This is the reason for multiplying each component of
~vi (i.e., ~vi[k]) with the scaling factor s before encrypting it. In general, the value of
s can be either static (chosen by the network administrator) or dynamic (varies with
target user ui). For example, when ~vi[k] = 0.143 (3-point precision), a scaling factor
(i.e., s) of 1000 is sufficient. Briefly, ui computes Vi[k] = Epk(s ·~vi[k]), for 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
and sends Vi to each user ujl , for 1 ≤ l ≤ t. Note that if s ·~vi[k] is still a floating-point
number, then the ceiling value of it can be taken before encryption. For the rest of
this section, the proposed protocols simply omit the ceiling operation.
Upon receiving Vi from ui, each user ujl performs the following operations:
• Compute the friendship vector vjl from FL(ujl) and normalize it to get ~vjl . That




• Compute the encrypted cosine similarity score as Zjl =
∏n
k=1 Vi[k]
s·~vjl [k] mod N2
and send Zjl to user ui. Note that the exponent term should be an integer in ZN ;
therefore, ujl first multiplies ~vjl by s component-wise (scaling) and then uses
the result s · ~vjl [k] (which is an integer in ZN) to do exponentiation operations.
Finally, ui performs the following operations to compute the final social closeness
scores for each ujl , where 1 ≤ l ≤ t:
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(s · ~vi[k]) · (s · ~vjl [k])
= s2 · (~vi • ~vjl)
= s2 · NS(ui, ujl)
• Compute SC(ui, uj) using Φ(ui, ujl) and TS(ui, ujl) as follows.
SC(ui, ujl) = θ ·
Φ(ui, ujl)
s2
+ (1− θ) · TS(ui, ujl)
= θ · NS(ui, ujl) + (1− θ) · TS(ui, ujl)
4.5.2. Complexity Analysis of PFRα. Next, the computation and com-
munication costs of the PFRα protocol are analyzed.
Computation Cost. During Stage 1, users in G simply sends their social tags
to the network administrator; therefore, there is no computation involved on the
user side. The main computation cost of PFRα occurs in Stage 2. During Stage
2, the target user ui creates his/her friendship vector, normalizes and encrypts it
component-wise (from step 3(c) of Algorithm 4). In addition, ui has to perform t
number of decryptions (from step 5(a) of Algorithm 4). However, in practice, the
value of t is less than n and the time for encryption is almost the same as the
decryption operation under Paillier cryptosystem [55]. Therefore, the computation
cost of ui is bounded by O(n) encryptions, where n is the number of users or size of
the global user space in G.
Furthermore, only the users in Gi participate in Stage 2 of PFRα. Since
each user ujl ∈ Gi receives a vector of size n from the target user ui, the number
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of exponentiation operations performed by ujl is bounded by O(n), at step 4(c) of
Algorithm 4. On the other hand, the total computation cost by all users in Gi is
bounded by O(t · n) exponentiations. In general, an encryption is much costlier than
an exponentiation operation; therefore, the computation cost of ui is more significant
compared to ujl .
Communication Cost. In the PFRα protocol, the communication occurs be-
tween each user and the network administrator (from Stage 1). In addition, the
communication also happens between ui and each user in Gi (from Stage 2). During
Stage 1, each user uk ∈ G sends his/her social tags to the network administrator (fol-
lowing from step 1(a) of Algorithm 4). Therefore, the communication cost between
each user uk and the network administrator is bounded by O(|Tags(uk)|) in bits.
In addition, during Stage 2, the target user ui sends his/her encrypted vector
which is of size n to each user ujl ∈ Gi (following from step 3(d) of Algorithm 4).
Hence, the communication cost between ui and ujl is bounded by O(z · n) in bits,
where z denotes the encryption key size in bits.
4.5.3. Security Analysis of PFRα. The PFRα protocol assumes that the
users’ friend lists are private. In addition, the social tags of one user are not revealed
to any other user. One issue with the PFRα protocol is the assumption of revealing
social tags to the network administrator. Though the social tags of one user are not
revealed to the other user, the above issue may not be allowed in some cases where
users wish to hide their tags even from the network administrator.
Also, the category information of each user is published publicly within the
group in order to compute TS(ui, ujl), for 1 ≤ l ≤ t. However, revealing the category
of a user may leak valuable information as it is possible to extract the semantic
relations by analyzing the possible set of tags under this category. Therefore, to
achieve better protection, it is desirable to move the computation of matching scores
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(i.e., computation of users’ categories) from the network administrator to individual
users giving rise to the second proposed protocol as explained in the next sub-section.
4.5.4. The PFRβ Protocol. In this sub-section, in addition to the friend
lists, assume that users’ social tags as well as their category information are private.
Along this direction, a new PFR protocol (denoted as PFRβ) is proposed. The basic
idea is to allow users to have control over their data which is achieved by perform-
ing the data critical computations locally and the remaining non-local operations
are performed on the encrypted data using the additive homomorphic properties as
discussed earlier.
Since the users cannot directly compute their categories locally, PFRβ explic-
itly includes an initialization step to compute T including the frequency details of
each tag globally as follows. In the PFRβ protocol, unlike PFRα, the users of G do
not send their social tags directly to the network administrator. Instead, one of the
user acts as a coordinator (say un) and each user sends his/her encrypted social tags
(using the public key of the network administrator) to un. Then, un appends his/her
own encrypted social tags to the list and permutes the global list of encrypted social
tags, and sends it to the network administrator. After receiving, the network admin-
istrator decrypts each entry and constructs T as mentioned in the PFRα protocol.
However, in addition to the tags as leaf nodes, the network administrator also in-
cludes its global frequency information (i.e., each leaf node in T looks like 〈ω, f(ω)〉,
where ω is a social tag). After this, the network administrator publishes T to the
users in G. Since un permutes the global list of encrypted social tags, the network
administrator cannot trace back which social tag belongs to which user.
Apart from the above initialization step, the PFRβ protocol consists of the
following two stages similar to PFRα. However, the steps involved in each stage of
PFRβ are different from that of PFRα.
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Stage 1 - Computation of Users’ Categories: During Stage 1, each user locally
computes the category corresponding to him/her using the ontology tree T published
by the network administrator from the initialization step.
Stage 2 - Secure Computation of Social Closeness Scores: The target user ui
randomly chooses t users (denoted as set Gi ⊂ G) and computes the social closeness
scores with each user in Gi. At the end of this step, only ui knows the scores and
nothing is revealed to either ui or other users in Gi.
The overall steps in PFRβ are highlighted in Algorithm 5. Now, the steps
involved in each stage of the PFRβ protocol are discussed as below.
Stage 1 - Computation of Users’ Categories. Unlike in PFRα, the social tags of
users in G are not disclosed to the network administrator in PFRβ. Instead, assume
that the network administrator simply publishes the ontology tree T (where the leaf
nodes consist of social tags and their frequencies) and makes it available to users in G.
From T , each user uk ∈ G can locally compute the matching scores between Tags(uk)
and tags of each category (deepest non-leaf nodes) and identifies the one with largest
matching score as his or her corresponding category Cat(uk). Since the computation
is done locally and as Tags(uk) is only known to user uk, the category Cat(uk) is only
known to user uk. Thus, social tags of users as well as his/her category information
are kept private. Stage 1 is shown as step 1 in Algorithm 5.
Stage 2 - Secure Computation of Social Closeness Scores. Following from Stage
1, user ui knows only his/her category Cat(ui) (similarly, other users in G knows their
respective categories). When user ui wants to make new friends from a group of users
Gi ⊂ G (note that Gi is chosen randomly after excluding ui and friends of ui from G),
ui can securely compute the cosine similarity with each of them as discussed in the
PFRα protocol. That is, ui computes the component-wise encryption of the scaled
normalized friend list vector as Vi[k] = Epk(s ·~vi[k]), for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. However, for any
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Algorithm 5 PFRβ(ui, Gi ⊂ G)→ 〈SC(ui, uj1), . . . , SC(ui, ujt)〉
Require: pr is known only to ui; s, pk, θ, and T are public (note that T is resulted
from the initialization step); FL(uk), Tags(uk), and Cat(uk) are private ∀ uk ∈ G
1: User uk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n do:
(a). Compute uk’s category Cat(uk)
2: User ui:
(a). Select Gi randomly from G
(b). for k = 1 to n do:
• ~vi[k]← vi[k]||vi||
• Vi[k]← Epk(s · ~vi[k])
(c). for x = 1 to m do (where m denotes the number of deepest non-leaf
category nodes)
• Compute TS(ui, u′x) (where u′x is a dummy user such that Cat(u′x) =
Cx)
• Zi[x]← Epk(s2 · TS(ui, u′x))
(d). Send Vi and Zi to each user in Gi
3: Each user ujl ∈ Gi, for 1 ≤ l ≤ |Gi| = t:





s·~vjl [k] mod N2
(d). Sjl ← Y s·θjl · Zi[Index(Cat(ujl))]s·(1−θ) mod N2
(e). Send Sjl to ui
4: User ui:
(a). for 1 ≤ l ≤ t do:
• Receive Sjl from user ujl
• SC(ui, ujl)← Dpr(Sjl )s3
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user ujl ∈ Gi, the main difficulty is to compute TS(ui, ujl) without revealing either
Cat(ui)/Tags(ui) to ujl or Cat(ujl)/Tags(ujl) to ui.
This work solves the above issue (i.e., securely computing TS(ui, ujl), ∀ ujl ∈ Gi)
as follows. Letm be the number of deepest non-leaf category nodes in T (in order from
left to right), denoted by C1, . . . , Cm. User ui computes TS(ui, u
′
x), for 1 ≤ x ≤ m,
where u′x is a dummy user such that Cat(u
′
x) = Cx. Then ui computes the encrypted
vector of scaled tag similarity scores, i.e., Zi[x] = Epk(s
2 ·TS(ui, u′x)), for 1 ≤ x ≤ m
(the reason for scaling by s2 instead of s will become clear later). After this, ui sends
Vi and Zi to each user in Gi. Upon receiving the values, each user ujl ∈ Gi performs
the following operations:
• Compute the normalized friendship vector ~vjl using FL(ujl).
• Compute the encryption of (scaled) cosine similarity score between the friend-
ship vectors of ui and ujl as Yjl =
∏n
k=1 Vi[k]
s·~vjl [k] mod N2. This step is shown
as step 3(c) in Algorithm 5. As mentioned earlier in the PFRα protocol, observe
that Yjl = Epk(s
2 · (~ui •~ujl)) and the scaling factor here is s2. This is the reason
for scaling TS(ui, u
′
x) by the same value (i.e., s
2), for 1 ≤ x ≤ m.




· Zi[Index(Cat(ujl))]s·(1−θ) mod N2 (4.5)
where Index(Cat(ujl)) returns the index corresponding to the category node
of ujl . That is, if Cat(ujl) = Cp, then Index(Cat(ujl)) = p. Observe that
Zi[Index(Cat(ujl))] is the encryption of (scaled) tag similarity score between
ui and ujl (i.e., TS(ui, ujl)). In addition, since θ (resp., 1 − θ) is a fractional
value, one need to first multiply it by the scaling factor s before doing the
exponentiation operation. After this, ujl sends Sjl to ui.
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Finally, ui gets a list of SC scores by decrypting each Sjl value and dividing it by s
3
(removing the total scaling factor). Note that users in Gi with Top-K SC scores can
be treated as potential candidates to be new friends of ui; therefore, ui can either
send friend requests to them or filter them further by browsing through their profiles.




is always equal to the social closeness score between ui and ujl, as defined
in Equation 4.1, where 1 ≤ l ≤ t.
Proof. Following from the above discussions, it is clear that Yjl = Epk(s
2·(~ui•~ujl)) and
Zi[Index(Cat(ujl))] = Epk(s
2 · TS(ui, ujl)). Based on these values, one can simplify






2 · (~ui • ~ujl))s·θ · Epk(s2 · TS(ui, ujl))s·(1−θ)
= Epk(s
3 · θ · NS(ui, ujl)) · Epk(s3 · (1− θ) · TS(ui, ujl))
= Epk(s
3 · SC(ui, ujl))
From the above deductions, it is clear that Dpr(Sjl) = s




always holds, for 1 ≤ l ≤ t.
Example 3. Refer to the sample ontology tree T as shown in Figure 4.1. Let
the scaling factor s be 10 (for simplicity) and control parameter θ be 0.7. Suppose
Bob be the target user (i.e., ui = Bob) and Charles be the user chosen by Bob
randomly from group G (i.e., Charles ∈ Gi where Gi ⊂ G). As mentioned in Exam-
ple 1, let their friendship vectors be vBob = 〈1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0〉 and vCharles =
〈0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1〉 respectively. Without loss of generality, let C3 and C4 be
the categories of Bob and Charles. That is, Cat(Bob) = C3 and Cat(Charles) = C4.
†To make the presentation clear, this work simply omits the modN2 operation in the expansion
of Equation 4.5. However, this does not affect the derived results.
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Note that in the PFRβ protocol the category information is computed locally; there-
fore, it is not revealed to other users. Based on the PFRβ protocol, various interme-
diate results along the process of computing social closeness score between Bob and
Charles are shown in Table 4.2. The final social closeness score between Bob and
Charles (i.e., SC(Bob, Charles)) is known only to Bob.
4.5.5. Complexity Analysis of PFRβ. Next, the computation and com-
munication costs of the PFRβ protocol are analyzed.
Computation Cost. Similar to the PFRα protocol, the main computation cost
of PFRβ comes from Stage 2. During Stage 2, the target user ui encrypts the nor-
malized friendship vector component-wise (following from step 2(b) of Algorithm 5)
and also encrypts the tag similarity scores with each of the deepest non-leaf category
nodes (from step 2(c) of Algorithm 5). This results in O(n+m) encryptions. In ad-
dition, ui has to perform t number of decryptions (from step 4(a) of Algorithm 5). As
mentioned earlier, t is smaller than n in practice and also the cost of encryption and
decryption are almost the same. Therefore, the computation cost of ui is bounded
by O(n + m) encryptions. Furthermore, each user ujl ∈ Gi performs n number of
exponentiation operations (following from step 3(c) of Algorithm 5). Therefore, the
computation cost of each ujl is bounded by O(n) exponentiations, for 1 ≤ l ≤ t.
Communication Cost. Unlike the PFRα protocol, PFRβ does not need the
help of network administrator for computing the users’ categories; therefore, there is
no communication between users and the network administrator. The only commu-
nication in the PFRβ protocol is between ui and each user in Gi (which occurs during
Stage 2 of PFRβ). During stage 2, the target user ui sends his/her component-wise
encryption of normalized friendship vector (which is of size n) and the encrypted
values of m tag similarity scores to each user ujl ∈ Gi. Hence, the communication
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Table 4.2: Various intermediate results during the computation of social closeness
score between Bob and Charles based on the PFRβ protocol
For s = 10 and θ = 0.7
Bob:
~vBob = 〈0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0.5, 0, 0〉
VBob = 〈Epk(5), Epk(5), Epk(0), Epk(0), Epk(5), Epk(0), Epk(0), Epk(0), Epk(5), Epk(0), Epk(0)〉
ZBob = 〈Epk(75), Epk(75), Epk(200), Epk(18), Epk(18), Epk(18), Epk(18)〉
Send VBob and ZBob to Charles
Charles:
~vCharles = 〈0, 0.4, 0, 0, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0, 0, 0, 0.4〉
YCharles = Epk(40) and ZBob[Index(Cat(Charles))] = Epk(18)






cost between ui and ujl is bounded by O(z · (n + m)) in bits, where z denotes the
encryption key size in bits.
4.5.6. Security Analysis of PFRβ. During the initialization step, the co-
ordinator randomly permutes the global encrypted list of social tags before sending
it to the network administrator. Due to this, the network administrator cannot trace
back which social tag belongs to which user. Therefore, the revelation of global list
of social tags to the network administrator can be treated as minimum information
leakage. Other than this, the only communication in PFRβ is between ui and each
user ujl in Gi. Since the computation of matching scores is performed by each user
locally using their respective social tags, the privacy of users social tags and their
category information is preserved. In addition, the friendship vector which is sent
to ujl is encrypted by ui. Since the private key is only known to ui, the privacy of
friend lists of ui and ujl is also preserved (following from [60, 61]). Hence, the PFRβ
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protocol preserves the privacy of users’ friend lists along with their social tags and
category information under the assumption that the global list of social tags can be
revealed to the network administrator. At the end of the PFRβ protocol, the social
closeness scores (which is also the desired output) are revealed only to ui.
4.6. OTHER SECURITY CONCERNS
This sub-section discusses additional security issues related to the disclosure
of social tags and common network attacks, such as substitution, man-in-the-middle
and impersonation attacks. Also, it analyzes how these attacks are related to the
proposed protocols.
4.6.1. Security of Social Tags. The proposed protocols assume that social
tags are part of a user’s personal profile. Since social tags may reveal a user’s certain
interests or hobbies that the user may not want others to know, it is in the user’s
best interest to keep them private. Some social networks (e.g., Facebook) provide
an option that allows users to set their friend lists and personal profiles as private
information. Although it is not known whether this is the case for every social
network, having such an option is a general trend due to increasing privacy concerns.
Therefore, the main goal of the PFRβ protocol is to protect the security of users’
social tags and friend lists.
In the current implementation, the PFRβ protocol may reveal the number of
social tags of a user ua to a user ub when ua sends his or her encrypted social tags to
ub. The size or the number of social tags hardly leaks privacy information regarding
a user’s profile. However, one can eliminate this problem by adding dummy social
tags to ua’s encrypted social tag list to hide the actual number of social tags that ua
has. At the end, these dummy tags can be removed by the network administrator
when he or she builds the social-tag or ontology tree.
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4.6.2. Common Threats Related to Network Security. The proposed
protocols utilize the underlying communication structure provided by the social net-
work service provider. Therefore, as long as the underlying communication network
is secure against the man-in-the-middle and impersonation attacks, the proposed pro-
tocols are safe from these attacks. On the other hand, substitution attack is possible
under the proposed protocols when the adversary in consideration is malicious (in-
stead of assuming semi-honest in the current protocols). By substitution attack, a
user can substitute his or her actual input with some fake input to probe other users’
private information. Since the protocols only return similarity scores, the substitution
attack will not be very effective.
To further prevent substitution attack, one could employ some auditing and
outlier detection protocols as follows. The system keeps an audit trail for each user.
When a user with potential abnormal or malicious behavior is detected, the network
administrator can run an audit check to compare the user’s profile information and
the actual information used by the user during the execution of the proposed pro-
tocols. This auditing process could be implemented as a secure protocol under the
accountable computing framework [63, 64] so that the user’s private information is
not leaked during the auditing process. Developing such a secure protocol is not
straightforward, and this work leaves it as part of the future research direction.
4.6.3. Dimension Reduction of the Global Friend Space. When n be-
comes very large, in terms of millions, the computation cost of the proposed protocol
becomes very expensive. The increased cost mainly due to the size of the global
user/friend space G. Some potential ways to reduce the size of the global friend
space are discussed below.
Applicability of Secure Set Intersection Protocols. Since the individual friend
list of a user is generally very small, one may want to use secure set intersection
protocols (that do not need to represent a friend list under G) to compute the Cosine
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similarity between two friend lists. However, by using the secure set intersection
protocols proposed in [65, 66, 67] to compute the Cosine similarity, the intersection
size between two friend lists will be disclosed. This can allow an adversary (e.g., the
target user ui) to probe other users’ friend lists. To maximize security protection
of friend lists, this work adopted the secure dot product protocol [68] that bypasses
the direct computation of the intersection of two friend lists. Since the friend list
vectors are normalized, the dot product between two normalized lists gives the Cosine
similarity between the two lists. In this way, the intersection size is never disclosed.
Generating a Virtual Friend Space. When n is large and to improve compu-
tation efficiency of the proposed protocols, this work adopts universal hash functions
to generate a virtual friend space that is much smaller than the actual global friend
space. For example, ui initially develops a mapping function (converting IDs in a
friend list to an integer domain). This mapping function is sent to every user ujl in
Gi. From the mapping function alone, ujl can map every ID or user log-in in his or
her friend list to an integer value within a proper domain. Then through a universal
hash function, these values can be mapped to a vector whose size is much smaller
than |G|. Given a positive integer v, a universal hash function, denoted by ha,b, can
be derived as follows:
ha,b(v) = (a · v + b mod p) mod |S| (4.6)
where p is a prime, a ∈ Z∗p = {1, 2, . . . , p − 1} and b ∈ Zp = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. The
hash function has the property of collision resistant. The universal hash function is
commonly used to map values from some larger domain to chosen smaller domain and
is especially useful when the number of elements in a set is much smaller than their
domain size. From the existing results [69], it has been shown that when p is close
to 9,000 and the number of elements is limited by hundreds, the Cosine similarities
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computed under this virtual global friend space are almost 100% accuracy. Therefore,
by utilizing a universal hash function, this work claims that the proposed protocols
can still be efficient and preserve maximum security without sacrificing much or any
accuracy.
4.7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This sub-section empirically analyzes the computation costs of the proposed
protocols based on various parameters. Since both proposed protocols compute the
social closeness scores based on the scoring function in [13], their accuracy is exactly
similar to the method in [13]. In particular to PFRβ, if the social closeness scores
are too low (i.e., if the scores are less than a threshold value set by ui), then ui can
repeat the process with a new subset of users (i.e., by selecting different Gi).
The proposed protocols were implemented in C, and experiments were per-
formed on a Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM 3.07GHz PC running Ubuntu 10.04 with
12GB of RAM. In the evaluations, Paillier cryptosystem [55] is used due to its effi-
ciency (however, any other HPEnc system can be used to implement the proposed
protocols). The Paillier key size is set to 1,024 bits (a commonly accepted key size)
for all the experiments. Though the results presented here are for key size 1,024 bits,
one can observe that the computation time increases by almost a factor of 6 when the
size of encryption key doubles and other parameters are fixed. Furthermore, assume
that on average each user uk ∈ G contains 100 tags (i.e., |Tag(uk)| = 100). First,
the computation costs of the proposed protocols are analyzed separately based on
different parameters. Then, the computation costs of both protocols are compared
under various parameter settings.
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4.7.1. Computation Cost of PFRα. The computation cost of PFRα mainly
depends on n (i.e., number of users in G) and t (i.e., number of users in Gi). In ad-
dition, the computation cost of ui is different from ujl (observe that the computation
cost is the same for every user in Gi). Therefore, the computation costs of ui and
ujl for different values of n and m are analyzed. Note that the computation cost of
ui and ujl are independent of m (i.e., number of non-leaf category nodes) since the
computation of user category information is shifted to the network administrator in
PFRα. Hence, for the rest of this sub-section, the value of m is fixed to 20. The
results are as shown in Figure 4.2.
For t = 50 and varying values of n, the computation cost of uj and ujl are
given in Figure 4.2(a). From Figure 4.2(a), it is clear that the computation of ui is
significantly high (due to expensive encryption operations) compared to ujl (due to
less expensive homomorphic addition and multiplication operations). For example,
when n = 1000, the computation cost of ui and ujl are 2.703 and 0.024 seconds
respectively. As expected, the computation cost of ui and ujl is almost doubled
whenever n is increased by a factor of two. For instance, as shown in Figure 4.2(a),
the computation cost of ui is changed from 2.703 to 5.277 seconds when n is changed
from 1000 to 2000. However, for ujl , the increase in the computation cost is very
small (due to less expensive homomorphic addition and multiplication operations)
when n increases.
Similarly, for n = 1000 and varying values of t, the computation cost of uj and
ujl are as shown in Figure 4.2(b). Since the computation cost of ujl is independent
of t, it remains constant (0.024 seconds) for varying values of t. On the other hand,
the number of decryption operations performed by ui depends on t. As shown in
Figure 4.2(b), the computation cost of ui grows linearly with t. For example, the
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Figure 4.2: Computation costs of PFRα for varying n and t with m = 20
4.7.2. Computation Cost of PFRβ. Unlike PFRα, the computation cost
of PFRβ also depends on m in addition to the parameters n and t. Therefore, the
run time of ui and ujl for varying values of n, t, and m are computed. The results
are as shown in Figure 4.3.
First, the values of t and m are fixed to 50 and 20, respectively. The compu-
tation cost of ui and ujl for varying values of n are shown in Figure 4.3(a). It is clear
that, following from Figure 4.3(a), the computation cost of both ui and ujl grows
linearly with n. For example, when n is changed from 1000 to 5000, the computation
cost of ui varies from 3.02 to 13.304 seconds respectively. A similar trend can be
observed for ujl .
Next, when n = 1000 and m = 20, the run time of ui and ujl for varying t are
computed. As shown in Figure 4.3(b), the computation cost of ui varies from 3.02 to
3.54 seconds when t is changed from 50 to 250. Whereas, the computation cost of ujl
varies from 0.287 to 0.404 seconds when t is varied from 50 to 250. In a similar way,
the run time of ui and ujl for varying values of m are computed when n = 1000 and
t = 50. As shown in Figure 4.3(b), observe a linear growth in the computation time
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Figure 4.3: Computation complexity of PFRβ for varying n, t, and m
Based on the above results, it is clear that the computation cost of ui and ujl
in both PFRα and PFRβ does not increase much for varying t. This further justifies
the complexity analysis given in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.5.
4.7.3. Comparison: PFRα Vs. PFRβ. This sub-section compares the
total run time of PFRα with PFRβ (excluding the cost of the network administrator)
as shown in Figure 4.4. First, the values of t andm are fixed to 50 and 20, respectively.
As shown in Figure 4.4(a), the total run time of both protocols grows linearly with
increasing n. Note that since |Tag(uk)| is fixed to 100 for each user uk ∈ G, the total
run time of PFRβ is not significantly more compared to that of PFRα for any given
n. For example, when n = 3000, the total run time of PFRα and PFRβ are 7.953
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Figure 4.4: PFRα Vs. PFRβ
Given n = 1000 and t = 50, the total run time of both proposed protocols
for varying values of m are as shown in Figure 4.4(b). As expected, the run time
of PFRα (which is 2.727 seconds) remains to be constant for increasing values of m
since the computation cost of both ui and ujl in the PFRα protocol are independent
of m. However, the run time of PFRβ varies from 3.307 to 3.64 seconds when m
is increased from 20 to 100 since the computation cost of ui in the PFRβ protocol
depends on m.
4.8. CONCLUSION
In the recent years, friend recommendation application has gained significant
importance since it helps for the development of entire network structure which is
essential for the survival of any online social network. In addition, it also helps users
to meet new friends based on their dynamic interests and to expand their social
connections. However, the existing friend recommendation techniques do not take
users’ privacy into consideration; therefore, they are not applicable in a privacy-
preserving environment. This work proposed two private friend recommendation
algorithms for users in a group G by leveraging both social tags and network topology.
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For a given target user ui, the proposed protocols compute the social closeness scores
between ui and each user in the subset Gi ⊂ G in a privacy-preserving manner by
utilizing an ontology tree T constructed by the domain expert such as the network
administrator.
In the first protocol (referred to as PFRα), the target user ui can choose the
users in Gi (excluding ui and friends of ui) based on his/her interest. Also, PFRα is
more efficient than the second protocol (referred to as PFRβ), however, this efficiency
gain comes at the expense of releasing users social tags to the network administrator.
Whereas the PFRβ protocol facilitates user ui to compute the social closeness scores
with some random users in G (i.e., Gi is chosen randomly after excluding ui and
friends of ui from G). Nevertheless, PFRβ protects the privacy of users’ friend lists,
social tags, and category information.
The proposed protocols in this work assume that the network administrator
builds the ontology tree T based on the domain knowledge of a particular group.
However, extending it to multiple groups may not seem to be feasible at this point of
time and this issue will be addressed in the future work. Though the second protocol is
more secure, the amount of computation involved for user ui is high when the number
of deepest non-leaf (category) nodes in T is large. In addition, this work used social
tags as the content of user information. However, computing the similarity between
user profiles based on other details such as education, hobbies, and employment in
a privacy-preserving manner can still be achieved using the secure computation of
cosine similarity. Therefore, investigation of the above issues can be regarded as an
interesting direction for future work.
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5. PRIVACY-PRESERVING FRIEND RECOMMENDATIONS USING
COMMON NEIGHBORS METHOD
Given the snapshot of an OSN, the social closeness between two users is termed
as proximity. The proximity measures can be divided into two groups. The first group
includes measures based on node neighborhoods, such as common neighbors, Jaccard
Coefficient, Adamic/Adar, and preferential attachment. Whereas, the second group
consists of measures based on ensemble of all paths, such as Katz, Hitting time, Page
Rank and SimRank. It was shown that the common neighbors method acts as a good
proximity measure to capture the similarity among the nodes of a social network
[15, 16]. Therefore, to be more concrete, this work uses the common neighbors as the
similarity measure to compute the social closeness between two users.
More specifically, this work proposes two novel methods for solving the friend
recommendation in a privacy-preserving manner. What is private to a given user
is subjective in nature. In particular to the friend recommendation problem, the
friendship between any two users can be treated as sensitive/private information.
This assumption is realistic and being supported by many on-line social networks
(e.g., Facebook) where users are allowed to hide their friend lists. Most often, when
people maintain friendship with trusted ones, there is much information flowing from
one to another. Thus, revealing this sensitive information (i.e., friendship) poses a
great threat to user privacy through social engineering attacks [24, 25].
Additionally, this work assumes that the social network operators or adminis-
trators are not allowed to know the users’ friend lists or other private personal profile
information. Note that this is a commonly made assumption in the related problem
domains [57, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76] and such a social network has several signifi-
cant benefits. For example, when a user’s private personal profile is not disclosed to
the social network, the network would likely not face any obligations about leaking
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its users’ private information when the network were hacked. Therefore, the social
network has the incentive not to know the user’s private information, like friend list.
On the other hand, the user has more incentive to use the social network since the
user has complete control over his or her private information. Due to increasing pri-
vacy concerns, such a private social network will become more common, and it can
attract non-traditional users. In addition, since the social network provider does not
know the network structure and users’ private profile, this may allow private organi-
zations or government agencies to outsource their internal communication means to
such networks. This work claims that there will be a market for such a privacy social
network. Hence, by assuming users’ friend lists are private, this work proposes a set
of solutions by utilizing the common neighbors method as the underlying similarity
metric.
5.1. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Consider a social network where the friendship of two users is treated as pri-
vate, and the other users should not know whether the two users are friends. In this
social network, users can still create or share contents among themselves, but the
friend list of a user (considered private) should be accessible only by the user him-
self/herself. The challenge is how to perform friend recommendation in such a social
network without disclosing the friendship information between any two users to the
other users. This problem is referred to as privacy-preserving friend recommendation
(PPFR), and the goal of this section is to develop PPFR protocols based on the
common neighbors method [15]. Let A be the target user (who wish to make new
friends) in a social network and Fr(A) denote the friend list of A. Without loss of
generality, assume Fr(A) = 〈B1, . . . , Bm〉, where Bi is a friend of A, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
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More formally, the PPFR protocol can be defined as follows:
PPFR(A,Fr(A), F r(B1), . . . , F r(Bm), t)→ S (5.1)
where t denotes a threshold value (more details are given in the later part of this
section) and S denotes the list of recommended friends whose common neighbors
scores with A are greater than or equal to t. The following properties hold for a
PPFR protocol:
(a). Privacy-Preserving
• Fr(A) (resp. Fr(Bi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ m) is never disclosed to users other than
A (resp. Bi) in a social network.
• Similarly, ∀ Cij ∈ Fr(Bi), Fr(Cij) is never disclosed to users other than
Cij.
• Friend lists of all users including A are never disclosed to the social network
administrator T .
• At the end of PPFR, S is only known to A.
(b). Correctness
• S ⊆ ⋃mi=1 Fr(Bi)
• ∀ C ∈ S ⇒ Φ(A,C) ≥ t
where C is a recommended new friend to userA and Φ(A,C) denotes the common
neighbors score between A and C. In order to recommend C as a new friend to
A, Φ(A,C) should be greater than or equal to t.
The proposed PPFR protocols provide a means to recommend friends to A based
on the common neighbors scores in a privacy-preserving manner. Note that only the
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users with scores ≥ t are recommended as friends to A. However, A may not wish to
make friendship just simply based on the recommendations from the PPFR protocols.
That is, A might want to know more about the recommended friends before sending
the friend requests. Nevertheless, after the recommendations, A can visit the web
pages corresponding to the recommended friends and send friend requests to only
those users who are of particular interest to A.
For example, consider the case where Bob and Charles are recommended as
new friends to Alice using the PPFR protocols. Without loss of generality, let us
assume that Charles was in the same high school as Alice and Bob has no relationship
with Alice (except that they share one or more common friends). Once Alice receives
the recommendations, she may find that Charles is her old schoolmate from the web-
page of Charles. Then, Alice can simply send a friend request only to Charles (whom
she might trust) and may ignore Bob (if Alice does not want to establish friendship
with unknown users).
5.2. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
This work presents two novel PPFR protocols that satisfy the well-known se-
curity definitions in the literature of secure multiparty computation (SMC) [50, 77].
The first protocol adopts an additive homomorphic encryption scheme [55] and pro-
vides a very strong security guarantee. It also utilizes a universal hash function for
improving the efficiency. This efficiency comes at the expense of degraded accuracy
due to the involved hash collisions. Whereas, the second method utilizes the con-
cept of protecting the source privacy [78] through randomizing the message passing
path and recommends friends accurately. The main contributions of this work are
summarized as follows:
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• Security - Both of the proposed protocols preserve the privacy of each user
(i.e., his/her friend list). Nevertheless, both protocols leak different additional
information thereby providing different security guarantees. The first protocol
leaks the common neighbors scores to a third party (denoted by T , such as the
network administrator). However, due to hashing and random permutation,
T cannot identify the source of this scores. The second protocol reveals the
common neighbors scores which are≥ t to user A. Since the protocol guarantees
the source privacy, A cannot determine the sources corresponding to the scores.
A detailed security analysis of both protocols is provided in the later part of
this section.
• Accuracy & Efficiency - The first protocol uses a universal hash function,
so it is expected to produce false positives and false negatives due to hash
collisions. Also, its efficiency depends on the parameters of hash function and
the size of Fr(A). On the other hand, the second protocol recommends friends
accurately and its efficiency depends mainly on the size of both Fr(A) and
friend lists of A’s friends.
• Flexibility - The proposed protocols act as a trade-off among security, accu-
racy and efficiency; therefore, a domain expert can choose between these two
protocols depending on the requirements of a specific application.
5.3. RELATED WORK
This sub-section first reviews upon the existing work related to friend recom-
mendations in OSNs. Then it discusses the private social networks and the existing
PPFR algorithms. Also, it summarizes the literature work on secure multiparty
computation along with the security definition adopted in this paper.
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5.3.1. Existing Friend Recommendation Algorithms in OSNs. So-
cial network analyses have been utilized for various business applications [6, 27], such
as predicting the future [28] and developing recommender systems [29, 30, 31, 32].
With growing interest of expanding a person’s social circle, friend recommendation
has become an important service in many OSNs. Along this direction, researchers
from both academia and industry have published much work. In particular, Chen
et al. [9] evaluated four recommender algorithms, which utilize social network struc-
ture and/or content similarity, in an IBM enterprise social networking site Beehive
through personalized surveys. Their analysis showed that algorithms based on social
network information produce better-received recommendations. A novel user cali-
bration procedure was proposed by Silva et al. [11] based on a genetic algorithm to
optimize the three indices derived from the structural properties of social networks.
Xie [12] designed a general friend recommendation framework to recommend friends
based on the common interests by characterizing user interests in two dimensions -
context (e.g., location and time) and content.
By treating friend recommendation process as a filtering problem, Naruchit-
parames et al. [10] developed a two-step approach to provide quality friend recom-
mendations by combining cognitive theory with a Pareto-optimal genetic algorithm.
Gou et al. [13] developed a visualization tool (named as SFViz) that allows users
to explore for a potential friend with an interest context in social networks. Their
method considers both semantic structure in social tags and topological structures
in social networks to recommend new friends. The correlation between social and
topical features in three popular OSNs: Flickr, Last.fm, and aNobii has been stud-
ied by Aiello et al. [33] to analyze friendship prediction. Their results showed that
social networks constructed solely from topical similarity captured the actual friend-
ship accurately. Nevertheless, Facebook uses the “People You May Know” feature to
recommend friends based on the simple “friend-of-a-friend” approach [34].
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5.3.2. Private Social Networks. In current online social networks (OSNs),
such as Facebook and Google+, users do not have full control of their own data.
Though the OSN providers facilitate users with various privacy options, this will not
guarantee the privacy of user’s data since the data are stored on the server of an
OSN provider (assuming the data are not encrypted). In addition, with the past
history of data leaks and privacy controversies [79, 80], users have many trust issues
with OSN providers. To address various security concerns in OSNs, researchers have
been working to develop decentralized architectures for OSNs where social networking
service is provided by a federation of nodes (i.e., peer-to-peer networks). Along this
direction, much work has been published such as [81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86].
Most recently, Nilizadeh et al. [87] proposed a decentralized architecture (re-
ferred to as Cachet) to efficiently support users with the central functionality of
OSNs while providing security and privacy guarantees. Cachet uses a combination
of techniques, namely distributed hash tables and attribute based encryption [88], to
protect confidentiality, integrity, availability of user content as well as the privacy of
user relationships. In particular, they developed a gossip-based social caching algo-
rithm to speedup the process of loading the data in newsfeed application. However,
their scheme is entirely different from the work presented in this section. First, their
decentralized architecture involves no network provider and the communication hap-
pens directly between users. In this work, user’s data are encrypted and stored on
the server of an OSN. Therefore, the problem setting in this paper is orthogonal to
their model. Second, the algorithm proposed in [87] is to support newsfeed applica-
tion (under peer-to-peer network architecture) whereas this paper focuses on friend
recommendation application. Third, the peer-to-peer based social network system in-
curs heavy computation as well as communication costs on the users. Therefore, this
work focuses on conventional OSN framework where the data resides on the server of
an OSN.
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The decentralized architecture in OSNs is a more restricted model since it
avoids the use of an OSN provider altogether. Also, it was claimed in [76] that
decentralization is an insufficient approach since it leaves the user with an enviable
dilemma: either sacrifice availability, reliability and convenience by storing data either
on his/her machine or entrust his/her data to one of the several providers that he/she
probably does not know or trust any much more than he/she would with a centralized
provider. Therefore, this work explicitly assumes that user’s data are encrypted at
first place, for privacy and security reasons, and then sent to an OSN. Under such
an architecture, where user’s encrypted data are stored on the OSN’s server, various
schemes, such as [57, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75], have been proposed to protect users’
privacy through cryptography. Nevertheless, even after proper encryption of user’s
data, centralized provider cannot be trusted for various reasons. For example, a
malicious provider can show different users divergent views of the system state. This
behavior is referred to as server equivocation [76].
Along this direction, the authors in [76] developed a novel framework for
social network applications, referred to as Frientegrity, that can be realized with
an untrusted service provider. In Frientegrity, the service provider sees only the
encrypted data and cannot deviate from correct execution without being detected.
Therefore, their system preserves data confidentiality and integrity. However, as
mentioned in [76], Frientegrity reveals social relations to the service provider whereas
in this work social relations (i.e., friend lists) are protected from the service provider.
Also, in their method, the target userA discovers the new friends by searching through
the access control lists of his/her friends for potential FoF (i.e., friend-of-a-friend) that
he/she might want to become friend with. However, such a process is not allowed
from user’s privacy perspective since this reveals the friend lists of A’s friends to A.
On the other hand, in this work, friend list of a user is never revealed to other users.
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This work assumes that users as well as the OSN provider are semi-honest.
However, in the case of malicious model, the proposed protocols can be combined
with the techniques from [76] in order to mitigate the server equivocation problem.
5.3.3. Existing PPFR Algorithms in OSNs. Due to various privacy is-
sues [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], many users keep their friend lists private. Only
recently, researchers have focused on developing accurate and efficient PPFR meth-
ods. Along this direction, Dong et al. [35] proposed a method to securely compute
and verify social proximity between two users using cosine similarity in mobile social
networks. This work differs from theirs in two aspects. First, the problem setting
in this section is entirely different from theirs. More specifically, this work assumes
users’ friend lists are kept as secret; thus, who are involved in the computation is not
revealed before hand. Whereas, in their approach, participating users are aware of
one another, and only their social closeness is securely computed and verified to de-
termine the new friendship. Secondly, the proposed protocols in this work are purely
based on the user IDs and does not need any pre-computation from a server. On the
other hand, their approach assumes that the social coordinates (which may change
often due to the mobility of users) for individual users are pre-computed by a trusted
central server which is a violation of user privacy.
Machanavajjhala et al. [36] estimated the trade-offs between accuracy and
privacy of private friend recommendations using differential privacy [37, 54]. In their
work, the authors used the existing differentially private algorithms as underlying sub-
routines and assumed the existence of PPFR protocols based on these sub-routines.
Also, according to their claims, if privacy is to be preserved when using the common
neighbors utility function, only users with Ω(log n) friends can hope to receive accu-
rate recommendations, where n is the number of users in the graph. In this work,
the privacy guarantees are based on an entirely different security model, namely
the semi-honest security definitions from the field of secure multiparty computation
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(SMC) [38, 39, 50]. Under the SMC model, this work develops accurate PPFR pro-
tocols. In particular, the second proposed protocol recommends friends accurately
irrespective of the size of users’ friend list and simultaneously preserves the privacy
of each user.
Recently, Samanthula et al. [89] proposed a new private friend recommenda-
tion algorithm using a specific scoring function [14, 53] that takes the social network
structure as well as the number of real message interactions among social network
users into consideration. For a given target user A, their method computes the rec-
ommendation scores of all potential users who reside within a radius of r (≥ 2) in
the corresponding candidate network of A. When r = 2, the snapshot of the social
network in their approach is the same as the one considered in this work. Never-
theless, the scoring function adopted in this work (i.e., common neighbors method)
is entirely different from theirs, and the protocols proposed in this section are more
secure in the perspective of protecting friendship information.
5.3.4. Secure Set Operations. At the first glance, secure set operation
protocols [66, 67, 90] related to intersection and union may be adopted to solve the
proposed friend recommendation problem. There are two main challenges to use these
secure set operations protocols: one is related to computation efficiency and the other
is related to security. For example, let illustrate the challenges using the protocols
proposed in [67] since these protocols seem most suitable to solve the proposed friend
recommendation problem.
First of all, to generate encrypted polynomial representation of friend lists of
A’s friends is computationally expensive because the polynomials f1, . . . , fm from all
users B1, . . . , Bm need to be multiplied together to generate f = Π
m
i=1fi and f needs
to be computed based on the encrypted coefficients of f1, . . . , fm. Since the degree or
the number of coefficients of fi discloses the size of the friend list of Bi, one need to
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hide the actual degree. Let make the matter simple and assume f1, . . . , fm have the
same degree denoted by d. Therefore, the degree of f is bounded by m · d.
According to [67], the computation of f needs to be done sequentially. That is,
B1 sends the encrypted f1, denoted E(f1) to A (serving as a router), where E(f1) =
{E(f1[d]), . . . , E(f1[0])} and f1[j] is a coefficient for 0 ≤ j ≤ d. Then A sends E(f1)
to B2, and B2 returns E(f1 · f2) to A. B2 needs to perform d2 exponentiations to
produce E(f1 · f2). A repeats the above process with each remaining user. However,
the computation increases from Bi to Bi+1. Specifically, the computation cost of the
ith user Bi is bounded by i ·d2 exponentiations. For Bm, the cost is m ·d2. As a result,
even when d and m are small (e.g., m = 50 and d = 200), the computation costs for
some users are much higher than the proposed protocol (detailed complexity of the
proposed protocols is given in the later part of this section).
In addition, more computation is needed to actually identify the element in
the union above the threshold. In particular, it needs to call another secure protocol
“IsEq” to verify if two ciphertexts correspond to the same plaintext. The “IsEq”
protocol is the same as the “testRecord” protocol given in [91]. The “testRecord”
protocol is not straightforward to implement, and it needs to be called m · d times.
This further reduces the computation efficiency comparing to the proposed protocols.
Furthermore, it takes m sequential rounds for A to compute E(f), so the throughput
in the proposed protocol is much higher.
Moreover, since the polynomial f needs to be evaluated by each Bi based on
his or her private dataset. This evaluation will not produce the correct result if A
randomizes E(f) in order to hide the actual user IDs. On the other hand, if A does
not randomize E(f), Bi will know who (among his or her current friend list) will be
recommended as new friends for A. It is not clear how to prevent this information
leakage if one adopts the aforementioned secure set operation protocols.
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5.4. PRELIMINARIES
This sub-section presents some concepts and properties related to universal
hash functions, additive homomorphic encryption schemes, and common neighbors
methods which are used throughout the section. Some of the common notations used
in this section are highlighted in Table 5.1.
5.4.1. Universal Hash Function. Consider a set of integers L = {0, 1, . . . , l−
1}. The goal is to map the integers from domain L to a smaller domain V =
{0, 1, . . . , s − 1} (where s < l) with minimum number of collisions. This can be
achieved by a universal hash function [92]. Given a positive integer x ∈ L, a univer-
sal hash function ha,b is defined as follows:
ha,b(x) = (a · x+ b mod p) mod s (5.2)
where p is a prime ≥ l, a and b are randomly chosen from Z∗p = {1, 2, . . . , p − 1}
and Zp = {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} respectively. The universal hash function has the property
of collision resistant. This is because, ∀x, y ∈ L, h(x) − h(y) mod v is uniformly
distributed in V . That is the chance of collision between x and y is 1
s
. (Note that
there is no perfect hash function without collisions.)
5.4.2. Additive Homomorphic Probabilistic Encryption. The proposed
first protocol uses an additive homomorphic encryption scheme (denoted as HEnc)
that is probabilistic in nature. Let E and D be the encryption and decryption func-
tions of an HEnc system with pk and pr as their respective public and private keys.
Suppose N∗ is the RSA modulus or the group size, and it is a part of the public key
pk. Given two plaintexts x1, x2 ∈ ZN , an HEnc system has the following properties:
• The encryption function is additive homomorphic: Epk(x1) ·Epk(x2) = Epk(x1+
x2).
∗The product of two large prime numbers of similar bit-length.
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Table 5.1: Common notations used in the PPFR protocols
HEnc An additive homomorphic probabilistic encryption scheme
PPFR Privacy-preserving friend recommendation
SMC Secure multiparty computation
〈E,D〉 A pair of encryption and decryption functions in an HEnc System
〈pk, pr〉 Public and private key pair corresponding to 〈E,D〉
ha,b(x) Hash value of an integer x, and ha,b is an universal hash function
s The domain size of the hash function ha,b
Fr(A) The friend list of user A
B or Bi One friend of A
C or Cij One friend of B or Bi, or any user in a social network
t A threshold value for recommendation condition
• Given a constant c ∈ ZN and Epk(x1): Epk(x1)c = Epk(c · x1).
• The encryption function has semantic security as defined in [56]. Briefly, a set
of ciphertexts do not provide additional information about the plaintext to an
adversary.
There are many HEnc systems available in the literature. However, this work uses
the Paillier’s encryption scheme [55] due to its efficiency.
5.4.3. The Common Neighbors Method. Let A and C be two users in
a social network such that C /∈ Fr(A). Then, the common neighbors score (denoted
as Φ) for A and C is defined as the number of friends/neighbors that A and C have
in common [93]. More formally,
Φ(A,C) = |Fr(A) ∩ Fr(C)| (5.3)
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Note that the common neighbors score is computed between two-hop neighboring
nodes. Therefore, in order to recommend new friends for user A, consider the users
who are two hops away from A as the possible candidates.
Example 3. Consider the sample two-hop snapshot of the social network for Alex
as shown in Figure 5.1. The figure shows all the users who are at most two hops
away from Alex. The goal is to recommend new friends to Alex. Let us assume
that t = 2. From Figure 5.1, it is clear that the set of potential candidates are
〈Baker,Bob, Evans,Martin,Wilson〉. The friend lists and the common neighbors
scores for Alex and each one of the potential candidates are as shown in Table 5.2.
Since Φ(Alex,Baker) = 2 and Φ(Alex,Martin) = 2, Baker and Martin are recom-
mended as new friends to Alex.
5.5. PROPOSED PRIVACY-PRESERVING FRIEND RECOMMENDA-
TION PROTOCOLS
To solve the PPFR problem, this work considers the following practical as-
sumptions supported in many online social networks:
1. Friendship is symmetric: If A is in Bi’s friend list, then Bi must be in A’s
friend list.
2. Known Participation: A user participation in the social network is public
information. E.g., a person can browse existing Facebook user IDs.
3. Recommendation Condition: Consider the case of recommending new friends
to A. These new friends are chosen from the candidate users that share at least
t friends with A. Here, the candidate users are all the friends of A’s friends.
In general, t can be a static value decided by either the network administrator
or A, and it can be changed occasionally. The observation is 1 ≤ t ≤ |Fr(A)|.
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Figure 5.1: Sample snapshot (two-hop) of social network for Alex
On one hand, a small value of t may result in more number of recommenda-
tions. On the other hand, while increasing it, may result in lesser number of
recommendations. In this section, assume that t (which is randomly chosen by
A from [1, |Fr(A)|]) is public.
Since the proposed protocols are distributed, the messages communicated
among participating entities need to be authenticated. There exist many user and
message authentication protocols, so this work does not address these issues when
presenting and analyzing the proposed protocols. In addition, this work assumes that
the participating entities do not collude.
5.5.1. The PPFRh Protocol. The PPFRh protocol is based on an additive
homomorphic encryption scheme as explained earlier. The basic idea is to encrypt
the ID of each friend of A’s friend independently (under a common candidate space)
and perform a homomorphic addition by A on the encrypted data. Since the global
user space is public in a social network, one could use this global space to represent
the candidate space without disclosing any particular candidate’s ID to A. However,
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Table 5.2: Friend lists and the computation of common neighbors scores for Alex
based on Figure 5.1
Friend Lists
Fr(Alex) = 〈Scott,Moore, Rice,Davis〉






Common neighbors scores for Alex
Fr(Alex) ∩ Fr(Baker) = 〈Scott,Moore〉
Fr(Alex) ∩ Fr(Bob) = 〈Moore〉
Fr(Alex) ∩ Fr(Evans) = 〈Moore〉
Fr(Alex) ∩ Fr(Martin) = 〈Rice,Davis〉
Fr(Alex) ∩ Fr(Wilson) = 〈Davis〉
Φ(Alex,Baker) = Φ(Alex,Martin) = 2
Φ(Alex,Bob) = Φ(Alex,Evans) = 1
Φ(Alex,Wilson) = 1
as the size of the social network is usually large (e.g., in millions), generating a global
user space is often impractical.
In general, the size of the potential candidate space (i.e.,
∑m
i=1 |Fr(Bi)|) is
much smaller than the size of the global user space. Additionally, since users’ friend
lists are private, neither A nor Bi knows the potential candidate space before hand.
A quick fix is for Bi to use a universal hash function that can hash the IDs of his/her
friends into integers less than s (a predefined system parameter). This creates a
pseudo and oblivious candidate space. Since the universal hash function maps integers
from one integer domain into another integer domain, there is a need to have a
mechanism to convert each user ID which may contain some characters into a unique
integer. A simple and straightforward approach is to initially convert each character
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in the ID (if there are any) into its ASCII value (a three-digit integer). In addition,
a single digit d (0 ≤ d ≤ 9) can be mapped to 128 + d. Then, any given string can
be mapped to a unique integer by appending these three-digit values together. E.g.,




where || denotes concatenation. This conversion method satisfies the condition that
each user ID is mapped into a unique integer, and this integer can be easily mapped
back to its corresponding user ID. The collision caused by the hash function is the
price to pay for the accuracy in recommendations. Hereafter, A is used to simply
represent the converted integer of ID(A) for convenience. Also, Fr(A) gives the list
of converted user IDs of A’s friends.
Based on the above description, A chooses a prime number p, such that the
converted user IDs are in the range of [0, . . . , p− 1]. Then A chooses the values of a
and b randomly from Z∗p and Zp respectively. In addition, A chooses the domain size
of the hash function ha,b and sets it to s. Also assume that there exists a party T (e.g.,
the network administrator) in the network which generates the key pair (pk, pr) using
the Paillier’s encryption scheme [55]. T sends the public key pk to A. In this protocol,
T is only responsible for certain intermediate computations. These computations do
not reveal the user IDs to T (due to involved randomization and permutation) and
consequently preserve user privacy.
The main idea of the PPFRh protocol is as follows. Initially, each Bi hashes the
user IDs in his/her friend list (omitting A’s ID) and generates a two-column matrix
Mi, where the first column contains user IDs and the second column contains either 0s
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Algorithm 6 PPFRh
Require: Friend list of each user is treated as private (Note: the public key pk is
known to A and T , whereas the private key pr is known only to T )
1: A:
(a). Randomly choose a, b from Z∗p and Zp, and pick s
(b). Send ha,b (i.e., a, b, p, s) and pk to each Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
2: Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ m):
(a). Receive ha,b and pk from A
(b). Compute matrix Mi using ha,b and Fr(Bi)
(c). Compute M ′i [j][k]← Epk(Mi[j][k]), for 1 ≤ j ≤ s and 1 ≤ k ≤ 2
(d). Send M ′i to A
3: A:
(a). Receive M ′i from Bi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
(b). Compute Z[j][2]← Πmi=1M ′i [j][2], for 1 ≤ j ≤ s
(c). Compute Z[j][1] ← Z[j][2]rj · Πmi=1M ′i [j][1], where rj is randomly chosen
from Z∗N , for 1 ≤ j ≤ s
(d). Compute Zˆ ← pi(Z) and send Zˆ to T (note that function pi is known only
to A)
4: T :
(a). Receive Zˆ from A
(b). Compute freqj ← Dpr(Zˆ[j][2]), for 1 ≤ j ≤ s
(c). If freqj ≥ t, compute βj ← Dpr(Zˆ[j][1])freqj . Else, set βj to 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s
(d). Send β to A
5: A:
(a). Receive β from T
(b). F ← pi−1(β)
(c). S = {Fj − rj mod N | Fj ∈ F ∧ Fj 6= 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s}
or 1s. Given the jth row inMi, if the value in the second entry is 1, the corresponding
first column entry contains an actual user ID, and j equals to the hashed value of the
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user ID. After successfully generating Mi, Bi encrypts Mi component-wise and sends
it to the target user A.
Upon receiving all encrypted matrices, A computes the encrypted two-column
frequency matrix using homomorphic additions, where the first column contains en-
crypted user IDs and the second column contains the encrypted frequency of the
corresponding user ID in the friend lists of A’s friends. After this, A randomizes the
user IDs, permutes the frequency matrix row-wise and sends the resulting encrypted
matrix to T . Upon receiving the matrix, T decrypts the second entry of each row to
get the frequency. If the second entry is greater than or equal to t, he/she decrypts
the corresponding first entry. Else, because the frequency is less than t, there is no
need to recommend the corresponding user. Therefore, T sets the corresponding first
entry to zero. Note that the first entries are randomized by A, so the decrypted values
will result in random values. Then T sends the updated first entries to A. Finally, A
performs the inverse permutation over the entries received from T and removes the
randomization for all non-zero entries to get the actual set of recommended user IDs
as new friends.
The main steps involved in the PPFRh protocol are shown in Algorithm 6.
To start with, whenever A wants to make new friends, he/she shares the parameters
of ha,b (i.e., a, b, p, s) and pk with only his/her friends. Then each friend Bi of A
generates a matrix Mi of size s× 2 whose values are initialized to zero and updated
according to Fr(Bi) as follows:
Mi[ha,b(Fr(Bi)[j])][1] = Fr(Bi)[j]
Mi[ha,b(Fr(Bi)[j])][2] = 1
where Fr(Bi)[j] is the j
th user in Fr(Bi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ |Fr(Bi)|.
(Note that while generating the matrices, A’s ID is skipped from Fr(Bi).) Briefly,
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Bi hashes each user in his/her friend list and sets the corresponding row entries
to Fr(Bi)[j] and 1 (indicating Fr(Bi)[j] being Bi’s friend) respectively. Then Bi
encrypts his/her matrixMi component-wise using the public key pk and sends it to A.
Let the encrypted matrix be M ′i . Upon receiving the encrypted matrices, A performs
homomorphic additions† on all the encrypted matrices, i.e.,M ′i ’s component-wise and
computes a new matrix Z, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s:
Z[j][2] ← Πmi=1M ′i [j][2]
Z[j][1] ← Z[j][2]rj · Πmi=1M ′i [j][1]
where rj is a random number chosen from Z
∗
N and is used to randomize the encrypted
user ID value. After that, A permutes the row vectors of Z by computing Zˆ ← pi(Z),
where pi is a random permutation function (known only to A) and sends it to T .
Upon receiving Zˆ from A, T decrypts the second component of each row of Zˆ using
his/her private key pr which gives the approximate frequency, denoted by freq, of
corresponding hashed user(s). That is, T computes freqj = Dpr(Zˆ[j][2]) and decrypts
the first component of jth row of Zˆ, for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, as follows:
• If freqj ≥ t, decrypt the corresponding first component of Zˆ. That is, compute
Dpr(Zˆ[j][1]) and set βj =
Dpr(Zˆ[j][1])
freqj
. Else, set βj to 0.
• In case of no collision at location pi−1(j) and freqj ≥ t, the observation is that
βj = rk+IDk, where k = pi
−1(j) and IDk is one of the recommended friend IDs
to A. When freqj < t, βj is always 0.
• Sends β to A where β = 〈β1, . . . , βs〉.
†Note that the multiplication and exponentiation operations on cipher-texts are followed by
mod N2 operation so that the resulting ciphertext is still in {0, 1, . . . , N2 − 1}. However, to make
the presentation more clear, this work simply drops “mod N2” from the computations in the rest
of this section.
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The decryption of the first component of each row of Zˆ gives a random value. Finally,
A applies the inverse permutation on vector β and removes the randomness for each
non-zero entry. A selects the list of recommended friend IDs as shown below:
• Let vector F be pi−1(β).
• S = {Fj − rj mod N | Fj ∈ F ∧ Fj 6= 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ s}
Example 4. Refer to Figure 5.1, let t = 2 and s = 9. From Figure 5.1, Fr(Alex) =
〈Scott,Moore, Rice,Davis〉. The goal is to recommend new friend(s) to Alex using
the PPFRh protocol. Assume that the permutation function pi and the hashed values
of user IDs are as shown in Table 5.3. Let M1,M2,M3 and M4 denote the matrices
generated by Scott, Moore, Rice and Davis respectively using the PPFRh protocol.
The intermediate results during various steps involved in PPFRh are shown in Table
5.3. At the end of the PPFRh protocol, Baker and Martin are recommended as new
friends to Alex.
5.5.2. The PPFRsp Protocol. If s is large enough, the PPFRh protocol can
produce very accurate results, but large s increases computation costs. To overcome
this problem, this work presents an alternative PPFR protocol, termed as PPFRsp, to
accurately and efficiently recommend friends to A, at the expense of weaker security
guarantee comparing to PPFRh.
The overall steps involved in the PPFRsp protocol are demonstrated in Al-
gorithm 7 and Algorithm 8. The main process of the protocol is presented in Algo-
rithm 7. Assume that each user A in the network generates a public-private key pair
(pkA, prA) using the RSA public key system [94]. Also, each friend of an A’s friend
(say user Cij) uses an AES encryption algorithm [58] to encrypt his/her data, and
the secret key is divided into at most |Fr(C)| different shares such that at least t
shares are required to reconstruct the secret AES key [95].
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Table 5.3: Intermediate results based on the PPFRh protocol
A Martin Bob Scott Davis Baker Rice Evans Moore Wilson
ha,b(A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9









































































; S = {Baker,Martin}
The main idea of the PPFRsp protocol is to let the candidates introduce them-
selves to user A in a privacy-preserving way. Here, the so called candidates are all the
friends of A’s friends. Suppose if Bi is one of A’s friends and Cij is Bi’s friend, then
Cij acts as a candidate to be a new friend of A. The user A who wants some new
friends just waits for the self introductions to come. First, Bi arranges a random path
along which his/her friend (a candidate) will pass the self introduction to A. The
random path can hide the identities of Bi’s friends by preventing A from tracking
back to them. The PPFRsp protocol is centered at user A to make friends of A’s
friends not aware of whom they are sending the self-introductions to. This preserves
the privacy of both A and each user in Fr(A). Also, since A cannot trace back to
the candidate, the privacy of each candidate (i.e., friends of A’s friends) is preserved.
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Initially, A informs only his/her friends Bi that he/she wants new friends
and wait for luck. Then, each Bi informs his/her friends the opportunity to make
a new friend. To keep his/her friend list private from A, each Bi arranges the path
of message passing for each user in Fr(Bi) to hide the source [78], for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
That is, Bi randomly picks two users Xij and Yij for each of his/her friend Cij and
sends the path Mij = Xij||Yij||EpuYij (A) to Cij. During the self-introduction part of
the protocol, as shown in step 3 of Algorithm 7, Cij receives the message and then
appends kBiCij (the share of the key corresponding to Bi) and AESkCij (Cij) (encrypted
ID of Cij) to Mij , and sends only Yij||EpuYij (A)||k
Bi
Cij
||AESkCij (Cij) to Xij . Then,
Xij forwards EpuYij (A)||k
Bi
Cij
||AESkCij (Cij) to Yij which decrypts the first part using
his/her private key prYij to get A. After this, it forwards the remaining message
kBiCij ||AESkCij (Cij) to A. Finally, in the Collect and Solve part of the protocol, as
shown in Algorithm 8, A waits and collects the returned messages from each Yij and
groups them based on AESkCij (Cij).
For each group Gij, A proceeds as follows. If |Gij| ≥ t, A can generate
the corresponding key (kCij) from any t different partial keys in Gij (using polyno-
mial interpolation of t shares). Using kCij , A can successfully decrypt the message
AESkCij (Cij) to get the user ID Cij (newly recommended friend). Else, dump the
group Gij (since the number of different partial keys are less than t and A cannot
generate the corresponding key). Note that the method in [95] guarantees that a
group with size less than t will not provide enough information for A to generate the
key, and consequently A cannot successfully decrypt AESkCij (Cij). Observe that in
the PPFRsp protocol, since two random users are added to the path, all the messages
received by A are sent to him/her by random users (namely Yij); therefore, A cannot
trace back to the source Cij that does the self-introduction. Note that two random
users are necessary; otherwise, if only one random user were chosen to do the favor,
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Algorithm 7 PPFRsp
Require: ∀ user A, A has his/her RSA private key prA and shares his/her RSA
public key puA to the public. A uses AES encryption algorithm to encrypt data
and divides the secret AES key into at most |Fr(A)| shares such that at least t
shares are required to reproduce the secret AES key.
1: A:
(a). Send messages to each Bi that A wants some new friends where Bi ∈ Fr(A)
2: Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ m):
(a). Receive message from A
(b). for each Cij ∈ Fr(Bi) do:
• Pick two random users Xij and Yij from the social network
• Mij = Xij||Yij||EpuYij (A)
• Send Mij to Cij
3: Cij (1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ |Fr(Bi)|):
(a). Receive Mij from Bi
(b). if |Fr(Cij)| ≥ t then:
• Generate a share kBiCij of kCij
• Send Yij||EpuYij (A)||k
Bi
Cij
||AESkCij (Cij) to Xij
4: Xij (1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ |Fr(Bi)| ):
(a). Receive Yij||EpuYij (A)||k
Bi
Cij
||AESkCij (Cij) from Cij
(b). Send EpuYij (A)||k
Bi
Cij
||AESkCij (Cij) to Yij
5: Yij (1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ |Fr(Bi)| ):
(a). Receive EpuYij (A)||k
Bi
Cij
||AESkCij (Cij) from Xij
(b). Decrypt EpuYij (A) to get A
(c). Send kBiCij ||AESkCij (Cij) to A
6: A:
(a). Collect and Solve(t)
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Algorithm 8 Collect and Solve(t)
1: G = {kBiCij ||AESkCij (Cij), 1 ≤ i ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ j ≤ |Fr(Bi)|}
2: Partition G into Gijs, where




3: S = ∅
4: for each Gij do
5: if |Gij| ≥ t then
6: Generate kCij via polynomial interpolation on




7: Using kCij to decrypt AESkCij (Cij) to get Cij




he or she would know that Cij and A share a friend. To increase security, one can
choose more than two random users.
To protect the privacy of each Cij ∈ Fr(Bi), Cij needs to encrypt his/her user
ID (part of self-introduction), and attaches it with a partial key, which is done at step
3(b) of Algorithm 7. According to the theory proposed in [95], only the user that can
collect at least a threshold (t) number of different partial keys can generate the full
key to decrypt the user ID. Why is this necessary? Consider the goal of this protocol
- only the users who share at least t friends with A should be recommended to A, A
should not know anything else. Without the encryption of the self introduction, in
addition to getting a few recommendations of new friends, A would know the user
IDs of all his/her friends’ friends which violates the privacy of Bi. Moreover, the AES
secret key should be changed occasionally since it can be generated by A. Also note
that only one partial key should correspond to one friend like Bi to ensure that A
gets different partial keys from different friends shared by A and Cij.
Example 5. Consider the snapshot of the social network for Alex as shown in Fig-
ure 5.1, and let t = 2. Following from Figure 5.1, the set of potential candidates
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for Alex are 〈Baker,Bob, Evans,Martin,Wilson〉. By applying the PPFRsp pro-
tocol, initially, Alex informs his friends 〈Scott,Moore, Rice,Davis〉 that he wants
new friends. Then, each of Alex’s friend will create an encrypted path for each of
his/her friend. For example, Scott sends an encrypted path to his only friend Baker.
Whereas, Moore creates three different encrypted paths and sends each one of them
to her friends Baker,Bob, and Evans separately. Without loss of generality, let us
consider the potential candidate Baker. Upon receiving the encrypted paths (differ-
ent) from Scott and Moore, Baker appends his self introductions kSB||AESkB(Baker)
and kMB ||AESkB(Baker) to the respective random and encrypted paths. Where kSB and
kMB are the corresponding key shares for Scott and Moore (only known to Baker).
After this, Baker forwards the appended self-introduction messages along their re-
spective random paths. Upon receiving the messages from random users, Alex groups
the messages based on AESkB(Baker). Since Alex has two different key shares i.e.,
kSB and k
M
B corresponding to the group AESkB(Baker), he generates the key kB (as
t = 2) and decrypts AESkB(Baker) successfully and identifies Baker as the newly
recommended friend. Similarly, Alex identifies Martin as a new friend.
5.5.3. Complexity Analyses. Next, this work analyzes the computation
and communication costs of the proposed protocols.
Computation Cost. Since the proposed protocols are asymmetric in nature,
the computation costs vary for each party. For the PPFRh protocol, the computation
cost of each Bi is bounded by the number of encryption operations which depends on
the hash domain size (s). Therefore, the computation complexity of Bi is bounded by
O(s) number of encryptions. (Note that each Bi performs the encryption operations
independently using his/her friend list in parallel.) The computation complexity of
A depends on the number of homomorphic addition and exponentiation (involved
during randomization) operations. The number of homomorphic addition operations
depends on s and |Fr(A)|. Whereas, the number of exponentiations depends on the
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size of s. Therefore, the computation complexity of A is bounded by O(s · |Fr(A)|)
homomorphic additions and O(s) exponentiations. In addition, since T has to decrypt
second component of each row of Zˆ, the computation complexity of T is bounded by
O(s) number of decryptions.
For the PPFRsp protocol, computation time mainly depends on the number of
public key encryptions (which depends on the size of each Bi’s friend list). Because
the time taken to compute the AES private key, to generate the secret shares and to
reconstruct the secret key is negligible comparing to the public key encryption costs.
Therefore, the computation cost of the PPFRsp protocol is bounded by O(|Fr(B)|)
encryptions assuming that t and |Fr(A)| are not exceedingly larger than |Fr(B)|.
Communication Cost. For the PPFRh protocol, the communication occurs
between A and each of his/her friends, and also between A and T . Without loss
of generality, let K denote the Paillier encryption key size (usually 1,024 bits long).
The communication complexity between A and all of his/her friends is bounded by
O(K · s · |Fr(A)|) bits. In addition, A has to send the randomized encrypted matrix
Zˆ to T which is bounded by O(K · s) bits. Therefore, the overall communication
complexity of PPFRh is bounded by O(K · s · |Fr(A)|) bits.
In PPFRsp, communication occurs among different users involved in each ran-
domized path (i.e., Bi → Cij → Xij → Yij → A). Each Bi generates one path for
each of his/her friend whose size is bounded by O(K) bits. Then, the total communi-
cation between each Bi and his/her friends is bounded by O(K · |Fr(Bi)|) bits. Since
there exist Σmi=1|Fr(Bi)| number of (Bi, Cij) pairs, the total communication complex-
ity of PPFRsp is bounded by O(K · l), where l = Σmi=1|Fr(Bi)|. One disadvantage of
the PPFRsp protocol is that it assumes that each Xij , Yij, and Cij are available and
semi-honest, i.e., following the prescribed steps of the protocols.
5.5.4. Security Analysis. Next, a comprehensive analysis on the security
of the proposed protocols is provided.
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The Semi-Honest Security Model. There are two main reasons to adopt the
semi-honest adversary model. First of all, a semi-honest model generally leads to more
efficient secure protocols. Most existing practical secure protocols in secure multi-
party computation (SMC) are under this model. By using standard zero-knowledge
proofs [96] for threshold Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme [97, 98], the PPFRh
protocol can be easily converted into a secure protocol under the malicious model.
However, its computation time is around 10 times more expensive than PPFRh since
zero-knowledge proofs are very costly.
More importantly, there is no need to design a secure protocol under the
malicious model if the protocol is non-interactive. For example, the PPFRh protocol
only requires one round of communication between A and each user. There is no
further interactions between A and each user. In the field of SMC, it is well-known
open problem that input modification cannot be prevented [49]. That is, before
executing a secure protocol, a participating party can provide any arbitrary input
value to the protocol. There does not exist any mechanisms to determine if the input
is legitimate. In addition, for a non-interactive protocol, any malicious behavior can
be directly mapped to input modification. Since the proposed protocols are non-
interactive, there is not need to enforce them to be secure under the malicious model.
Security Analysis under the Semi-Honest Model. To prove the security of the
proposed protocols, this work adopts the standard proof methodology in the literature
of SMC. According to Definition 1, one need to generate a simulated execution image
of a protocol based on a participating party’s private input and output. As long as
the simulated execution image is computationally indistinguishable from the actual
execution image, one can claim that the protocol is secure [49]. Since the proposed
protocols are non-interactive, the security of participating parties is not symmetric.
For instance, there is one way communication from Bi to A; therefore, A is considered
as the adversary for each A’s friend Bi. Similarly, T is considered as the adversary
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for A. To prove PPFRh is secure, one need to show that the execution image of
PPFRh from A’s perspective (denoted by ΠA) does not leak any information regarding
Bi’s friend list. Also, it is required that the execution image of PPFRh from T ’s
perspective (denoted by ΠT ) does not leak any information regarding A’s friend list.
Refer to the steps given in Algorithm 6, ΠA contains {ha,b, pk,M ′1, . . . ,M ′m, S}.
Then the simulated execution image of A (denoted by ΠSA) can be generated as
{ha,b, pk, R1, . . . , Rm, S}, where Ri[j][k] (1 ≤ j ≤ s and 1 ≤ k ≤ 2) is randomly
chosen from ZN2 and N is part of the public key pk. Since M
′
i [j][k] is an encrypted
value generated from a semantically secure encryption scheme [55], M ′i [j][k] is com-
putationally indistinguishable from Ri[j][k] [99]. As a result, ΠA is computationally
indistinguishable from ΠSA, and the PPFRh protocol is secure from each user Bi’s
perspective. That is, the friend list of Bi is not disclosed to A, except for what can
be inferred from A’s private input and output. Similarly, it is easy to prove that the
PPFRh protocol is secure from each user A’s perspective. That is, A’s friend list is
not disclosed to T . T only knows the frequency information of each permuted and
randomized user IDs, and this is the only information leakage comparing to what can
be achieved under the ideal trusted third party model. Also, since T does not know
the hash function, T knows neither the friends of A nor any of the friends of A’s
friends. Therefore, the information leaked to T is negligible. In addition, nothing is
revealed to A and Bi.
It is also possible to completely eliminate the information leakage to T by
first adopting a fast secure binary conversion protocol over encrypted data [100]
and comparing the result with the threshold t without ever disclosing the frequency
information. In this way, the PPFRh offers the best security achievable in the semi-
honest model. The price to pay here is the increased computation cost. According
to the previous analysis, since the information leaked is extremely small, the security
offered by the current implementation of PPFRh is likely sufficient.
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In PPFRsp, unlike PPFRh where the scores are revealed to T , the common
neighbors scores are directly revealed to A. However, A can only link the scores to the
actual user IDs whose frequency is greater than or equal to t. If the common neighbors
score is less than t, the corresponding real user ID is not revealed to A because the
encrypted user ID cannot be decrypted by A according to the security guarantee of
the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [95]. Furthermore, other than the intermediate
encrypted results, no additional information is revealed to Bi. In general, PPFRh is
more secure than PPFRsp, but it is less efficient.
Inference Problem and the Ideal Security Model. In the proposed protocols,
there exists an inference problem, but it is worth pointing out that the inference
problem exists even for the most secure common-neighbor based PPFR protocol.
The reasoning is as follows.
In SMC, the security guarantee of a protocol is generally compared with
the ideal security model: the trusted third party (TTP) model. Under the TTP
model, there is a third party (P0) who has the complete trust among all participating
parties (e.g., A and B1, . . . , Bm in the proposed protocols). Let PPFRP0 denote a
privacy-preserving friend recommendation protocol by utilizing a TTP. To implement
PPFRP0 , all participating parties send their private inputs to P0, and P0 will adopt
the common neighbor method to identify potential new friends for A. At the end, P0
will send the identified potential friends to A.
It is a well-known fact that a secure protocol implemented using a completely
trusted party offers the maximum security guarantee [49]. However, when t is small,
the inference problem, still exists even for the most secure protocol PPFRP0 . E.g.,
when t = m = 1, A will learn the friend list of his or her only friend. The existence of
the inference problem is not because PPFRP0 is not secure, but it is mainly because
the output of the common neighbor friend recommendation method reveals some
additional information regarding the friend list of Bi. Therefore, under SMC, the
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information that can be inferred from the output of a secure protocol is not considered
as a security violation [49].
As illustrated in the ideal security model, to completely eliminate the inference
problem is impossible. On the other hand, when the size of A’s friend list m is two
and t = 1, A will not be able to precisely know if the recommended friends are B1 or
B2’s friends since the recommended friends have equal probability for coming from
either friend lists. For smaller values of t, the larger the m is, the more difficult for A
to make correct inference. In general, the inference problem mainly depends on the
size of m and t but not on the size of individual friend list. This is partly because A
does not know the size of the friend lists of his or her friends and partly because the
recommended friends are computed from an aggregated friend list whose contents are
summed from B1 to Bm’s friend lists when m ≥ 2.
To further mitigate the inference problem, the network service provider can fix
t to a large number and makes it publicly available. Alternatively, if t is very small,
each user Bi can refuse to participate to prevent the content of his or her friend list
from being inferred.
5.6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This sub-section analyzes the effectiveness and computation cost of both pro-
tocols using a Facebook dataset. Since the PPFRsp protocol always recommends
friend(s) accurately, the effectiveness of PPFRh is analyzed by using the PPFRsp
protocol as a baseline. In addition, the computation costs for both protocols are
analyzed in detail.
5.6.1. Dataset and Platform Description. To conduct the experiments,
friend lists of 11,500 Facebook users from Facebook.com are collected as follows. The
crawler will first login using a Facebook account. It then starts to crawl the account’s
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friend list, the friend list of the friends in the list, and so on. To get a friend list
of a Facebook account while logged in, the crawler will make use of the Facebook’s
AJAX API (a web service the Facebook web client side used to update its friend list
display). The response will be a Javascript code file for the browser to update the
web page, from where the friend list is extracted using a proper regular expression.
Remember that Facebook lets users to set their privacy preferences. So one can only
crawl those users who set their friend lists information as public.
Due to privacy settings, some of the extracted friend lists are empty (for 2,068
users). In addition, the combined friend lists of users’ friends are empty for 112
users. Therefore, after removing the friend lists of these users, the experiments were
conducted on the final set of friend lists for 9,330 users. Among the 9,330 users, the
maximum and minimum friend list sizes are 447 and 1 respectively. In addition, the
maximum number of unique friends of users’ friends is 3,754, and each user has 24
friends on average. The proposed protocols were implemented in C, and experiments
were performed on a Intel R© Xeon R© six-CoreTM 3.07GHz PC running Ubuntu 10.04
with 12GB memory.
5.6.2. Effectiveness of PPFRh. The effectiveness of PPFRh is analyzed
by using PPFRsp as the baseline. Out of the 9,330 Facebook users, 1,000 users
are randomly selected as target users and conducted various experiments based on
different parameters. Let the target users (who wish to find new friends) be denoted
by the set D. Hereafter, the effectiveness results presented are average values over
the 1,000 random users in D. (The results are almost independent from the set and
the size of the random users chosen when s is large enough. Also, different hash
functions produce almost identical results.)
Let Sh and Ssp denote the sets of recommended friends resulting from PPFRh
and PPFRsp respectively. Then, the accuracy of PPFRh (with respect to PPFRsp) is
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Note that Ssp always contains the accurate friend recommendations. The accuracy
for each user in D is computed based on different hash/vector sizes (s), threshold
values (t) and the results are as shown in Figure 5.2. Following from Figure 5.2(a),
the accuracy of PPFRh is 65.4% when s = 1, 000 and t = 5. Because the number of
unique candidates for some of the users is greater than 1,000, this results in many
collisions when s = 1, 000. However, for t = 5, the accuracy increases from 65.4% to
94.1% as the value of s increases from 1,000 to 7,000. The reason behind that is as
the value of s increases, the number of collisions are reduced; therefore, improving the
accuracy. Also, as shown in Figure 5.2(a), for a fixed value of s, the accuracy improves
with an increase in the value of t. For example, for s = 5, 000, accuracy changes from
92.1% to 96% when t is varied from 5 to 25. A similar trend can be observed for
other values of s and t. Collision rate of a universal hash function is generally low,
and low collision rate introduces fewer false positives and false negatives when t is
large.
Besides accuracy based on intersection size, the experiments also considered
the false positive and false negative error rates for the PPFRh protocol which are
defined below:
Errorfp = 1− |Ssp ∩ Sh||Sh| ; Errorfn = 1−
|Ssp ∩ Sh|
|Ssp|
As shown in Figure 5.2(b), for s = 1, 000 and t = 5, the false positive error is
37.9%. However, when t changes from 5 to 25, the false positive error drops to
17.9%. Whereas, for a fixed t, observe that the false positive error rate decreases


















































































































(f) PPFRh Vs. PPFRsp
Figure 5.2: Performance evaluation of PPFRh and PPFRsp
positive error drops from 17.9% to 4.6% when s is increased from 1,000 to 7,000. A
similar trend can be observed for false negative errors as shown in Figure 5.2(c).
Based on the above discussions, it is clear that PPFRh gives good accuracy
and low errors rates (both false positives and false negatives) when s (≥ 3, 000) and
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t (≥ 5). In particular, when m = 7, 000 and t = 25, the PPFRh protocol recommends
friends 96% accurately with a false positive error rate of 4.6% and a false negative
error rate of 2.6%.
Next, the computation costs incurred on different parties in the PPFRh and
PPFRsp protocols are analyzed separately. Also, the running time of both protocols
for different values of s and key sizes are evaluated.
5.6.3. The Computation Cost of PPFRh. For the PPFRh protocol, the
computation costs are different for target user A, friend of A, and T . The computation
cost of A depends on the size of his/her friend list (m = |Fr(A)|) and the hash domain
or the vector size (s). Whereas, the computation cost of each friend of A (i.e., B)
mainly depends on s (deciding factor for the number of encryptions to be performed
by each B). For a friend B of A, observe that the cost involved in hashing and
creating the matrix M is negligible comparing to the encryption cost involved in
creating M ′. Also, the computation cost of the party T is equivalent to the number
of decryptions he/she needs to perform (which mainly depends on the values of s
and t). In addition, for the PPFRh protocol, the computation costs of A and B are
independent from t.
Based on the above discussions, the computation costs of each party in the
PPFRh protocol are presented. Since the friend list sizes vary for different users,
this work selected three different users with friend list sizes 110, 247, and 447 such
that the size of one friend list is almost double the size of the other. This kind of
selection is to purely present the variations in computation times in a more precise
and concrete manner. However, similar results can be observed for other users. Note
that in the above Facebook dataset, 447 is the maximum friend list size. For key size
1024, PPFRh is executed for each of these three users by varying the values of s.
As shown in Figure 5.2(d), for user A with m = 110, the computation time
increases linearly with the value of s. When m = 110, the computation time of
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A increases from 3.57 seconds to 10.54 seconds (increases by a factor of 3 due to
expensive exponentiations) when s is changed from 1,000 to 3,000. A similar trend
can be observed for the other values of s. On the other hand, when m = 227, the
computation time of the user increases slightly (due to less expensive homomorphic
additions) comparing to the user with m = 110 for a fixed value of s. In addition,
as shown in Figure 5.2(d), the computation cost of B and T are the same under the
assumption that T has to decrypt the whole encrypted matrix Z1 (in the worst case).
Under the worst case scenario, the time taken for encrypting the matrix by
B is almost the same as the time taken to decrypt the whole encrypted matrix by
T . For instance, when s = 5, 000, the computation time of B and T are 26.27 and
25.37 seconds (not depending onm), respectively. The above results indicate that the
computation time incurred by the PPFRh protocol is more on B and T comparing
to the time of A (except for the worst case where m = 447) irrespective of the hash
domain size (s) because most operations performed at A are multiplications (much
less costly than encryption or decryption operations).
5.6.4. The Computation Cost of PPFRsp. The computation cost of
PPFRsp depends on the running time of A, B, and C. On one hand, the com-
putation cost of A depends on the number of introductions he/she receives and also
on t. The computation cost of B depends on the number of randomized paths he/she
creates (equivalent to the size of his/her friend list). On the other hand, the compu-
tation cost of C depends on the threshold t and |Fr(C)| for generating shares of the
AES secret key. In the experiments, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [95] is used to
generate the secret partial keys or shares.
Consider the same three users as mentioned before. When A has 447 friends,
he/she receives 13,444 self-introductions (through randomized paths). For t = 5, A
consists of 461 groups (formed out of 13,444 self-introductions) and generates the
AES secret keys for all groups in 2.02 seconds as shown in Figure 5.2(e). Similarly,
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when t = 25, A has 37 groups and can generate the keys in 0.156 seconds. A similar
trend can be observed for other two users. Note that since the values of t are small,
the total time taken to generate all keys (following from the Lagrange Polynomial
Interpolation) is very small. In the case of B, the computation cost only depends on
his/her friend list and is independent of t. Therefore, as shown in Figure 5.2(e), it
takes 1.169 seconds for B to generate all encrypted paths (assuming the worst case,
where B can have 447 friends).
Since B performs public key encryptions, B takes more time comparing to A
for t greater than or equal to 10 (resulting in fewer number of self-introductions).
Additionally, the results are based on the worst case for computing C’s time (i.e.,
assuming 447 friends). Therefore, C’s computation time mainly depends on the time
required to generate the secret shares based on t and its friend list size. Since the
value of t is small, it takes 53 milliseconds for C to create all 447 secret shares and
also to encrypt his/her ID using the AES private key encryption.
5.6.5. The Computation Cost of PPFRh vs. PPFRsp. Finally, the
total running times of both protocols for the worst case (i.e., A with 447 friends)
with different key sizes and s values are as shown in Figure 5.2(f). It is clear that
the computation time of PPFRh increases almost by a factor of 6 when the key size
is doubled for any fixed value of s. For instance, if s = 5, 000, the total run time
of the PPFRh protocol increases from 80.853 seconds to 553.459 seconds when the
key size is changed from 1,024 to 2,048 bits. The results show that PPFRsp is much
faster than PPFRh, when the key size is greater than or equal to 512 bits, by many
orders of magnitude. However, PPFRh provides stronger security, as per the security
definition of SMC [50, 77] comparing to the PPFRsp protocol.
A note on practicality: It is important to note that since friend recom-
mendation needs not to be performed every minute or even every day, the proposed
protocols are practical. The additional computation cost is a very small price to
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pay comparing to the achieved privacy protection. More significantly, the proposed
protocols make friend recommendation possible even when the friend lists are private.
5.7. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
This sub-section points out various implementation details involved for deploy-
ing the proposed protocols in real-world applications. In general, many online social
networks (OSNs), such as Facebook, collect sensitive user profile data and store them
on their server after proper encryption for security reasons. Therefore, users have no
control over their stored data except trusting the OSN service and OSNs are free to
share this stored data with third parties for business purposes. In order to give more
control to users, this work considers the privacy-enhanced web pages where a user
can encrypt his/her profile information before sending it to the OSN [57]. That is,
the data stored on the OSN server is encrypted using user’s secret key. When a user
logins, his/her data stored on the OSN server is pushed back to the web page and
decrypted. On the other hand, when the user tries to sign-out, his/her information is
updated (in encrypted form) on the OSN server. Under this kind of architecture, can
users still receive friend recommendations? Since T (i.e., the network administrator)
has encrypted user’s friend lists under different secret keys, it seems the process of
friend recommendations by T alone is complex. Note that the friend list of each user
is encrypted by using his/her secret key. In addition, the inherent information flow
in OSNs makes the friend recommendation problem more challenging. However, by
establishing a secure channel between the users, the proposed protocols make friend
recommendation possible under the above mentioned architecture. In order to use
the proposed protocols in a full fledge manner, one should first address an issue that
arises due to the inherent information flow in OSNs which are discussed as below.
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In the proposed protocols, users are assumed to exchange messages directly
without revealing them to T (i.e., the network administrator). However, in many
OSNs, messages are always passed through T because the user who is intendend
to receive the message may not be online. Additionally, in order to minimize the
information disclosure to T , one need to make sure that the messages exchanged
between users are in encrypted form and only the intended receiver should be able
to decrypt it. The above issue can be solved by creating a secure session between
the users. Briefly, assume that each user holds a public/private key pair, where the
public keys are treated as global information. If user B wants to send some message
to A, then B generates an AES encryption key (i.e., the session key which should
be different from the secret key used to encrypt and store his/her data on the OSN
server), encrypts it using the public key of A, and forwards it to A through T . Note
that here T merely acts as a network router that simply forwards the message to
A. Upon receiving the encrypted message, A decrypts it to get the AES session key
which is used for further secure communication with B.
Once this kind of secure session is established between users, the proposed pro-
tocols can be directly applied where two users A and B can communicate securely by
simply encrypting their messages using the AES session key and forwarding them to
one another through T . Note that the AES session key should be changed occasionally
for security reasons. The proposed protocols, after taking the above implementation
details into account, protect the friend list of a user from other users and T .
5.8. CONCLUSION
The emerging growth of social networks has resulted in vast amount of social
data which need to be mined for various kinds of recommendations such as friend
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recommendation. However, since the social data contain personal and sensitive in-
formation about individual users, when friend lists remain private, existing friend
recommendation techniques do not work. As a result, this section proposed two pri-
vacy preserving friend recommendation algorithms under the assumption that users’
friend lists are private. Both of the proposed protocols recommend new friends using
the common neighbors proximity measure in a privacy-preserving manner.
The first protocol PPFRh is based on an additive homomorphic encryption
scheme, and its accuracy is essentially based on the parameters of universal hash
function ha,b. Whereas the second protocol PPFRsp utilizes the concept of protecting
the source privacy through randomizing the message passing path and also recom-
mends friends accurately. The observation is that the PPFRsp protocol is more
efficient than the PPFRh protocol. The proposed PPFR protocols act as a trade-off
among security, efficiency and accuracy.
For the PPFRsp protocol, if both A and his/her friends have long friend lists,
then the protocol will cause a large number of communication between the users.
In general, only a small number of users are recommended to A; thus, most of the
messages passing back to A will end up useless. One possible solution is to develop
a pruning mechanism so that some of the candidates could be pruned during the
process. Another issue is that both of the proposed protocols are designed only to
compute the recommendation in a nearest neighbor way. On the other hand, a new
friend can also be recommended in other ways using various information, like the
similarities of sharing contents, user profiles or activities in the network. As a future
work, it will be interesting to explore alternative ways for developing hybrid privacy-
preserving friend recommendation methods by combining different scoring functions.
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6. PRIVACY-AWARE FRIEND RECOMMENDATIONS IN
OUTSOURCED SOCIAL NETWORKS
As an emerging computing paradigm, cloud computing attracts many organi-
zations to consider utilizing the benefits of a cloud in terms of cost-efficiency, flexibil-
ity, and offload of administrative overhead. With cloud computing, users now have
the opportunity to outsource their data as well as the data management services to
the cloud [101, 102]. On one hand, by outsourcing, the organization gets the benefit
of reducing the data management costs and improves the quality of service. On the
other hand, hosting and query processing of data out of the organization’s control
raises security challenges such as preserving data confidentiality. Therefore, due to
the rise of various privacy issues, sensitive data (e.g., user’s profile information) need
to be encrypted before outsourcing to the cloud. In addition, all computations should
be handled by the cloud; otherwise, there would be no point to outsource the data
at the first place.
One straightforward way to protect the confidentiality of the outsourced data
from the cloud as well as from the unauthorized users is to encrypt data by the data
owner before outsourcing [103]. By this way, the data owner can protect the privacy
of his/her own data. This work assumes that users profile data were encrypted and
then outsourced to the cloud. In general, performing computations over encrypted
data without the cloud ever decrypting the data is a very challenging task. This work
focuses on solving the friend recommendation problem over encrypted users’ profiles
outsourced to a cloud using k-nearest neighbor (kNN) method. That is, given the
encrypted profile of a target user (denoted by input query Q), the goal is for the
cloud to securely identify the k-nearest user profiles to Q. The question here is how
can the cloud execute a set of operations over encrypted data while the data stored
at the cloud are encrypted at all times? In the literature, various techniques related
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to query processing over encrypted data have been proposed, including range queries
[104, 105, 106] and other aggregate queries [107, 108]. However, these techniques are
either not applicable or inefficient to solve advanced queries such as the k-nearest
neighbor (kNN) query.
From the above discussion, it is clear that friend recommendations under out-
sourced social networking environment is closely related to the problem of secure
k-nearest neighbor (denoted by SkNN) query. Briefly, given the query Q of a target
user, the objective of the SkNN problem is to securely identify the k-nearest profiles
to Q using the database of encrypted profiles (say T ) in the cloud, without allowing
the cloud to learn anything regarding the actual contents of the database T and the
query Q. More specifically, assuming encrypted data are outsourced to a cloud, an
effective SkNN protocol needs to satisfy the following properties:
• Preserve the confidentiality of T and Q at all times
• Hiding data access patterns from the cloud
• Accurately compute the k-nearest neighbors of query Q
• Incur low computation overhead on the end-users
In the past few years, researchers have proposed various methods [101, 109, 110,
111] to address the SkNN problem. However, the existing SkNN methods violate
at least one of the above mentioned desirable properties of a SkNN protocol. On
one hand, the methods in [101, 109] are insecure because they are vulnerable to
chosen and known plaintext attacks. On the other hand, recent method in [111]
returns non-accurate kNN result to the end-user. More precisely, in [111], the cloud
retrieves the relevant encrypted partition instead of finding the encrypted exact k-
nearest neighbors. Furthermore, in [101, 110, 111], the end-user involves in heavy
computations during the query processing step. By doing so, these methods utilize
cloud as just a storage medium, i.e., no significant work is done on the cloud side.
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Additionally, the existing SkNN methods do not protect data access patterns from
the cloud. More details regarding the existing SkNN methods are provided in Section
6.3.
This work first presents a basic scheme to solve SkNN and demonstrates that
such a naive solution is not secure. To provide better security, a novel secure kNN
protocol is also proposed that protects both confidentiality of the data and access
patterns to the data. Also, this work empirically analyzes the efficiency of the pro-
posed protocols through various experiments. The results indicate that the secure
protocol is very efficient on the user end, and this lightweight scheme allows a user to
use any mobile device to request friend recommendations. The protocols developed
in this paper are secure under the semi-honest model [50]. However, they can be
easily extended to secure protocols under other adversary models, such as malicious
and covert, using threshold based cryptosystem and zero-knowledge proofs.
6.1. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In the outsourced environment, assume the existence of two non-colluding
semi-honest cloud service providers, denoted by C1 and C2, which together form a
federated cloud. Such an assumption is not new and has been commonly used in
the related problem domains [112, 113]. The intuition behind such an assumption
is as follows. Most of the cloud service providers in the market are well-established
IT companies, such as Amazon and Google. Therefore, a collusion between them is
highly unlikely as it will damage their reputation which in turn effects their revenues.
Also, assume that C2 generates a pair of public-secret key pair (pk, sk) based on
an additive homomorphic public-key cryptosystem that is semantically secure (e.g.,
Paillier cryptosystem [55]).
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Let us assume that a user profile can be represented as a vector based on
a pre-determined set of attributes. Here the attributes can be location, education,
hobbies, friend list and so on. In the outsourced social networking environment, this
work assumes that each user encrypts his/her profile vector attribute-wise using the
public key pk of C2 and sends the encrypted vector along with his/her user ID to
C1. Now consider the problem of recommending friends to a target user Bob by C1.
For this purpose, C1 randomly picks a subset of n users whose profile vectors are
denoted by T = {t1, . . . , tn}. Note that C1 has encrypted version of T , say Epk(T ),
where Epk(.) denotes the encryption function of an additively homomorphic public-
key cryptosystem that is semantically secure. Let Q /∈ T be the profile vector of
Bob such that Q = 〈q1, . . . , qm〉, where m denotes the number of attributes. Then,
the goal is for C1 and C2 to jointly compute the k-nearest neighbors of Q who are
recommended as potential friends to Bob. During this process, Bob’s query Q and
contents of database T should not be revealed to C1 and C2. In addition, the access
patterns to data (e.g., the user IDs corresponding to top k profiles for any given
Q) should be protected from the clouds. Such a process is referred to as Secure
kNN (SkNN) query over encrypted data in the cloud. Without loss of generality,
let 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉 denote the k-nearest profiles to Q. Then, the SkNN protocol can be
formally defined as follows:
SkNN(Epk(T ), Epk(Q))→ 〈ID(t′1), . . . , ID(t′k)〉
where ID(t′i) denotes the user ID of profile t
′
i. Note that, at the end of the SkNN
protocol, the output 〈ID(t′1), . . . , ID(t′k)〉 should be revealed only to Bob.
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6.2. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
This work proposes a novel SkNN protocol to facilitate friend recommen-
dations in outsourced social networks based on the k-nearest neighbor search over
encrypted data in the cloud that protects user’s privacy and hides access patterns.
In the proposed protocol, once the encrypted data are outsourced to the cloud, users
do not participate in any computations. In particular, the proposed protocol meets
the following requirements:
• Data confidentiality - Contents of T or any intermediate results should not
be revealed to the clouds.
• Query privacy - Bob’s input query Q should not be revealed to the clouds.
• Correctness - The output 〈ID(t′1), . . . , ID(t′k)〉 should be computed accu-
rately and revealed only to Bob. Additionally, no information other than
ID(t′1), . . . , ID(t
′
k) should be revealed to Bob.
• Low computation overhead on Bob - The proposed protocols incur low
computation overhead on Bob compared with the existing works [101, 109, 110,
111].
• Hidden data access patterns - Access patterns to the data, such as the
profile IDs corresponding to the k-nearest neighbors ofQ, should not be revealed
to the clouds (to prevent any inference attacks).
It is worth pointing out that the intermediate results seen by the clouds in the pro-
posed protocol are either newly generated randomized encryptions or random num-
bers. Thus, which data profiles correspond to the k-nearest neighbors of Q are not
known to the clouds. Also, Bob does not involve in any computations. Hence, data
access patterns are further protected from Bob.
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6.3. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
This sub-section presents an overview of the existing secure k-nearest neighbor
techniques. Then, it discusses the security definition adopted in this paper along with
the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem as a background.
6.3.1. Existing SkNN Techniques. Retrieving the k-nearest neighbors to
a given query Q is one of the most fundamental problem in many application do-
mains such as similarity search, pattern recognition, and data mining. In the lit-
erature, many techniques have been proposed to address the SkNN problem, which
can be classified into two categories based on whether the data are encrypted or not:
centralized and distributed.
Centralized Methods. In the centralized methods, the data owner is assumed
to outsource his/her database and DBMS functionalities (e.g., kNN query) to an un-
trusted external service provider which manages the data on behalf of the data owner
where only trusted users are allowed to query the hosted data. By outsourcing data
to an untrusted server, many security issues arise, such as data privacy (protecting
the confidentiality of the data from the server and query issuer). To achieve data pri-
vacy, data owner is required to use data anonymization models (e.g., k-anonymity) or
cryptographic (e.g., encryption and data perturbation) techniques over his/her data
before outsourcing them to the server.
Encryption is a traditional technique used to protect the confidentiality of
sensitive data such as medical records. Due to data encryption, the process of query
evaluation over encrypted data becomes challenging. Along this direction, various
techniques have been proposed for processing range [104, 105, 106] and aggregation
queries [107, 108] over encrypted data. However, this work restricts the discussion to
secure evaluation of kNN query.
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In the past few years, researchers have proposed different methods [101, 109,
110, 111] to address the SkNN problem. Wong et al. [109] proposed a new encryp-
tion scheme called asymmetric scalar-product-preserving encryption (ASPE) that
preserves scalar product between the query vector Q and any tuple vector ti from
database T for distance comparison which is sufficient to find kNN. In [109], data and
query are encrypted using slightly different encryption schemes before outsourcing to
the server and all the query users know the decryption key. As an improvement, Zhu
et al. [110] proposed a novel SkNN method in which the key of the data owner is
not disclosed to the user. However, their architecture requires the participation of
data owner during query encryption. As an alternative, Hu et al. [101] proposed
a method based on provably secure privacy homomorphism encryption scheme from
[114] that supports modular addition, subtraction and multiplication over encrypted
data. They addressed the SkNN problem under the following setting: the client has
the ciphertexts of all data points in database T and the encryption function of T
whereas the server has the decryption function of T and some auxiliary information
regarding each data point. However, both methods in [101, 109] are not secure be-
cause they are vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attacks. Also, all the above methods
leak data access patterns to the server.
Recently, Yao et al. [111] proposed a new SkNN method based on partition-
based secure Voronoi diagram (SVD). Instead of asking the cloud to retrieve the
exact kNN, they required, from the cloud, to retrieve a relevant encrypted partition
Epk(G) for Epk(T ) such that G is guaranteed to contain the k-nearest neighbors of
Q. However, this work solves the SkNN problem accurately by letting the cloud to
retrieve the exact k-nearest neighbors of Q (in encrypted form). In addition, most of
the computations during the query processing step in [101, 110, 111] are performed
locally by the end-user which conflicts the very purpose of outsourcing the DBMS
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functionalities to the cloud. Furthermore, the protocol in [111] leaks data access
patterns, such as the partition ID corresponding to a user query, to the cloud.
Data Distribution Methods. In the data distributed methods, data are assumed
to be partitioned either vertically or horizontally and distributed among a set of
independent, non-colluding parties. In the literature, the data distributed methods
rely on secure multiparty computation (SMC) techniques that enable multiple parties
to securely evaluate a function using their respective private inputs without disclosing
the input of one party to the others. Many efforts have been made to address the
problem of kNN query in a distributed environment. Shaneck et al. [115] proposed
privacy-preserving algorithm to perform k-nearest neighbor search. The protocol in
[115] is based on secure multiparty computation for privately computing kNN points
in a horizontally partitioned dataset. Qi et al. [116] proposed a single-step kNN
search protocol that is provably secure with linear computation and communication
complexities. Vaidya et al. [117] studied privacy-preserving top-k queries in which the
data are vertically partitioned. Ghinita et al. [118] proposed a private information
retrieval (PIR) based framework for answering kNN queries in location-based services.
In [118], the data residing at the server are in plaintext format. However, if the
data are encrypted to ensure data confidentiality, it is not clear how a user can
obliviously retrieve the output records because he/she does not know the indexes
that match his/her input query. Nevertheless, even if a user can retrieve the records
using PIR, the user still needs to perform local computations to identify the k-nearest
neighbors. However, in the framework proposed in this section, the users computation
is completely outsourced to a cloud.
In summary, the above data distribution methods are not applicable to per-
form kNN queries over encrypted data for two reasons: (1). This work deals with
encrypted form of database and query which is not the case in the above methods
(2). The database in this work is assumed to be encrypted and stored on the cloud
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whereas in the above methods it is partitioned (in plaintext format) among different
parties. Some common notations that are used extensively in this paper are shown
in Table 6.1.
6.3.2. Security Definition. In this paper, privacy/security is closely re-
lated to the amount of information disclosed during the execution of a protocol.
There are many ways to define information disclosure. To maximize privacy or mini-
mize information disclosure, this work adopts the security definitions in the literature
of secure multiparty computation (SMC) first introduced by Yao’s Millionaires’ prob-
lem for which a provably secure solution was developed [38, 39]. In this work, the
participating parties are assumed to be semi-honest; that is, a semi-honest party fol-
lows the rules of the protocol using its correct input, but is free to later use what it
sees during execution of the protocol to compromise security. Specific details regard-
ing the semi-honest security definition adopted in this work is given in Section 2. We
also emphasize that more details on standard security definitions and models can be
found in [50].
6.3.3. Paillier Cryptosystem. The Paillier cryptosystem is an additive ho-
momorphic and probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme [55]. Let Epk be the
encryption function with public key pk given by (N, g), where N is a product of two
large primes and g is in Z∗N2 . Also, let Dsk be the decryption function with secret
key sk. For any given plaintexts a, b ∈ ZN , the Paillier encryption scheme exhibits
the following properties:
a. Homomorphic Addition - Epk(a+ b)← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(b) mod N2;
b. Homomorphic Multiplication - Epk(a ∗ b)← Epk(a)b mod N2;
c. Semantic Security - The encryption scheme is semantically secure [56], i.e.,
given a set of ciphertexts, an adversary cannot deduce any information about the
plaintext.
137
Table 6.1: Common notations used in the SkNN protocols
T A subset of user profiles
Epk(T ) Attribute-wise encryption of T
n Number of user profiles in T
m Number of attributes in the profile vectors
ti i
th profile vector in T
Q Bob’s profile vector
t′i i
th nearest profile vector to Q based on T
ID(t′i) User ID corresponding to t
′
i
l Domain size (in bits) of the squared Euclidean distance between profile vectors
〈z1, zl〉 The most and least significant bits of integer z
[z] Vector of encryptions of the individual bits of z
This work assumes that a data owner or a social network user encrypted his or her
data using Paillier cryptosystem before outsourcing them to a cloud.
6.4. BASIC SECURITY PRIMITIVES
This sub-section presents a set of generic protocols that will be used as sub-
routines while constructing the proposed SkNN protocol in Section 6.6. All of the
below protocols are considered under two-party semi-honest setting. In particular,
assume the existence of two semi-honest parties P1 and P2 such that the Paillier’s
secret key sk is known only to P2 whereas pk is treated as public.
• Secure Multiplication (SM) Protocol:
This protocol considers P1 with input (Epk(a), Epk(b)) and outputs Epk(a ∗ b)
to P1, where a and b are not known to P1 and P2. During this process, no
information regarding a and b is revealed to P1 and P2. The output Epk(a ∗ b)
is known only to P1.
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• Secure Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED) Protocol:
P1 with input (Epk(X), Epk(Y )) and P2 securely compute the encryption of
squared Euclidean distance between vectors X and Y . Here X and Y are two
m dimensional vectors given by Epk(X) = 〈Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)〉 and Epk(Y ) =
〈Epk(y1), . . . , Epk(ym)〉. At the end of SM, the output Epk(|X − Y |2) is known
only to P1.
• Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD) Protocol:
P1 with input Epk(z) and P2 securely compute the encryptions of the individual
bits of z, where 0 ≤ z < 2l. The output [z] = 〈Epk(z1), . . . , Epk(zl)〉 is known
only to P1. Here z1 and zl denote the most and least significant bits of integer
z respectively.
• Secure Minimum (SMIN) Protocol:
P1 with input ([u], [v]) and P2 with sk securely compute the encryptions of the
individual bits of minimum number between u and v. That is, the output is
[min(u, v)] which will be known only to P1. During this protocol, no information
regarding u and v is revealed to P1 and P2.
• Secure Minimum out of n Numbers (SMINn) Protocol:
In this protocol, P1 has n encrypted vectors ([d1], . . . , [dn]) and P2 has sk. Here
[di] = 〈Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)〉 such that di,1 and di,l are the most and least
significant bits of integer di respectively, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. P1 and P2 jointly
compute the output [min(d1, . . . , dn)]. At the end, [min(d1, . . . , dn)] is known
only to P1. During SMINn, no information about di’s is revealed to P1 and P2.
• Secure Bit-OR (SBOR) Protocol:
P1 with input (Epk(o1), Epk(o2)) and P2 securely compute Epk(o1 ∨ o2), where
o1 and o2 are two bits. The output Epk(o1 ∨ o2) is known only to P1.
139
Next, each of these protocols are discussed in detail. Also, this work either proposes
a new solution or refers to the most efficient known implementation to each one of
them.
6.4.1. Secure Multiplication (SM). Consider that P1 holds private input
(Epk(a), Epk(b)) and P2 holds the secret key sk. The goal of the secure multiplication
(SM) protocol is to return the encryption of a ∗ b, i.e., Epk(a ∗ b) as output to P1.
During this protocol, no information regarding a and b is revealed to P1 and P2.
The basic idea of SM is based on the following property which holds for any given
a, b ∈ ZN :
a ∗ b = (a+ ra) ∗ (b+ rb)− a ∗ rb − b ∗ ra − ra ∗ rb (6.1)
where all the arithmetic operations are performed under ZN . The overall steps in
SM are shown in Algorithm 9. Briefly, P1 initially randomizes a and b by computing
a′ = Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra) and b′ = Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb), and sends them to P2. Here ra and
rb are random numbers in ZN known only to P1. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts and
multiplies them to get h = (a+ ra) ∗ (b+ rb) mod N . Then, P2 encrypts h and sends
it to P1. After this, P1 removes extra random factors from h
′ = Epk((a+ra)∗ (b+rb))
based on Equation 6.1 to get Epk(a ∗ b). Note that, for any given x ∈ ZN, “N − x”
is equivalent to “−x” under ZN . Hereafter, the notation r ∈R ZN is used to denote
r as a random number in ZN .
Example 6. Suppose a = 59 and b = 58. For simplicity, let ra = 1 and rb = 3.
Initially, P1 computes a
′ = Epk(60) = Epk(a)∗Epk(ra), b′ = Epk(61) = Epk(b)∗Epk(rb)
and sends them to P2. Then, P2 decrypts and multiplies them to get h = 3660. After
this, P2 encrypts h to get h
′ = Epk(3660) and sends it to P1. Upon receiving h′, P1
computes s = Epk(3483) = Epk(3660−a∗rb), and s′ = Epk(3425) = Epk(3483−b∗ra).
Finally, P1 computes Epk(a ∗ b) = Epk(3422) = Epk(3425− ra ∗ rb). 
140
Algorithm 9 SM(Epk(a), Epk(b))→ Epk(a ∗ b)
Require: P1 has Epk(a) and Epk(b); P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). Pick two random numbers ra, rb ∈ ZN
(b). a′ ← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra)
(c). b′ ← Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb); send a′, b′ to P2
2: P2:
(a). Receive a′ and b′ from P1
(b). ha ← Dsk(a′) and hb ← Dsk(b′)
(c). h← ha ∗ hb mod N
(d). h′ ← Epk(h)
(e). Send h′ to P1
3: P1:
(a). Receive h′ from P2
(b). s← h′ ∗ Epk(a)N−rb
(c). s′ ← s ∗ Epk(b)N−ra
(d). Epk(a ∗ b)← s′ ∗ Epk(ra ∗ rb)N−1
6.4.2. Secure Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED). Suppose P1 holds
two encrypted vectors (Epk(X), Epk(Y )) and P2 holds sk. Here X and Y are two
m-dimensional vectors such that Epk(X) = 〈Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)〉 and Epk(Y ) =
〈Epk(y1), . . . , Epk(ym)〉. The goal of SSED is to securely compute Epk(|X−Y |2), where
|X − Y | denotes the Euclidean distance between X and Y . During this protocol, no
information regarding X and Y is revealed to P1 and P2. The basic idea of the SSED
protocol follows from the following equation:
|X − Y |2 =
m∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2 (6.2)
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Algorithm 10 SSED(Epk(X), Epk(Y ))→ Epk(|X − Y |2)
Require: P1 has Epk(X) and Epk(Y ); P2 has sk
1: P1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do:
(a). Epk(xi − yi)← Epk(xi) ∗ Epk(yi)N−1
2: P1 and P2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do:
(a). Compute Epk((xi − yi)2) using the SM protocol
3: P1 computes Epk(|X − Y |2)←
∏m
i=1Epk((xi − yi)2)
The main steps involved in SSED are shown in Algorithm 10. Briefly, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
P1 initially computes Epk(xi − yi) by using the homomorphic properties. Then P1
and P2 jointly compute Epk((xi − yi)2) using the SM protocol, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Note
that the outputs of SM are known only to P1. By applying homomorphic properties
on Epk((xi − yi)2), P1 computes Epk(|X − Y |2) locally based on Equation 6.2.
Example 7. Suppose P1 holds two encrypted data records Epk(X) = 〈Epk(63), Epk(1),
Epk(1), Epk(145), Epk(233), Epk(1), Epk(3), Epk(0), Epk(6), Epk(0)〉 whereas Epk(Y ) =
〈Epk(56), Epk(1), Epk(3), Epk(130), Epk(256), Epk(1), Epk(2), Epk(1), Epk(6), Epk(2)〉.
During the SSED protocol, P1 initially computes Epk(x1−y1) = Epk(7), . . . , Epk(x10−
y10) = Epk(−2). Then, P1 and P2 jointly compute Epk((x1 − y1)2) = Epk(49) =
SM(Epk(7), Epk(7)), . . . , Epk((x10 − y10)2) = SM(Epk(−2), Epk(−2)) = Epk(4). P1
locally computes Epk(|X − Y |2) = Epk(
∑10
i=1(xi − yi)2) = Epk(813). 
6.4.3. Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD). Assume that P1 has Epk(z)
and P2 has sk, where z is not known to both parties and 0 ≤ z < 2l. The goal
of the secure bit-decomposition (SBD) protocol is to compute the encryptions of
the individual bits of binary representation of z [100]. That is, the output is [z] =
〈Epk(z1), . . . , Epk(zl)〉, where z1 and zl denote the most and least significant bits of z
respectively. At the end, the output [z] is known only to P1. Since the goal of this
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work is not to investigate the existing SBD protocols, the most efficient SBD scheme
that was recently proposed in [100] is used in the proposed protocols.
Example 8. Let us suppose that z = 55 and l = 6. Then the SBD protocol with
private input Epk(55) gives [55] = 〈Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(1)〉 as
the output to P1. 
6.4.4. Secure Minimum (SMIN). In this protocol, P1 with input ([u], [v])
and P2 with secret key sk securely compute the encryptions of the individual bits
of min(u, v), i.e., the output is [min(u, v)]. [u] = 〈Epk(u1), . . . , Epk(ul)〉 and [v] =
〈Epk(v1), . . . , Epk(vl)〉, where u1 (resp., v1) and ul (resp., vl) are the most and least
significant bits of u (resp., v). At the end of SMIN, the output [min(u, v)] is known
only to P1.
By assuming that 0 ≤ u, v < 2l, this work proposes a novel SMIN protocol.
The basic idea of the proposed SMIN protocol is for P1 to randomly choose the
functionality F (by flipping a coin), where F is either u > v or v > u, and to
obliviously execute F with P2. Since F is randomly chosen and known only to P1,
the output of the functionality F is oblivious to P2. Based on the output and chosen
F , P1 computes [min(u, v)] locally using homomorphic properties.
The overall steps involved in the SMIN protocol are shown in Algorithm 11.
To start with, P1 initially chooses the functionality F as either u > v or v > u
randomly. Then, using SM, P1 computes Epk(ui ∗ vi) with the help of P2. Now,
depending on F , P1 proceeds as follows, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l:
• If F : u > v, compute
Wi = Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1 = Epk(ui ∗ (1− vi))
Γi = Epk(vi − ui) ∗ Epk(rˆi) = Epk(vi − ui + rˆi)
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Algorithm 11 SMIN([u], [v])→ [min(u, v)]
Require: P1 has [u] and [v], where 0 ≤ u, v < 2l; P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). Randomly choose the functionality F
(b). for i = 1 to l do:
• Epk(ui ∗ vi)← SM(Epk(ui), Epk(vi))
• if F : u > v then:
– Wi ← Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1
– Γi ← Epk(vi − ui) ∗ Epk(rˆi); rˆi ∈R ZN
else
– Wi ← Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1
– Γi ← Epk(ui − vi) ∗ Epk(rˆi); rˆi ∈R ZN
• Gi ← Epk(ui ⊕ vi)
• Hi ← Hrii−1 ∗Gi; ri ∈R ZN and H0 = Epk(0)
• Φi ← Epk(−1) ∗Hi






(c). Γ′ ← pi1(Γ) and L′ ← pi2(L); send Γ′ and L′ to C
2: P2:
(a). Receive Γ′ and L′ from P1
(b). Mi ← Dsk(L′i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
(c). if ∃ j such that Mj = 1 then α← 1
else α← 0
(d). M ′i ← Γ′iα, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l; send M ′ and Epk(α) to P1
3: P1:
(a). Receive M ′ and Epk(α) from P2; compute M˜ ← pi−11 (M ′)
(b). for i = 1 to l do:
• λi ← M˜i ∗ Epk(α)N−rˆi
• if F : u > v then Epk(min(u, v)i)← Epk(ui) ∗ λi
else Epk(min(u, v)i)← Epk(vi) ∗ λi
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• If F : v > u, compute:
Wi = Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1 = Epk(vi ∗ (1− ui))
Γi = Epk(ui − vi) ∗ Epk(rˆi) = Epk(ui − vi + rˆi)
where rˆi is a random number in ZN known only to P1.
• Observe that if F : u > v, then Wi = Epk(1) only if ui > vi, and Wi = Epk(0)
otherwise. Similarly, when F : v > u, Wi = Epk(1) only if vi > ui, and Wi =
Epk(0) otherwise. Also, depending of F , Γi stores the encryption of randomized
difference between ui and vi which will be used in later computations.
• Compute the encrypted bit-wise XOR between the bits ui and vi as Gi =
Epk(ui ⊕ vi) using the formulation Gi = Epk(ui) ∗Epk(vi) ∗Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−2. For
any two bits o1 and o2, the property o1⊕ o2 = o1+ o2− 2(o1 ∗ o2) always holds.
• Compute an encrypted vector H by preserving the first occurrence of Epk(1)
(if there exists one) in G by initializing H0 = Epk(0). The rest of the entries
of H are computed as Hi = H
ri
i−1 ∗ Gi. Note that at most one of the entry in
H is Epk(1) and the remaining entries are encryptions of either 0 or a random
number. Also, if there exists an index j such that Hj = Epk(1), then index j
is the first position (from the most significant bit) at which the corresponding
bits of u and v differ.
• Then, P1 computes Φi = Epk(−1)∗Hi. Note that “−1” is equivalent to “N−1”
under ZN . From the above discussions, it is clear that Φi = Epk(0) at most
once since Hi is equal to Epk(1) at most once. Also, if Φj = Epk(0), then index
j is the position at which the bits of u and v differ first.
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• Compute an encrypted vector L by combining W and Φ. Note that Wi stores
the result of ui > vi or vi > ui which depends on F known only to P1. Precisely,
P1 computes Li = Wi∗Φr
′
i
i , where r
′
i is a random number in ZN . The observation
here is if ∃ an index j such that Φj = Epk(0), denoting the first flip in the bits
of u and v, then Wj stores the corresponding desired information, i.e., whether
uj > vj or vj > uj in encrypted form.
After this, P1 permutes the encrypted vectors Γ and L using two random permutation
functions pi1 and pi2. Specifically, P1 computes Γ
′ = pi1(Γ) and L′ = pi2(L), and sends
them to P2. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts L
′ component-wise to get Mi = Dsk(L′i),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and checks for index j (decide the output of F ). That is, if Mj = 1,
then the output of F is 1, and 0 otherwise. Let the output be α. Note that since
F is not known to P2, the output α is oblivious to P2. In addition, P2 computes a
new encrypted vector M ′ where M ′i = Γ
′
i
α, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, sends M ′ and Epk(α) to
P1. After receiving M
′ and Epk(α), P1 computes the inverse permutation of M ′ as
M˜ = pi−11 (M
′). Then, P1 performs the following homomorphic operations to compute
the encryption of ith bit of min(u, v), i.e., Epk(min(u, v)i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l:
• Remove the randomness from M˜i by computing
λi = M˜i ∗ Epk(α)N−rˆi
• If F : u > v, compute the ith encrypted bit of min(u, v) as Epk(min(u, v)i) =
Epk(ui) ∗ λi = Epk(ui + α ∗ (vi − ui)). Otherwise, compute Epk(min(u, v)i) =
Epk(vi) ∗ λi = Epk(vi + α ∗ (ui − vi)).
In the SMIN protocol, one main observation (upon which the correctness of the final
output can also be justified) is that if F : u > v, then min(u, v)i = (1−α)∗ui+α∗vi
always holds, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Similarly, if F : v > u, then min(u, v)i = α∗ui+(1−α)∗vi
always holds.
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Example 9. Consider that u = 55, v = 58, and l = 6. In addition, assume that P1’s
random permutation functions are given as below. Suppose that P1 holds [u] = [55] =
i = 1 2 3 4 5 6
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
pi1(i) = 6 5 4 3 2 1
pi2(i) = 2 1 5 6 3 4
〈Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(1)〉 and [v] = [58] = 〈Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(1),
Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(0)〉. Without loss of generality, let us assume that P1 chooses the
functionality F : v > u. Then, various intermediate results based on the SMIN
protocol are as shown in Table 6.2. Following from Table 6.2, observe that:
• At most one of the entry in H is Epk(1) (= H3) and the remaining entries are
encryptions of either 0 or a random number in ZN . Index j = 3 is the first
position at which the corresponding bits of u and v differ.
• Φ3 = Epk(0) since H3 is equal to Epk(1). Also, since M5 = 1, P2 sets α to 1.
At the end, only P1 knows [min(u, v)] = [u] = [55]. 
6.4.5. Secure Minimum out of n Numbers (SMINn). Consider P1 with
input ([d1], . . . , [dn]) and P2 with sk, where [di] = 〈Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)〉 and 0 ≤
di < 2
l, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The goal of the SMINn protocol is to compute [min(d1, . . . , dn)] =
[dmin] without revealing any information about di’s to P1 and P2. This work constructs
a new SMINn protocol by utilizing SMIN as the building block. The proposed SMINn
protocol is an iterative approach and it computes the desired output in an hierarchi-
cal fashion. In each iteration, minimum between a pair of values is computed and are
feeded as input to the next iteration. Therefore, generating a binary execution tree
in a bottom-up fashion. At the end, only P1 knows the final result [dmin].
The overall steps involved in the proposed SMINn protocol are highlighted in
Algorithm 12. Initially, P1 assigns [di] to a temporary vector [d
′
i], for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also,
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Table 6.2: Example of SMIN where F : v > u, u = 55 and v = 58




i Mi λi mini
1 1 0 r 0 0 −1 r 1 + r r r 0 1
1 1 0 r 0 0 −1 r r r r 0 1
0 1 1 −1 + r 1 1 0 1 1 + r r r −1 0
1 0 0 1 + r 1 r r r −1 + r r r 1 1
1 1 0 r 0 r r r r 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 + r 1 r r r r r r 1 1
*All column values are in encrypted form (Epk(.)) except Mi column. Also, r is a random
in ZN which is different for each row and column.
he/she creates a global variable num and initialize it to n, where num represents the
number of (non-zero) vectors involved in each iteration. Since the SMINn protocol
executes in a binary tree hierarchy (bottom-up fashion), it has dlog2 ne iterations,
and in each iteration, the number of vectors involved varies. In the first iteration




2j ]) and P2 with sk involve in the
SMIN protocol, for 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌊num
2
⌋
. At the end of the first iteration, only P1 knows
[min(d′2j−1, d
′





. Also, P1 stores












During the ith iteration, only the non-zero vectors are involved, for 2 ≤ i ≤
dlog2 ne. For example, during second iteration (i.e., i = 2), only [d′1], [d′3], and so on






. At the end of SMINn, P1 assigns the final encrypted binary
vector of global minimum value, i.e., [min(d1, . . . , dn)] which is stored in [d
′
1] to [dmin].
Example 10. For example, assume that P1 holds 〈[d1], . . . , [d6]〉 (i.e., n = 6). Then,
based on the SMINn protocol, the binary execution tree (in a bottom-up fashion) to
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Algorithm 12 SMINn([d1], . . . , [dn])→ [dmin]
Require: P1 has ([d1], . . . , [dn]); P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). [d′i]← [di], for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(b). num← n
2: P1 and P2, for i = 1 to dlog2 ne do:




• if i = 1 then:
– [d′2j−1]← SMIN([d′2j−1], [d′2j ])
– [d′2j ]← 0
else





3: P1 sets [dmin] to [d
′
1]
compute [min(d1, . . . , d6)] is as shown in Figure 6.1. Note that, [d
′
i] is initially set to
[di], for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. 
6.4.6. Secure Bit-OR (SBOR). P1 holds (Epk(o1), Epk(o2)) and P2 holds
sk, where o1 and o2 are two bits not known to both parties. The goal of the SBOR
protocol is to securely compute Epk(o1 ∨ o2). At the end of this protocol, only P1
knows Epk(o1∨o2). During this process, no information related to o1 and o2 is revealed
to P1 and P2. Using SM, P1 and P2 compute Epk(o1 ∨ o2) as follows:
• P1 with input (Epk(o1), Epk(o2)) and P2 with sk involve in the SM protocol. At
the end of this step, the output Epk(o1 ∗ o2) is known only to P1. Note that,
since o1 and o2 are bits, Epk(o1 ∗ o2) = Epk(o1 ∧ o2).
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Figure 6.1: Binary execution tree for n = 6 based on the SMINn protocol
• Epk(o1 ∨ o2) = Epk(o1 + o2) ∗ Epk(o1 ∧ o2)N−1.
In general, for any given two bits o1 and o2, the property o1 ∨ o2 = o1 + o2 − o1 ∧ o2
always holds.
6.5. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF BASIC PRIMITIVES UNDER THE
SEMI-HONEST MODEL
First of all, it is worth pointing out that the outputs in the above mentioned
protocols are always in encrypted format, and are known only to P1. In addition, all
the intermediate results revealed to P2 are either random or pseudo-random. Note
that, the SBD protocol proposed in [100] is secure under the semi-honest model.
Since the proposed SMIN protocol (which is used as a sub-routine in SMINn)
is more complex than other protocols mentioned above, this work provides its security
proof rather than providing proofs for each protocol. Therefore, only a formal security
proof for the SMIN protocol is included in this work based on the standard simulation
argument [50]. Nevertheless, similar proof strategies can be used to show that other
protocols are secure under the semi-honest model. Informally speaking, this work
claims that all the intermediate results seen by P1 and P2 in the mentioned protocols
are either random or pseudo-random.
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Proof of Security for SMIN: As mentioned in Section 2, to formally prove
that SMIN is secure [50] under the semi-honest model, one need to show that the
simulated execution image of SMIN is computationally indistinguishable from the
actual execution image of SMIN. An execution image generally includes the messages
exchanged and the information computed from these messages. Therefore, according
to Algorithm 11, let the execution image of P2 be denoted by ΠP2(SMIN), where
ΠP2(SMIN) = {〈Γ′i, µi + rˆi mod N〉, 〈L′i, α〉 | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
Observe that µi+ rˆi mod N is derived upon decrypting Γ
′
i, where the modulo operator
is implicit in the decryption function. Also, P2 receives L
′ from P1 and let α denote the
(oblivious) comparison result computed from L′. Without loss of generality, suppose




ΠSP2(SMIN) = {〈s′1,i, s′2,i〉, 〈s′3,i, α′〉 | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
Here s′1,i and s
′
3,i are randomly generated from ZN2 , and s
′
2,i is randomly generated
from ZN . In addition, α
′ is a random bit. Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption
scheme with resulting ciphertext size less than N2, Γ′i and L
′
i are computationally
indistinguishable from s′1,i and s
′
3,i, respectively. Also, as rˆi is randomly generated,
µi + rˆi mod N is computationally indistinguishable from s
′
2,i. Furthermore, because
the functionality is randomly chosen by P1 (at step 1(a) of Algorithm 11), α is either
0 or 1 with equal probability. Thus, α is computationally indistinguishable from
α′. Combining all these results together, this work concludes that ΠP2(SMIN) is
computationally indistinguishable from ΠSP2(SMIN). This implies that during the
execution of SMIN, P2 does not learn any information regarding u, v and the actual
comparison result. Intuitively speaking, the information P2 has during an execution
of SMIN is either random or pseudo-random, so this information does not disclose
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anything regarding u and v. Additionally, as F is known only to P1, the actual
comparison result is oblivious to P2.
On the other hand, the execution image of P1, denoted by ΠP1(SMIN), can be
given by
ΠP1(SMIN) = {M ′i , Epk(α) | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
Here M ′i is an encrypted value, which is random in ZN2 , received from P2 (at step




ΠSP1(SMIN) = {s′4,i, b | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
Both s′4,i and b are randomly generated from ZN2 . Since Epk is a semantically secure
encryption scheme with resulting ciphertext size less than N2, M ′i and Epk(α) are
computationally indistinguishable from s4,i and b. Therefore, ΠP1(SMIN) is compu-
tationally indistinguishable from ΠSP1(SMIN). This implies that P1 cannot learn any
information regarding u, v and the comparison result during the execution of SMIN.
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the proposed SMIN protocol is
secure under the semi-honest model. In a similar way, one can formally prove that all
the protocols given in the previous section are secure under the semi-honest model.
Hence, in the rest of this section, assume that the basic primitives presented in Section
6.4 are secure under the semi-honest model.
6.6. THE PROPOSED SkNN PROTOCOLS
This sub-section first presents a basic SkNN protocol and demonstrates why
such a simple solution is not secure. Then, it discusses the second approach, a fully
secure kNN protocol. Both protocols are constructed using the security primitives
discussed in the previous sub-section as building blocks.
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As mentioned earlier, this work assumes the existence of two non-colluding
semi-honest cloud service providers C1 and C2 which together form a federated cloud.
Also, assume that user profile vectors were encrypted by individual users (using the
public key of C2) and sent to C1. Now the goal of SkNN is to recommend k potential
friends to the target user Bob using k-nearest neighbors technique. For this purpose,
assume C1 selects a random set of n user profiles denoted by T = {t1, . . . , tn}. Let the
encrypted user profiles of T be denoted by Epk(T ). Also, assume that all attribute
values and their Euclidean distances lie in [0, 2l). Note that the secret key sk is known
only to C2.
The proposed SkNN protocols retrieve the top k user profiles that are closest
to the Bob’s query Q in an efficient and secure manner. At a high level, C1 and C2
involve in a set of sub-protocols to securely retrieve (in encrypted form) the set of k
profiles corresponding to the k-nearest neighbors of the input profile Q. At the end
of the proposed protocols, only Bob will receive the user IDs of k-nearest neighbors
to Q as the output.
6.6.1. The Basic Protocol. In the basic secure k-nearest neighbor query
protocol, denoted by SkNNb, the desirable properties are relaxed to produce an effi-
cient protocol (more details are given in the later part of this section).
The main steps involved in the SkNNb protocol are given in Algorithm 13.
Initially, C1 with private input (Epk(Q), Epk(ti)) and C2 with the secret key sk jointly
involve in the SSED protocol, where Epk(ti) = 〈Epk(ti,1), . . . , Epk(ti,m)〉, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The output of this step, denoted by Epk(di), is the encryption of squared Euclidean
distance between Q and ti, i.e., di = |Q− ti|2. As mentioned earlier, Epk(di) is known
only to C1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that computation of exact Euclidean distance between
encrypted vectors is hard to achieve as it involves square root. However, in the k-
nearest neighbor problem, it is sufficient to compare the squared Euclidean distances
as it preserves relative ordering. After this, C1 sends {〈1, Epk(d1)〉 , . . . , 〈n,Epk(dn)〉}
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Algorithm 13 SkNNb(Epk(T ), Epk(Q))→ 〈ID(t′1), . . . , ID(t′k)〉
Require: C1 has Epk(T ) and Epk(Q); C2 has sk
1: C1 and C2:
(a). for i = 1 to n do:
• Epk(di)← SSED(Epk(Q), Epk(ti))
(b). C1 sends {〈1, Epk(d1)〉 , . . . , 〈n,Epk(dn)〉} to C2
2: C2:
(a). Receive {〈1, Epk(d1)〉 , . . . , 〈n,Epk(dn)〉} from C1
(b). di ← Dsk(Epk(di)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(c). Generate δ ← 〈i1, . . . , ik〉, such that 〈di1 , . . . , dik〉 are the top k smallest
distances among 〈d1, . . . , dn〉
(d). Send δ to C1
3: C1:
(a). Receive δ from C2
(b). ID(t′j)← ID(tij), for 1 ≤ j ≤ k
(c). Send 〈ID(t′1), . . . , ID(t′k)〉 to Bob
to C2, where entry 〈i, Epk(di)〉 correspond to data record ti, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Upon
receiving 〈1, Epk(d1)〉 , . . . , 〈n,Epk(dn)〉, C2 decrypts the encrypted distance in each
entry to get di = Dsk(Epk(di)). Then, C2 generates an index list δ = 〈i1, . . . , ik〉 such
that 〈di1 , . . . dik〉 are the top k smallest distances among 〈d1, . . . , dn〉. After this, C2
sends δ to C1. Upon receiving δ, C1 simply sets ID(t
′
j) to ID(tij), for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and
recommends 〈ID(t′1), . . . , ID(t′1)〉 as top k potential friends to Bob.
6.6.2. Fully Secure kNN Protocol. The above-mentioned SkNNb proto-
col reveals the data access patterns to C1 and C2. That is, for any given Q, C1 and
C2 know which data records correspond to the k-nearest neighbors of Q. Also, it
reveals di values to C2 and top k profile IDs to C1. However, leakage of such infor-
mation may not be acceptable. Along this direction, a fully secure protocol, denoted
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by SkNNm (where m stands for maximally secure), is proposed here to retrieve the
k-nearest neighbors of Q. The proposed SkNNm protocol preserves all the desirable
properties of a secure kNN protocol as mentioned in the Introduction.
The main steps involved in the proposed SkNNm protocol are as shown in
Algorithm 14. Initially, C1 with private input (Epk(Q), Epk(ti)) and C2 with the
secret key sk jointly involve in the SSED protocol. The output of this step is
Epk(di) = Epk(|Q − ti|2) which will be known only to C1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then,
C1 with input Epk(di) and C2 with sk securely compute the encryptions of the
individual bits of di using the SBD protocol. Note that the output of this step
[di] = 〈Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)〉 is known only to C1, where di,1 and di,l are the most
and least significant bits of di respectively. Note that 0 ≤ di < 2l, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
After this, C1 and C2 compute the top k (in encrypted form) closest pro-
files that are closest to Q in an iterative manner. More specifically, they compute
Epk(ID(t
′
1)) in the first iteration, Epk(ID(t
′
2)) in the second iteration, and so on. Here
t′s denotes the s
th nearest neighbor to Q, for 1 ≤ s ≤ k. At the end of k iterations,
only C1 knows 〈Epk(ID(t′1)), . . . , Epk(ID(t′k))〉. To start with, in the first iteration,
C1 and C2 jointly compute the encryptions of the individual bits of the minimum
value among d1, . . . , dn using SMINn. That is, C1 with input 〈[d1], . . . , [dn]〉 and C2
compute [dmin], where dmin is the minimum value among d1, . . . , dn. The output [dmin]
is known only to C1. Now, C1 performs the following operations locally:






= Epk(dmin,1 ∗ 2l−1 + · · ·+ dmin,l)
where dmin,1 and dmin,l are the most and least significant bits of dmin respectively.
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Algorithm 14 SkNNm(Epk(T ), Epk(Q))→ 〈ID(t′1), . . . , ID(t′k)〉
Require: C1 has (Epk(T ), Epk(Q)) and pi; C2 has sk
1: C1 and C2: Epk(di)← SSED(Epk(Q), Epk(ti)) and [di]← SBD(Epk(di)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2: for s = 1 to k do:











• for i = 1 to n do:
– τi ← Epk(dmin) ∗ Epk(di)N−1
– τ ′i ← τ rii , where ri ∈R ZN
• β ← pi(τ ′); send β to C2
(c). C2:
• β′i ← Dsk(βi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• Compute U , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
– if β′i = 0 then Ui = Epk(1)
– else Ui = Epk(0)
• Send U to C1
(d). C1:






• γs ← Epk(ID(t′s)) ∗ Epk(rs), where rs ∈R ZN
• Send γs to C2 and rs to Bob
(e). C1 and C2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• Epk(di,γ)← SBOR(Vi, Epk(di,γ)), for 1 ≤ γ ≤ l
3: C2:
(a). for 1 ≤ s ≤ k do:
• γ′s ← Dsk(γs); send γ′s to Bob
4: Bob:
(a). for 1 ≤ s ≤ k do:
• Receive rs from C1 and γ′s from C2
• ID(t′s)← γ′s − rs mod N
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• Compute the encryption of difference between dmin and each di. That is, C1
computes τi = Epk(dmin) ∗ Epk(di)N−1 = Epk(dmin − di), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Randomize τi to get τ ′i = τ rii = Epk(ri ∗ (dmin − di)), where ri is a random
number in ZN . Note that τ
′
i is an encryption of either 0 or a random number,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also, permute τ ′ using a random permutation function pi (known
only to C1) to get β = pi(τ
′) and send it to C2.
Upon receiving β, C2 decrypts it component-wise to get β
′
i = Dsk(βi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
After this, he/she computes an encrypted vector U of length n such that Ui = Epk(1)
if β′i = 0, and Epk(0) otherwise. This work assumes that exactly one of the entries
in β equals to zero and rest of them are random. This further implies that exactly
one of the entries in U is an encryption of 1 and rest of them are encryptions of 0’s.
However, if β′ has more than one 0’s, then C2 can randomly pick one of those indexes
and assign Epk(1) to the corresponding index of U and Epk(0) to the rest. Then,
C2 sends U to C1. After receiving U , C1 performs inverse permutation on it to get
V = pi−1(U). Note that exactly one of the entry in V is Epk(1) and the remaining
are encryption of 0’s. In addition, if Vi = Epk(1), then ti is the closest profile vector
to Q. However, C1 and C2 do not know which entry in V corresponds to Epk(1).
Now C1 computes Epk(ID(t
′
1)) locally, the encryption of the user ID of the
closest profile to Q, and updates the distance vectors as follows:
• Compute V ′i ← V ID(ti)i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. After this, by using homomorphic







• It is important to note that the first nearest profile to Q should be obliviously
excluded from further computations. However, since C1 does not know the
profile corresponding to Epk(ID(t
′
1)), one need to obliviously eliminate the pos-
sibility of choosing this profile again in next iterations. For this, C1 obliviously
updates the distance corresponding to Epk(t
′
1) to the maximum value, i.e., 2
l−1.
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More specifically, C1 updates the distance vectors with the help of C2 using the
SBOR protocol as below, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ γ ≤ l.
Epk(di,γ) = SBOR(Vi, Epk(di,γ))
Note that when Vi = Epk(1), the corresponding distance vector di is set to the
maximum value. That is, under this case, [di] = 〈Epk(1), . . . , Epk(1)〉. However,
when Vi = Epk(0), the OR operation has no affect on di.
The above process is repeated until k iterations, and in each iteration [di] correspond-
ing to the current chosen profile is set to the maximum value. However, since C1 does
not know which [di] is updated, he/she has to re-compute Epk(di) in each iteration
using the corresponding [di], for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In iteration s, Epk(ID(t′s)) is known only
to C1.
At the end of the iterative step (i.e., step 2 of Algorithm 14), only C1 has
〈Epk(ID(t′1)), . . . , Epk(ID(t′k))〉 - the list of encrypted user IDs of k-nearest neighbors
to the input query profile Q. Then C1 proceeds as follows:
• Randomize the encrypted user IDs. More specifically, C1 computes Epk(γs) =
Epk(ID(t
′
s)) ∗Epk(rs), for 1 ≤ s ≤ k. Here rs is a random number in ZN known
only to C1. Send γs to C2 and rs to Bob, for 1 ≤ s ≤ k.
Upon receiving γs, C2 decrypts it to get γ
′
s = Dsk(γs) and sends it to Bob, for
1 ≤ s ≤ k. Note that, due to randomization by C1, decryption operation on γs
always yields a random number in ZN .
Finally, upon receiving rs from C1 and γ
′
s from C2, Bob computes the user ID
of sth potential friend as ID(t′s) = γ
′
s − rs mod N , for 1 ≤ s ≤ k.
6.6.3. Security Analysis. First, due to the encryption of profile vectors
and by semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem, user’s profile data is protected
from C1 and C2 in both protocols.
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In the SkNNb protocol, the decryption operations at step 2(b) of Algorithm
13 reveal di values to C2. In addition, since C2 generates the top k index list (at step
2(c) of Algorithm 13) and sends it to C1, the data access patterns are revealed to
C1 and C2. In addition, the top k user IDs are revealed to C1. Therefore, the basic
SkNNb protocol is secure under the assumption that di values can be revealed to C2,
output can be revealed to C1, and data access patterns can be revealed to C1 and C2.
On the other hand, the security analysis of SkNNm is as follows. At step 1 of
Algorithm 14, the outputs of SSED and SBD are in encrypted format, and are known
only to C1. In addition, all the intermediate results decrypted by C2 in SSED are
uniformly random in ZN . Also, as mentioned in [100], the SBD protocol is secure.
Thus, no information is revealed during step 1 of Algorithm 14. In each iteration,
the output of SMINn is known only to C1 and no information is revealed to C2. Also,
C1 and C2 do not know which profile belongs to current global minimum. Thus,
data access patterns are protected from both C1 and C2. At step 2(c) of Algorithm
14, a component-wise decryption of β reveals the tuples that satisfy the current
global minimum distance to C2. However, due to permutation by C1, C2 cannot
trace back to the corresponding data profiles. Also, note that decryption of β gives
either encryptions of 0’s or random numbers in ZN . Similarly, since U is an encrypted
vector, C1 cannot know which tuple corresponds to current global minimum distance.
Thus, data access patterns are further protected at this step from C1. In addition,
the update process at step 2(e) of Algorithm 14 does not leak any information to C1
and C2. In summary, C1 and C2 do not know which data profiles correspond to the
output set 〈t′1, . . . , t′k〉. Also, unlike SkNNb, it is worth pointing out that the output
of SkNNm is revealed only to Bob.
Based on the above discussions, it is clear that the proposed SkNNm protocol
protects the confidentiality of the data and hides the data access patterns from both
C1 and C2.
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6.6.4. Complexity Analysis. The computation complexity of SkNNb is
bounded by O(n ∗ m + k) encryptions, decryptions and exponentiations. In prac-
tice k  n ∗ m; therefore, the computation complexity of SkNNb is bounded by
O(n∗m) encryptions and exponentiations (assuming that encryption and decryption
operations under Paillier cryptosystem take similar amount of time).
On the other hand, the computation complexity of SkNNm is bounded by
O(n) instantiations of SBD and SSED, O(k) instantiations of SMINn, and O(n∗k∗ l)
instantiations of SBOR. Note that the computation complexity of the SBD protocol
proposed in [100] is bounded by O(l) encryptions and O(l) exponentiations. Also,
the computation complexity of SSED is bounded by O(m) encryptions and O(m)
exponentiations. In addition, the computation complexity of SMINn is bounded by
O(l∗n∗ log2 n) encryptions and O(l∗n∗ log2 n) exponentiations. Since SBOR utilizes
SM as a sub-routine, the computation cost of SBOR is bounded by (small) constant
number of encryptions and exponentiations. Based on the above analysis, the total
computation complexity of the SkNNm protocol is bounded by O(n ∗ (l+m+ k ∗ l ∗
log2 n)) encryptions and exponentiations.
6.7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This sub-section discusses the performances of the proposed protocols in detail
under different parameter settings. By using Paillier cryptosystem [55], the proposed
protocols were implemented in C. Various experiments were conducted on a Linux
machine with an Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM CPU 3.07 GHz processor and 12GB
RAM running Ubuntu 10.04 LTS.
Since it is difficult to control the parameters in a real dataset, synthetic
datasets are randomly generated depending on the parameter values in considera-
tion. Using these synthetic datasets one can perform a more elaborated analysis on
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the computation costs of the proposed protocols under different parameter settings.
The datasets were encrypted attribute-wise, using the Paillier encryption whose key
size is varied in the experiments, and the encrypted data were stored on the above ma-
chine. Then, a random query was chosen and executed over the encrypted data based
on the protocols protocols. For the rest of this section, the performance of Bob is not
discussed as he will not participate in any computations. Instead, the evaluations are
based on the performance of federated cloud in SkNNb and SkNNm separately. In ad-
dition, the computation costs of the two protocols are compared. In the experiments,
the Paillier encryption key size K is set to either 512 or 1024 bits.
6.7.1. Performance of SkNNb. This sub-section analyzes the computation
costs of SkNNb by varying the number of profiles (n), number of attributes in a profile
(m), number of nearest neighbors (k), and encryption key size (K). The results are
as shown in Figure 6.2. Note that the SkNNb protocol is independent of the domain
size of attributes (l).
First, by fixing k = 5 and K = 512, the computation costs of SkNNb are
evaluated for varying n and m. As shown in Figure 6.2(a), the computation costs of
SkNNb grows linearly with n and m. For example, when m = 6, the computation
time of SkNNb increases from 44.08 to 87.91 seconds when n is varied from 2000 to
4000. A similar trend is observed for K = 1024 as shown in Figure 6.2(b). For any
fixed parameters, the observation is that the computation time of SkNNb increases
almost by a factor of 7 when K is doubled.
Next, by fixing m = 6 and n = 2000, the running times of SkNNb for varying
k and K are computed. The results are shown in Figure 6.2(c). Irrespective of K, the
computation time of SkNNb does not change much with varying k. This is because
most of the cost in SkNNb comes from the SSED protocol which is independent of
k. E.g., when K = 512 bits, the computation time of SkNNb changes from 44.08 to
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Figure 6.2: Time complexities of SkNNb and SkNNm for varying values of n, m, l, k
and encryption key size K
clear that the running time of SkNNb mainly depends on (or grows linearly with) n
and m which further justifies the complexity analysis in Section 6.6.4.
6.7.2. Performance of SkNNm. The computation costs of SkNNm for vary-
ing values of k, l and K are evaluated. Throughout this sub-section, the values
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of m and n are fixed to 6 and 2000, respectively. However, the running time of
SkNNm grows almost linearly with n and m.
For K = 512 bits, the computation costs of SkNNm for varying k and l are
as shown in Figure 6.2(d). Following from Figure 6.2(d), for l = 6, the running
time of SkNNm varies from 11.93 to 55.65 minutes when k is changed from 5 to 25
respectively. Also, for l = 12, the running time of SkNNm varies from 20.68 to 97.8
minutes when k is changed from 5 to 25 respectively. In either case, the cost of
SkNNm grows almost linearly with k and l.
A similar trend is observed for K = 1024 as shown in Figure 6.2(e). In
particular, for any given fixed parameters, the computation cost of SkNNm increases
by almost a factor of 7 when K is doubled. For example, when k = 10, SkNNm took
22.85 and 157.17 minutes to generate the 10 nearest neighbors of Q under K = 512
and 1024 bits respectively. Furthermore, when k = 5, the observation is that around
69.7% of cost in SkNNm is accounted due to SMINn which is initiated k times in
SkNNm (once in each iteration). Also, the cost incurred due to SMINn increases from
69.7% to at least 75% when k is increased from 5 to 25.
In addition, by fixing n = 2000,m = 6, l = 6 and K = 512, the running times
of both protocols are compared for varying values of k. As shown in Figure 6.2(f),
the running time of SkNNb remains to be constant at 0.73 minutes since it is almost
independent of k. However, the running time of SkNNm changes from 11.93 to 55.65
minutes as the value of k increases from 5 to 25.
Based on the above results, it is clear that the computation costs of SkNNm are
significantly higher than that of SkNNb. However, SkNNm is more secure than
SkNNb; therefore, the two protocols act as a trade-off between security and effi-
ciency. Also, it is important to note that user’s computation cost is mainly due
to the encryption of his/her profile vector during outsourcing. As an example, for
m = 6, Bob’s computation costs are 4 and 17 milliseconds when K is 512 and 1024
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bits respectively. In the proposed protocols, it is worth pointing out that users do
not involve in any computations; therefore, they are very efficient from the end-user’s
perspective.
6.7.3. Towards Performance Improvement. At first, it seems that the
proposed protocols are costly and may not scale well for large values of n. How-
ever, in both protocols, the computations involved on each profile are independent of
others. Therefore, one can parallelize the operations on profile vectors for efficiency
purpose. To further justify this claim, this work implemented a parallel version of the
SkNNb protocol using OpenMP programming and compared its computation costs
with its serial version. As mentioned earlier, the machine used in this experiments
has 6 cores which can be used to perform parallel operations on 6 threads. For
m = 6, k = 5 and K = 512 bits, the comparison results are shown in Figure 6.3.
The observation is that the parallel version of SkNNb is roughly 6 times more effi-
cient than its serial version. This is because of the fact that the parallel version can
execute operations on 6 data records at a time (i.e., on 6 threads in parallel). E.g.,
when n = 10000, the running times of parallel and serial versions of SkNNb are 40
and 215.59 seconds respectively.
Similar efficiency gains can be achieved by parallelizing the operations in
SkNNm. Based on the above discussions, especially in a cloud computing environment
where high performance parallel processing can be easily achieved, this work claims
that the scalability issue of the proposed protocols can be eliminated or mitigated.
In addition, using the existing map-reduce techniques, one can drastically improve
the performance further by executing parallel operations on multiple nodes.
Following from the above empirical analysis, it is clear that SMINn is the
most costly sub-routine utilized in SkNNm. Therefore, by improving the efficiency of
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Figure 6.3: Parallel vs. serial versions of SkNNb for m = 6, k = 5 and K = 512
6.8. CONCLUSION
k-nearest neighbors is one of the commonly used query in many data mining
applications such as detection of fraud by credit card companies and prediction of
tumor cells levels in blood. With the recent growth of cloud computing as a new
IT paradigm, data owners are more interested to outsource their databases as well
as DBMS functionalities to the cloud. Under an outsourced social networking envi-
ronment, where encrypted users’ profile data are stored in the cloud, secure query
processing over encrypted data becomes challenging. In the literature, various secure
k-nearest neighbor (SkNN) techniques have been proposed. However, the existing
SkNN techniques over encrypted data are not secure.
Along this direction, two novel SkNN protocols over encrypted data in the
cloud are proposed. The first protocol, which acts as a basic solution, leaks some
information to the cloud. On the other hand, the second protocol is fully secure,
that is, it protects the confidentiality of the data and also hides the data access
patterns. However, the second protocol is more expensive compared to the basic
protocol. Also, this work evaluated the performance of both protocols under different
parameter settings. As a future work, it will be interesting to investigate and extend
this research to other complex conjuctive queries over encrypted data.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH
The popularity of online social networks (OSNs) is on a constant rise due to
various advantages such as online communication and sharing information of interest
among friends. In general, users often wish to make new friends; therefore, improving
the chances of expanding their social connections as well as getting information from a
broader range of friends. Friend recommendation is a well-known application in many
OSNs and has been studied extensively in the recent past. However, with the grow-
ing concerns about user privacy, there is a strong need to develop privacy-preserving
friend recommendation methods for social networks. Therefore, this document pro-
posed a set of private friend recommendation protocols as a way to facilitate the friend
recommendation process possible even when the user’s information in consideration
is kept as private.
The proposed protocol in Section 3 computes the recommendation scores of
all users within a radius of h from the target user A by using the similarity metric
proposed in [14] as a baseline. More specifically, the proposed protocol generates the
(scaled) recommendation scores along with the corresponding user IDs in such a way
that the relative ordering among the users in the TOP-K list of recommended users
is preserved (i.e., same accuracy as in [14]). In addition, this work demonstrated a
new security issue in the current online social networks due to the inherent message
flow information between different entities. To mitigate this issue or to provide bet-
ter security, this work also proposed an extended version of the proposed protocol
using randomization technique. Furthermore, a detailed empirical analysis based on
different parameter settings were provided.
The proposed protocols in Section 4 facilitate users in a group G to get friend
recommendations based on the social network structure and the users’ social tags. For
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a target user ui, the proposed protocols compute the social closeness scores between
ui and each user in the subset Gi ⊂ G in a privacy-preserving manner by utilizing an
ontology tree T constructed by the domain expert such as the network administrator.
The proposed protocols in Section 5 recommend new friends to a given target
user A using the common neighbors proximity measure under the assumption that
users’ friend lists are private. The first protocol PPFRh is based on an additive homo-
morphic encryption scheme, and its accuracy is essentially based on the parameters
of universal hash function ha,b. Whereas the second protocol PPFRsp utilizes the
concept of protecting the source privacy through randomizing the message passing
path and also recommends friends accurately. The PPFRsp protocol is more efficient
than the PPFRh protocol. The proposed PPFR protocols act as a trade-off among
security, efficiency and accuracy.
The proposed protocols in Section 6 generate friend recommendations to a
given target user assuming an outsourced social networking environment, where users’
profile data are encrypted and stored in the cloud. Both protocols are constructed
based on the k-nearest neighbor technique. That is, the proposed protocols compute
k-nearest profiles (in encrypted form) to a given target profile and obliviously recom-
mend the corresponding candidates as top k potential friends to the target user. The
experimental results showed that the SkNNb protocol is significantly more efficient
than SkNNm. However, SkNNm provides better security than SkNNb.
The proposed protocols in Sections 3 to 5 assume that either users’ friend lists,
social tags, or messages exchanged with other users of an online social network (OSN)
as private information. As a future work, it is also desirable to develop protocols that
can recommend friends based on other details such as education and employment in
a privacy-preserving manner. Also, the proposed protocols in Section 4 assume that
the network administrator builds the ontology tree T based on the domain knowledge
of a particular group. However, extending it to multiple groups may not seem to be
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feasible at this point of time; therefore, it can be treated as an interesting direction
for future research.
In the literature, many friend recommendation protocols have been proposed
based on different similarity metrics. However, only recently, researchers have focused
on constructing hybrid friend recommendation protocols by taking both network
structure as well as users’ profile contents into consideration. Hence, a possible
extension to this work is to explore alternative ways for developing hybrid privacy-
preserving friend recommendation methods by combining different scoring functions.
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